





























A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree of 
 




at Massey University 











This research investigates the determinants and consequence of cost stickiness using data of 
publicly listed U.S. firms. Understanding the determinants of cost stickiness and its implications 
is extremely crucial, since it affects firms’ profitability, consequently, shareholders’ wealth. 
Moreover, cost management has even wider repercussions for both debt and equity investors in 
the areas of risk assessment and the trust of customers, employees, and other stakeholders in 
the community. Therefore, this study is organised into three different research essays: (i) 
financial constraint and cost stickiness; (ii) trade credit and cost stickiness; and (iii) cost 
stickiness and firm value.  
Essay One investigates the association between financial constraints and cost stickiness. 
Using a large U.S. sample from 1976 to 2016, I find that financially constrained firms exhibit 
less cost stickiness. I document that such low-cost stickiness supports both “good” and “bad” 
arguments depending on the managerial motivation, namely: earnings management incentives, 
agency problem and value-creating potential of SG&A costs. I also investigate whether the 
association between financial constraints and cost stickiness varies across the economic cycle. 
I find that low cost stickiness is observed during both economic expansion and economic 
contraction periods, although it is more pronounced during contraction. As resources drive the 
cost of a business, and financial constraints affect resource availability, studying cost behaviour 
of constrained firms makes a valuable contribution to the existing cost stickiness literature.  
In Essay Two, I examine the relation between trade credit and cost stickiness and further 
investigate the moderating effects of agency problem, product market competition, and 
customer concentration. I find that firms using high levels of trade credit exhibit lower cost 
stickiness and this is prevalent in the high agency problem sub-sample. In addition, in a non-
competitive market, where the agency problem arises owing to lack of competition, trade credit 
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plays an external monitoring role by attenuating cost stickiness. However, high customer 
concentration curtails this monitoring ability of trade credit providers.  
Finally, in Essay Three, I investigate the association between cost stickiness and firm 
value, and examine whether the association, if any, is mediated by cost of equity capital and 
cash flows. Using a large sample of U.S. data, I find a robust negative relationship between cost 
stickiness and firm value. I then explore whether resource adjustment, managerial expectations, 
and agency theories of cost stickiness affect the negative relation, and find some support for the 
agency view. Furthermore, I find evidence that the detrimental impact of cost stickiness on firm 
value is mediated partially through the cost of equity and cash flow channels. I enrich the cost 
management literature by integrating cost asymmetry with corporate finance.  
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1.1 Motivations for the Research  
Traditional cost behaviour identifies all costs as either fixed or variable with respect to 
concurrent sales, or some other cost driver (e.g. Anderson et al., 2003; Banker & Byzalov, 
2014). However, in reality, the relation between cost and cost driver is more complex (Noreen, 
1991), in that some costs rise more with increases in activity, than they decrease with 
proportionate decreases in activity levels (Cooper & Kaplan, 1998): a phenomenon known as 
‘cost stickiness’. For example, Anderson et al. (2003) find that selling, general, and 
administrative (SG&A) costs increase by 0.55% for each 1% increase in sales; however, SG&A 
costs decrease by only 0.35% for each 1% decrease in sales. In this thesis I examine the 
determinants and consequences of cost stickiness. 
A plethora of academic research has documented evidence of cost stickiness in the U.S. 
and in international contexts. Some of the firm-level determinants of stickiness include prior 
activity change (Banker & Byzalov, 2014), managerial incentives (e.g. Dierynck et al., 2012; 
Kama & Weiss, 2013; Banker & Byzalov, 2014), organizational capital (Venieris et al., 2015), 
and investment in corporate social responsibile activities (Habib & Hasan, 2019). All these 
studies on the drivers of asymmetric cost behaviour are grounded on three theories, namely, 
resource adjustment theory, managerial expectation theory, and agency theory (Hartlieb et al., 
2020; Banker et al., 2018).  
Resource adjustment theory is premised on the notion that many costs arise from 
managers’ deliberate resource commitment decisions. Once committed, it is not easy to scale 
back resources without incurring some adjustment costs: defined as “economic sacrifices, 
social, contracting or psychological costs, which emerge during the resource-adjustment 
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process” (Venieris et al., 2015, p. 55). Thus, managers take the decision based on cost-benefit 
analysis. For instance, the labour adjustment cost has been found to induce stickiness (Banker 
et al., 2013; Golden et al., 2020). Managers are likely to enter into contract for resources, which 
are costly to renegotiate; thus, when demand falls, managers are bound to retain those slack 
resources, because discarding them would incur obligatory contractual costs, such as severance 
payments (Calleja et al., 2006). Thereby, owing to high adjustment costs, managers will reduce 
costs to a lesser extent when activity decreases than they will expand costs when activity 
increases, therefore, generating cost stickiness.   
Managerial expectation theory posits that when managers are optimistic (pessimistic) 
about future demand, they are likely to retain (reduce) slack resources in the event of declining 
demand (Banker & Byzalov, 2014; Banker et al., 2014). If the resource adjustment cost is high 
and the manager expects that sales will increase in future it would be unwise and expensive to 
dispose slack resources. However, if the resource adjustment cost is low but slack resource 
levels are high, managers’ expectation of future demand should have no impact on cost 
stickiness (Chen et al., 2019a).     
Finally, agency theory suggests that self-serving managers tend to engage in empire 
building by retaining unutilized resources in order to grow the firm beyond its optimal size 
(Chen et al., 2012; Hope & Thomas, 2008; Jensen, 1986; Masulis et al., 2007; Stulz, 1990). 
Managers’ decisions to retain unutilized resources are driven by personal motives instead of 
economic rationales (Hartlieb et al., 2020). Such self-serving managerial actions induce cost 
stickiness, as slack resources are retained when demand declines.  
“The relation of costs to sales is of crucial importance since it determines net profit, the 
maximization of which is the basic goal of organizations” (Brüggen & Zehnder, 2014, p. 170). 
Additionally, cost management has even wider repercussions for both debt and equity investors 
in the areas of risk assessment and the trust of customers, employees (with respect to job 
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security) and other stakeholders in the community. Despite the significance of ‘availability of 
resources’ as a driver of cost management, very little research, as of yet, has investigated the 
extent to which firm-level financial constraints affect cost stickiness. This is surprising, since 
the availability of resources affects cost behaviour, and constrained firms naturally suffer from 
resource shortages. Thereby, for Essay One I choose cost stickiness as the appropriate lens for 
understanding the effects of financial constraints.  
I predict that costs would be less sticky for constrained firms, because managers of 
financially constrained firms should decrease slack resources to control costs, to maintain 
profitability, and to generate internal finance for investment or expansion of their business. 
When sales decrease, financially constrained firms suffer a relatively greater reduction in the 
present value of revenue. Consequently, they decrease costs by a higher amount (Cheng et al., 
2018); thus, exhibit less cost stickiness. Importantly, costs also do not increase with an increase 
in sales, because financially constrained firms encounter higher costs of capital from both equity 
and debt providers. This prediction supports the “efficiency” view of cost stickiness, which 
implies that firms will decrease unused resources for the right reasons i.e., for survival. On the 
other hand, retaining unutilised resources by managers of financially-constrained firms for 
‘empire building’ reasons, is a manifestation of “bad” cost stickiness, i.e., stickiness stemming 
from the wrong reasons (Banker et al., 2018). Examining whether cost is sticky or less sticky 
provides only a partial explanation; therefore, it is crucial to examine why the cost behaves in a 
certain way. Thus, I use three contextual settings to examine cost behaviour by financially-
constrained firms. These contexts are the earnings management context; the agency context; 
and the value-creating potential of SG&A costs context.  
In Essay Two I explore the association between trade credit and cost stickiness, and 
whether this association, if any, is moderated by agency problem, product market competition 
and customer concentration. Trade credit is the major source of external finance for many firms 
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around the globe (see, e.g. Abdulla et al., 2017; Afrifa et al., 2018; Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Maksimovic, 1999; Fabbri & Klapper, 2016; Wilson & Summers, 2002). Accounts payable, the 
major component of trade credit, comprises 25% of total liabilities, 35.36% of current liabilities 
and 9% of total sales in my sample of U.S. firms from 1977 to 2017. Suppliers are willing to 
provide trade credit because it offers them a comparative advantage over financial institutions 
in acquiring information (see, e.g., Ferrando & Mulier; 2013; Goto et al., 2015; Martínez‐Sola 
et al., 2013), evaluating the creditworthiness of buyers, and enforcing credit contracts (see, e.g. 
Burkart & Ellingsen, 2004; Fabbri & Menichini, 2010). However, by doing so, the suppliers 
put themselves at risk, because there is the possibility that the buyer might misuse resources, 
e.g., invest heavily in unproductive expenses including in cost of goods sold (COGS) and 
SG&A costs, thereby, increasing the default risk. This not only leads to significant losses for 
suppliers, but also increases their bankruptcy risks (Jacobson & Von Schedvin, 2015). Such 
concerns naturally motivate suppliers to be active monitors of resource usage by customers: a 
function that is facilitated by the holding of private information about their buyers.  
 According to Anderson et al. (2003) and Brüggen and Zehnder (2014), managers retain 
unused resources in order to avoid adjustment costs. However, agency theory dictates that cost 
stickiness results from the self-serving behaviour of managers, who are likely to engage in 
empire building by retaining unutilised resources in order to grow the firm beyond its optimal 
size (see, e.g. Chen et al., 2012; Hope & Thomas, 2008; Jensen, 1986; Masulis et al., 2007; 
Stulz, 1990). Prior studies find that managers’ empire building tendencies lead to cost 
stickiness, but the relation is weaker under strong corporate governance, implying that corporate 
governance can mitigate the agency problem (see, e.g. Chen et al., 2012). Prior literature on 
trade credit has provided evidence supporting the corporate governance role of trade credit (see, 
e.g. Cao et al., 2018; Fisman & Love, 2003; McMillan & Woodruff, 1999; Petersen & Rajan, 
1997). Thereby, I posit that, when sales decrease, trade credit will play a stronger monitoring 
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role by forcing buyers to cut slack resources in firms plagued with marked agency problem. 
Thus, I expect trade credit to lessen cost stickiness in firms with marked agency problem, when 
compared with their immaterial agency problem counterparts.  
Agency problem is more acute for firms operating in non-competitive industries, and 
existing evidence shows that market competition acts as an external governance mechanism 
that reduces agency problem (Giroud & Mueller, 2011; He, 2012) by disciplining managers and 
encouraging operational efficiency (Liu et al., 2017a). Thus, I predict that firms operating in 
non-competitive industries will benefit more from the monitoring role of trade credit in 
restraining manager’s opportunistic empire building behaviour. It is also intuitive to expect that 
customer size can influence the monitoring power exerted by suppliers on customers. Prior 
studies find that major customers exert bargaining power over suppliers by demanding lower 
prices and delayed payments (see, e.g. Bhattacharyya & Nain, 2011; Campello & Gao, 2017; 
Fee & Thomas, 2004; Murfin & Njoroge, 2014). In such a scenario, if suppliers enforced their 
monitoring role on customers, profits would reduce, and the volatility of suppliers’ earnings 
and cash flow would increase (see, e.g. Balakrishnan et al., 1996; Gosman & Kohlbeck, 2009; 
Huang et al., 2016; Piercy & Lane, 2006; Ravenscraft, 1983). Therefore, I would expect 
suppliers to play a more prominent monitoring role in the low customer concentration sub-
sample, because of their customer’s relatively weak bargaining power and high switching costs. 
While a plethora of studies have examined the determinants of cost stickiness (see 
Banker et al., 2018 for a comprehensive review), surprisingly little evidence exists on its 
implications. Weiss (2010, p. 1442), who documents a positive relationship between cost 
stickiness and the analyst forecast error argues that a firm with higher cost stickiness 
demonstrates greater decline in earnings because “……stickier costs result in a smaller cost 
adjustment when activity level declines and, therefore, lower cost savings [which] result in a 
greater decrease in earnings. This greater decrease in earnings when the activity levels fall 
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increases the variability of the earnings distribution, resulting in less accurate earnings 
predictions.”. Weiss (2010) also finds that firms with stickier costs have lower analyst coverage, 
and that investors rely less on such firms’ realized earnings because of their lower predictive 
power. Ciftci et al. (2016), reveal that analysts are unable to recognize and incorporate the 
‘sticky’ nature of costs in their forecasts: a feature that increases error in earnings prediction. 
In addition, cost stickiness has been found to increase credit risk. Firms encounter increased 
default and credit risk owing to higher earnings and asset volatility stemming from cost 
stickiness (Homburg et al., 2016). Similar to analysts, managers are also unable to incorporate 
asymmetric cost behaviour, as Ciftci and Salama (2018) show that cost stickiness leads to 
greater errors in management earnings forecasts. Thus, in Essay Three I examine the association 
between cost stickiness and firm value, and the mediating effect of cost of equity capital and 
cash flows on this relationship, if any. 
From resource adjustment and managerial expectation theory, I hypothesize that cost 
stickiness may not affect firm value adversely, as investors are likely to consider the downward 
resource adjustment costs (e.g., economic sacrifices, social, contracting or psychological costs) 
associated with disposing of slack resources when demand declines. From managerial 
expectation theory angle, when managers are optimistic (pessimistic) about future demand, then 
they are likely to retain (dispose) slack resources in the event of declining demand, to avoid 
future (current) adjustment costs (Venieris et al., 2015). Changes in managerial expectation, 
therefore, could affect the firm value differentially. However, agency theory perspective 
suggests that managers with empire-building tendencies are unlikely to reduce unutilised 






1.2 Findings of the Research  
Using a large sample consisting U.S. public listed firms, my overall findings suggest that 
financial constraint leads to less cost stickiness and, owing to the monitoring role of suppliers, 
trade credit lowers cost stickiness. From the implication perspective of cost stickiness, my 
evidence suggests that cost stickiness destroys firm value.     
Using three different measures of firm level financial constraints in Essay One, I 
document that financially constrained firms do, indeed, exhibit less cost stickiness, and such 
low cost stickiness is a manifestation of both “good” and “bad” cost stickiness. I further 
investigate whether the business cycle moderates low cost stickiness for constrained firms. I 
predict that costs would be less sticky for financially constrained firms during both expansion 
and contraction periods, although the effects should be more pronounced during the contraction 
phase. During expansion, most firms operate in a favourable business environment, owing to 
lower information asymmetry (Choe et al., 1993). Therefore, investors are likely to charge a 
higher cost for the constrained firms, and this leads to use of internal capital. Covas and Haan 
(2011) document the observation that internal financing is procyclical. During contractionary 
periods external investors have limited capital. Therefore, they are more selective in providing 
finance, consequently, external financing turns out be extremely expensive, or even 
unavailable, to constrained firms. My empirical evidence documents the existence of low 
stickiness for financially-constrained firms during both economic expansion and economic 
contraction periods.  
In Essay Two I use three different widely used measures of trade credit, and document 
that trade credit results in relatively low COGS and SG&A cost stickiness for all three measures 
of trade credit. I also find some evidence that trade credit-induced lower cost stickiness is 
prevalent in high agency problem sub-sample as compared to low agency problem sub-sample. 
This implies that trade credit restrains the empire building tendencies of managers in high 
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agency problem firms, by forcing them to dispose unutilized resources when sales decline. I 
also find that firms operating in non-competitive markets with more trade credit show low cost 
stickiness, as the magnitude of the coefficient on the interactive variable, trade credit and cost 
stickiness, is positive and statistically significant in the low, as opposed to the high, product 
market competition group. Finally, with respect to the moderating effects of customer 
concentration on the association between trade credit and cost stickiness, I find the coefficients 
on the interactive variable to be positive and significant for both low and high customer 
concentration groups.   
Finally, in Essay Three I document that operating cost stickiness reduces firm value. In 
terms of economic magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in cost stickiness decreases 
firm value by 2.44 percent relative to its mean. An additional test suggests that this detrimental 
relationship between cost stickiness and firm value exists owing to investor recognition of 
agency problem associated with retention of slack resources. Further, I find evidence that this 
negative relation between cost stickiness and firm value is partially mediated through both the 
cost of equity and the cash flow channels, as the direct effect of cost stickiness on firm value 
accounts for the bulk of the total effect. The negative relationship between cost stickiness and 
firm value also holds for two other cost components, namely, SG&A and COGS. 
 
1.3 Contributions & Implications of the Research  
In general, one of the studies contribute to the line of research that integrates management 
accounting (asymmetric cost behaviour) with financial accounting and corporate finance. 
Specifically, through Essay One I make the following contributions: first, it fills the void in the 
literature on how resource availability affects cost behaviour. Since costs are driven by 
resources, and resource availability depends on access to capital, studying the cost behaviour 
of constrained firms makes a valuable contribution to the existing cost asymmetry literature. 
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Second, it describes how financial constraint impacts SG&A costs behaviour, and how this 
relation persists during economic cycles. Third, it is one of the first studies to test the relation 
between financial constraints and cost behaviour in the context of “good” versus “bad” cost 
stickiness (Brüggen & Zehnder, 2014). 
 Essay Two, on the other hand, contributes firstly by reconfirming trade credit’s 
monitoring role from a cost management angle. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first 
study to examine the relation between trade credit and cost stickiness. Although a plethora of 
research has explored the determinants of trade credit (Seifert et al., 2013), very little research 
examines the monitoring role of trade credit (see, e.g. Cao et al., 2018; McMillan & Woodruff, 
1999). Therefore, the findings of this study contribute to both cost management and trade credit 
literatures. Secondly, besides documenting that firms using high levels of trade credit exhibit 
less cost stickiness, I further show that such behaviour is desirable, because it disciplines 
opportunistic managers. Thirdly, I contribute to the product-market competition and customer 
concentration literature by documenting that the trade-credit and cost behaviour relationship 
varies conditional on the characteristics of the market in which the firms operate, as well as on 
the suppliers’ incentives for monitoring the cost management approaches of their buyers. 
Finally, the presence of trade credit is likely to assure investors, and increase other 
stakeholders’ confidence, regarding the operational efficiency of firms, especially when the 
external governance system is weak. Therefore, firms can send positive signals to investors 
and other stakeholders through trade credit finance.  
 Essay Three makes a significant contribution to understanding how cost stickiness could 
explain firm value, because it is not clear ex-ante whether the findings documented by Weiss 
(2010) will mean that firms having more cost stickiness will have lower market value. Because 
costs are a core driver of firm profitability, consequently, firm value. Therefore, it is important 
to understand how cost stickiness affects firm value, since the maximization of firm value is 
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considered to be the primary objective of the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Weiss (2010) 
uses three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) surrounding the earnings announcement 
dates to proxy for market response to quarterly earnings announcements. However, such a short 
window may fail to capture managerial resource adjustment decisions. This is because 
companies make resource adjustment decisions throughout the year, and the chosen short 
window may not coincide with any significant resource adjustment decisions. Hence, taking a 
longer time span of one year could ensure that resource adjustment decisions during the entire 
year are incorporated into firm value; thereby, overcoming the limitations of the short window 
test to some extent.    
Understanding the implications of cost stickiness is important for managers as well as 
investors. Managers need to be aware of how their deliberate resource adjustment decisions 
could affect the overall financial health of the firm. Feedback from the market could enable 
them to be more efficient in managing resources. From the perspective of the investors, it is 
important that they understand the rationale behind retaining slack resources. A myopic view 
that fails to recognize the rationale for retaining resources: i.e., to minimize resource 
adjustment costs; might lead them to conclude erroneously that retention of unutilised 
resources is detrimental to firm value. Therefore, my study provides a timely contribution to 
the limited research on the implications of cost stickiness.  
 
1.4 Organization of the Research  
The remainder of the thesis proceeds as follows: Chapters two, three and four review the related 
literature, develop the hypotheses, discuss research methods and sample selection, with analysis 
of test results for essay one, two and three, respectively. Essay one is titled “Financial constraint 
and cost stickiness”, essay two is titled “Trade credit and cost stickiness” and the third essay is 
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titled “Cost stickiness and firm value”. Chapter five concludes the thesis with its implications 
























FINANCIAL CONSTRAINT AND COST STICKINESS (ESSAY ONE) 
 
This study investigates the association between financial constraints and cost stickiness. 
Anderson et al. (2003) document that SG&A costs are sticky i.e. costs rise more when sales 
increase, but decrease less when sales decrease. However, costs can be anti-sticky as well, 
implying that the rise in costs when sales increase is less than their fall when sales decrease 
(e.g. Weiss, 2010; Banker & Byzalov, 2014). Despite the significance of ‘availability of 
resources’ as a driver of cost management, very little research as of yet has investigated the 
extent to which firm-level financial constraints affect cost stickiness. This is surprising since 
availability and accessibility to finance impacts the availability of resources, and that in turn, 
impacts cost behaviour. 
Lamont et al. (2001) define financial constraints as frictions that prevent firms from 
funding their desired investments1. In a frictional environment, investment and growth depend 
largely on the availability of internal capital, as the cost of raising outside capital can be high 
relative to that of internally generated funds. This is particularly true for financially constrained 
firms that face severe agency and transaction costs in accessing external capital markets 
(Korajczyk & Levy, 2003). As constrained firms have to pay high interest rate on loans, they 
rely heavily on other sources of finance, e.g., trade credit and internal fund to finance 
continuation of their operation (Mulier et al., 2016). Consequently, constrained firms with 
attractive growth opportunities but without access to external financing may invest less into 
optimal value-increasing investment projects, resulting in lower future growth and firm value.  
 
1This study focuses on financial constraint, not financial distress. Senbet and Wang (2012) note that distressed 
firms are unable to keep the promises made to creditors. In other words, financial distress refers to the inability of 
a company to pay its financial obligations as they mature (Beaver et al., 2011). 
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Young and small firms are likely to be financially constrained because such firms suffer 
from high information asymmetry (Beck et al., 2006; Arslan et al., 2006; Hadlock & Pierce 
2010). Firms that pay dividend (Fazzari et al., 1988), have affiliation with business groups 
(Hoshi et al., 1991; Kato et al., 2002), and are politically connected (Poncet et al., 2010; Shen 
& Lin, 2016; Cull et al., 2015) are found to be financially unconstrained. Prior research 
documents a number of consequences of financial constraints, including increased earnings 
management (Kurt, 2017), high engagement in corrupt activities (Lopatta et al., 2017), and 
aggressive tax planning (Edwards et al., 2016; Law & Mills, 2015).  
 Firms incur costs even when firms are faced with financial constraints, because some of 
those costs are contractual, and failing to pay those could lead to bankruptcy (Chen et al., 
2019b). Therefore, it is not unlikely that financially constrained firms may retain slack 
resources even when sales decline: an action that leads to higher cost stickiness. However, from 
a resource adjustment cost perspective, I posit that financial constraints will result in lower cost 
stickiness for SG&A costs. When sales decrease, financially constrained firms suffer a 
relatively greater reduction in the present value of revenue, thereby, forcing them to cut back 
on unutilized resources. Importantly, costs do not increase with an increase in sales, because 
financially constrained firms encounter higher costs of capital from both equity and debt 
providers. Consequently, they decrease costs by a higher amount (Cheng et al., 2018), thus, 
exhibiting lower cost stickiness. Said differently, financially constrained firms may put less 
weight on future adjustment costs, and more weight on the costs of unused capacity, thus 
altering the trade-offs involved in their resource allocation decision.  
Cheng et al. (2018) document anti-sticky cost behaviour for a sample of Chinese private 
firms using a regional financial development index as a proxy for access to finance. However, 
my paper differs from the Cheng et al. (2018) paper in a number of important ways. Cheng et 
al. (2018) use a sample consisting of only small and private Chinese companies. These firms, 
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compared to listed firms, have access to the debt market only. Therefore, the findings of Cheng 
et al. (2018) are unlikely to be generalizable to U.S. listed firms, which have access to both debt 
and public equity markets, and are much larger in size. In addition, prior research show that in 
emerging market government plays a role in allocation of financial resources (Cull et al. 2015; 
Chen et al., 2017). Cheng et al. (2018) use regional financial development as a proxy for 
financial constraints. However, such a macroeconomic variable fails to incorporate firm-
specific idiosyncrasies that can affect the magnitude of financial constraints differentially. I 
overcome this problem by using firm-specific financial constraint measures. I also use three 
contextual settings, where the association between financial constraints and cost stickiness 
could become more, or less, pronounced.  
 
2.1 Literature Review & Hypotheses Development 
In the seminal paper of Anderson et al. (2003) on cost stickiness, the authors propose two 
theories underlying cost stickiness: adjustment cost theory and agency theory. The former relies 
on the notion that many costs, arise from managers’ deliberate resource commitment decisions. 
Once committed, it is not easy to scale back resources without incurring some kind of 
adjustment costs. Therefore, to the extent that managers recognize the trade-offs arising because 
of adjustment costs, they will reduce costs to a lesser extent when activity decreases than they 
will expand costs when activity increases and, thereby, generate cost stickiness. Agency theory-
based arguments for cost stickiness consider the self-serving behavior of managers, who are 
likely to engage in empire building by retaining unutilized resources in order to grow the firm 
beyond its optimal size (Chen et al., 2012; Hope & Thomas, 2008; Jensen, 1986; Masulis et al., 
2007; Stulz, 1990). Such actions induce cost stickiness, as slack resources are not disposed of 
when sales decline. In addition, managerial expectation has also been used to explain 
asymmetric cost behaviour (Banker & Byzalov, 2014; Banker et al., 2014b). If managers are 
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optimistic about future demand, they are likely to retain slack resources even when sales 
decrease; whereas, if managers are pessimistic about future demand then they are likely to 
dispose slack resources when sales decline.  
Cost behaviour is driven by the availability of resources; and the availability of 
resources, in turn, depends on the availability of finance. Firms face financial constraints for 
various reasons, such as capital market imperfections stemming from information asymmetry, 
weak institutional settings (Chen et al., 2017), agency problem (Pawlin & Renneboog, 2005) 
and risk (Senbet & Wang, 2012); as a result, firms’ are unable to borrow or issue equity (Lamont 
et al., 2001). If firms operated under frictionless capital markets then managers did not have to 
make trade-off decisions regarding which projects to invest in and which projects to forgo, as 
the availability of abundant resources would have enabled managers to invest in all positive 
NPV projects. However, in the real-world frictional markets, investment and growth depend 
largely on the availability of internal capital, as the cost of raising outside capital could be high 
relative to that of internally generated funds. Consequently, firms with attractive growth 
opportunities but without access to external financing may invest less into optimal value-
increasing investment projects. Financial constraints, therefore, will require managers to 
carefully consider retaining or disposing slack resources for optimizing future growth and firm 
value.   
 From the resource adjustment cost perspective, I posit that when sales decrease it 
becomes more costly to maintain unutilized resources for constrained firms, because such 
resources incur additional costs which, in turn, place further constraints on the financial health 
of the firm. Maintaining unutilized resources decreases the present value of sales, and increases 
the opportunity cost of keeping unused resources and, thereby, decreases firm profitability. 
Especially, successive decreases in sales make it more costly, at a given time, for constrained 
firms to maintain slack resources for future periods. Moreover, constrained firms are more 
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likely to hold on to cash instead of non-cash assets, in order to fund future expansion through 
internal finance (Calomiris et al., 1995). Therefore, when sales decrease, financially constrained 
firms are more likely to dispose of unutilized resources, to reduce avoidable costs. I posit that 
for financially constrained firms, the option value of waiting for the arrival of new information 
falls short of the NPV of reduction in future costs from downward resource adjustments, since 
the propagation of financial constraints could lead to corporate bankruptcy.  
 Popov and Rocholl’s (2015) study of the German market shows that firms that had a 
credit relation with at least one global financial crisis (GFC)-affected bank, had to decrease 
both the number of employees and the average compensation of the remaining employees. 
Fernandes and Ferreira (2017) show that, in the post-GFC era, financially constrained 
Portuguese firms hired more fixed-term workers compared to permanent workers, than their 
unconstrained counterparts.2 Fernandes and Ferreira (2017) conclude that increased proportions 
of fixed-term employees enable the flexibility needed to adjust future employment rates without 
incurring additional firing costs. Constrained firms also face more upward resource adjustment 
costs, as they incur higher transaction costs and have available loans that come with stricter 
conditions, including stringent collateral requirements. All these increase for constrained firms 
during an increase in sales or an expansion of the business (Cheng et al., 2018). Therefore, 
constrained firms rely heavily on other sources of finance, e.g., trade credit and internal fund to 
finance their operation (Mulier et al., 2016). 
However, the adjustment cost theory posits that, once committed, resources are not easy 
to scale down without incurring additional (future) adjustment costs; such as severance pay, 
search and training costs for new employees and transaction costs associated with purchasing 
new equipment (Cheng et al., 2018). This could be more applicable to constrained firms, who 
 
2Fixed-term workers have a flexible fixed-term contract and, therefore, can be laid off without incurring the 
severance payment that is required to lay off permanent workers (Fernandes & Ferreira, 2017).  
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face difficulty in raising capital when demand increases after a slump and, thereby, are inhibited 
from procuring critical resources, for example, skilled employees. Therefore, managers of 
constrained firms might prefer to retain unused resources in the short run to minimize the 
adjustment costs. Banker et al. (2013a) document that at country-level, stricter employment 
protection regulation results in higher firing costs, which could be more onerous for financially 
constrained firms, as saving costs and/or conserving cash in the present are the key priorities 
for these firms (Caggese et al., 2019). Therefore, in a well-developed country like the U.S., 
adjustment costs associated with labor are high compared to those in China and other emerging 
economies, owing to the availability of more highly-skilled human capital and the enforcement 
of minimum wage regulations (Banker et al., 2013). Thus, laying off human capital, which 
comes with high adjustment costs, might threaten the future growth of firms. However, based 
on the more rational premise that financially constrained firms will reduce unutilized resources 
as a survival strategy, I hypothesize the following:   
H1: Financially-constrained firms will exhibit less cost stickiness.  
 
I subject H1 above to empirical tests using three different contextual settings as explained 
below, to shed light on “good” versus “bad” less cost stickiness.    
My first context incorporates earnings management incentives to examine variations in 
cost behaviour. Kama and Weiss (2013) document that managers have an incentive to cut back 
resources to meet earnings benchmarks. When sales decline, financially constrained firms 
suffer a relatively greater reduction in the present value of revenue. Thus, such firms might be 
tempted to cut down resources to reduce costs, hence, increase profit to meet earnings 
benchmarks. This should provide a positive signal about the future survival prospects of these 
financially constrained firms. In line with this view, Kurt (2017) predicts and finds that 
constrained firms engage in income-increasing earnings management more aggressively than 
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unconstrained firms, around seasoned equity offerings. Linck et al. (2013) document that 
constrained firms overstate earnings compared to their unconstrained counterparts during the 
quarters prior to investment. Earnings management by financially constrained firms designed 
to understate costs, therefore, could result in less cost stickiness, but for the wrong reason, i.e., 
“bad” less stickiness. On the other hand, the existence of less cost stickiness in the absence of 
earnings management would support “good” less stickiness. Thus, I develop the following 
hypothesis: 
H1EM: Less cost stickiness exhibited by financially-constrained firms without earnings 
management incentives will support “good” less stickiness. 
 
My second context is the existence of the agency problem manifested through actions 
that encourage empire building. Managers who engage in empire-building for personal benefits 
are likely to overinvest when sales increase but are unlikely to cut back resources when sales 
decline (e.g. Williamson, 1963; Banker et al., 2018). This perspective suggests that financially 
constrained firms plagued with pervasive agency problem (empire building incentives in my 
case) will exhibit cost stickiness. On the contrary, Musso and Schiavo (2008) document that 
financial constraints increase the possibility of firms exiting the market. Therefore, survival 
may become crucial for constrained firms, and might require the elimination of costs in order 
to generate the funds they are unable to raise from the financial market. For constrained firms 
suffering from agency problem, the question of whether maximizing personal benefits 
outweighs survival remains unclear and unexplored. Based on the aforementioned arguments, 
I conjecture that, even in firms having pervasive agency problem, firm survival would take 
priority. Therefore, if firm survival takes precedence over empire building incentives, I would 
expect a scaling down of resources in the event of a sales decline for financially constrained 
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firms with agency concerns (good less cost stickiness). Thus, I develop the following 
hypothesis:    
H1AP: Less cost stickiness exhibited by financially-constrained firms with high agency problem 
will support “good” less stickiness.  
 
My final context involves cost behaviour conditional on the value-creating abilities of 
SG&A costs. Empirical research shows that value-creating SG&A costs exhibit greater cost 
stickiness (e.g. Lev and Sougiannis 1996, Banker et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2012). Decreasing 
value-creating SG&A costs involves higher resource adjustment costs (Liu et al., 2017b). Chen 
et al. (2012) predict, and find, that SG&A costs can create greater future value, and SG&A cost 
stickiness is influenced by economic considerations. The latter implies that constrained firms 
would trade-off the benefits derived from retaining value-creating resources against the costs 
of maintaining those resources. On the other hand, if SG&A costs generate low future value, 
then managers do not have a legitimate reason to retain such resources in the event of a sales 
decline. However, Caggese et al. (2019) document that employee layoff decisions of 
constrained firms are inefficient compared to those of their unconstrained counterparts, for a 
sample of Swedish companies. The authors show that constrained firms fire recently-hired 
workers having high expected productivity growth, to take advantage of their low firing costs. 
Laying off long-tenured workers who are considered less productive, may expose firms to 
significantly larger firing costs, e.g., higher severance payments, as compared to firing recently-
recruited workers. In sum, their evidence suggests that constrained firms make the wrong firing 
decisions in order to conserve cash in the short term. Additionally, Musso and Schiavo (2008) 
posit that, to alleviate financial constraints, firms are likely to shed long term investments, 
giving rise to detrimental implications for their long-term growth prospects. Therefore, 
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constrained firms exhibit good (bad) less cost stickiness if they reduce future value-reducing 
(value-creating) SG&A costs.  
H1VSGA: Less cost stickiness through a reduction in value-destroying (value-creating) SG&A 
costs will support good (bad) less stickiness for financially-constrained firms. 
 
2.1.1 Financial constraints and cost behaviour during business cycles  
The business cycle adds uncertainty to economic activities and to firm performance as reflected 
in corporate sales, profit, cash flow, and dividends. During expansion, most firms operate in a 
favourable business environment, with little competitive pressure, growing sales, and rising 
profitability. In contrast, during recession, corporate sales decline, profits shrink, and dividends 
may slump, or disappear entirely. Choe et al. (1993) argue that information asymmetry is less 
during an expansion period. Therefore, investors are able to identify the opportunity for, and 
are likely to charge, a higher cost for constrained firms, and this directs those constrained firms 
towards the utilization of internal capital rather than external financing sources. Thus, 
constrained firms would face significant pressure to increase their internal resources during an 
economic expansion (e.g. Hennessy & White, 2007; Kurt, 2017).   
During contraction periods, information asymmetry increases. Investors become 
extremely selective while making an investment decision for several reasons, including higher 
information asymmetry and scarcity of resources. This creates an adverse shock for firm cash 
flows. Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) find that constrained firms have low cash flows during 
a contraction period, and are likely to increase prices compared to their unconstrained 
counterparts in order to achieve short-term profit. However, such a strategy could motivate 
unconstrained firms to engage in predatory pricing strategies, resulting in constrained firms 
being driven out of the market (Liu et al., 2017b). Firms experiencing a financial downturn 
reduce costs, including investments in CSR and assets substantially, to stabilize business 
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operations and to maintain profitability (e.g. Robbins & Pearce, 1992; Bansal et al., 2015; Habib 
& Hasan, 2019). According to the seminal work of Robbins and Pearce (1992), to overcome 
financial downturns, managers engage in “restructuring”, “downsizing” or “downscoping”: 
actions that save money. Firms undergoing a declining performance will reduce costs 
significantly in order to stabilize operations and retain profitability (e.g. Bibeault, 1982; 
Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Slatter, 1984; Finkin, 1985; Bailey & Szerdy, 1988; Grinyer et al., 
1988; Dumaine, 1990; Grinyer & McKiernan, 1990; Robbins & Pearce, 1992). Banker et al. 
(2016) document that, owing to managerial pessimism about future sales, firms’ exhibit less 
cost stickiness during economic contraction. Therefore, if managers are pessimist about future 
demand, as would be the case during a contractionary period, they would decrease slack 
resources aggressively when sales decrease, resulting in low cost stickiness or high anti-
stickiness (Banker et al., 2018). Following, H1, I, therefore, predict that constrained firms would 
exhibit a greater degree of less cost stickiness during economic recession, than during economic 
expansion. I hypothesize as follows: 
H2: For financially constrained firms, the magnitude of less cost stickiness will be greater 
during a contraction period than during an expansion period.  
 
2.2  Research Design 
2.2.1 Empirical model  
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where SG&A (Compustat data item XSGA) is selling, general and administrative 
expenses, and SALE (Compustat data item SALE) is sales revenue. DECDUM takes the value 
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of 1 if sales in year t are less than sales in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. Coefficient β1 measures the 
percentage increase in SG&A with a 1% increase in sales revenue. The sum of coefficients β1 
and β2 measures the percentage decrease in SG&A with a 1% decrease in sales. A significant 
positive β1 and a significant negative β2 confirm cost stickiness. FC are the financial constraint 
variables (detailed in subsection 2.2.2), and ECONVAR are the economic variables and include: 
asset intensity (AIN), measured as the total assets divided by the sales revenue for year t; 
employee intensity (EIN), the ratio of the total number of employees over sales; successive 
decrease (SUDEC), an indicator variable equal to 1 if the revenue in year t-1 is less than the 
revenue in t-2, and 0 otherwise; and stock performance (RET), measured as the raw stock return 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). These four economic variables are 
incorporated in the model as stand-alone variables and interacted with the sticky variable: β2. 
The coefficient of primary interest is the sign and significance of the interactive variable, β5. A 
positive and significant β5 will support H1.  
 
2.2.2 Measurement of the independent variable: Financial constraints  
As there is no consensus on which is the best proxy for financial constraint measurement, and 
the majority of studies use more than one constraint measure as a proxy, I use three different 
measures in this study. The financial constraint measures used are: SA index (SA); WW index 
(WW); and the Bodnaruk, Loughran and McDonald (BLM) text-based constraint measure.  
(i) SA index: The index has been developed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010) using firm size and 
age, and higher SA indices indicate higher financial constraint. The SA index is calculated as 
follows:  
SAit = −0.737 SIZEit + 0.043 (SIZEit)
2 − 0.040 AGEit                (2.2) 
where SIZE is the natural log of total assets, and AGE is the number of years the firm is 
listed on Compustat.  
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(ii) WW index: WW index has been constructed by Whited and Wu (2006), and higher WW 
indices mean higher financial constraint. The index is composed of six components and is 
calculated as follows: 
WWit = − 0.091 CFit − 0.062 DIVPOSit + 0.021 TLTDit − 0.044 LNTAit + 0.102 ISGit 
        − 0.035 SGit                    (2.3) 
 
where CF is cash flow (Compustat data item IB plus DP) divided by total assets 
(Compustat data item AT), DIVPOS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm pays dividends 
(Compustat data item DVC plus DVP) and 0 otherwise, TLTD is long-term debt (Compustat 
data item DLTT) divided by total assets, LNTA is the natural log of total assets, ISG is the firm’s 
three-digit SIC code industry annual sales growth, and SG is the firm’s annual sales growth. 
 
(iii) Bodnaruk et al. (2015) text-based financial constraint measure (BLM): Bodnaruk et 
al. (2015) developed a list of 184 constraining words from all 10-K filings. The commonly used 
constraining words from their list include required, obligations, impairment, covenants, 
requirements, permitted, comply, imposed, and the index uses the percentage of constraining 
words as a measure of financial constraint. Bodnaruk et al. (2015) show that the more managers 
are concerned about future financial constraints, the more they will disclose through the text of 
10-K. Higher BLM values indicate higher financial constraint. 
 The underlying notion of traditional accounting-based measures of financial constraint 
is that larger firms are less likely to be financially constrained; whereas, owing to financial 
meltdown, larger and older firms can become financially constrained (Bodnaruk et al., 2015). 
This inherent shortcoming of traditional measures, may result in misclassifying financially 
constrained firms arising from previously unconstrained firms. Thus, the text-based measure 




2.2.3 Business cycle measure 
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., DeStefano, 2004; Jenkins et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011), this 
study uses the well-accepted measure based on the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) business cycle classification in identifying different states of economic activities (i.e., 
expansion and contraction).3 Periods of expansion begin at the trough date and end at the peak 
date, and periods of recession begin at the peak date and end at the trough date. The NBER 
defines a recession (expansion) in terms of significant decline (increase) in economic activity 
spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real 
income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales. Thus, unlike the 
employment rate and industrial production as proxies for the business cycle, the NBER’s 
business cycle captures more comprehensive information regarding economic activities. I also 
consider the OECD Composite Leading Indicators as an alternative proxy to define economic 
recession. According to this time series, the recession begins at the midpoint of the period of 
the peak and ends at the midpoint of the period of the trough.  
 
2.2.4 Sample selection and descriptive statistics  
Financial data are collected from Compustat, whilst the stock return data are collected from the 
CRSP for the years 1976 to 2016. I deliberately choose a long sample period to provide a richer 
analysis of the cost stickiness behaviour. Panel A, Table 2.1, illustrates the sample selection 
process, which follows the process used by Anderson et al. (2003). I begin with a total sample 
of 462,735 firm-year observations during 1976–2016. I then exclude firm-year observations 
from the regulated industries (two-digit SIC code 48-49), financial institutions (two-digit SIC 
 






codes 60-69) and any duplicate values. This process eliminates a total of 170,800 firm-year 
observations. After excluding observations based on missing data on SALE and SG&A for the 
current and previous periods, zero SALE and SG&A values, negative SALE and SG&A values, 
as well as SALE<SG&A, the sample size drops down to 207,969 observations. A further 24,770 
firm-year observations were lost because of the requirement for one-year lagged revenue and 
SG&A observations. The baseline regression sample, therefore, consists of 183,173 firm-year 
observations for the SA version of financial constraints. However, missing data on some of the 
control variables further reduces the sample. Merging the stickiness sample after including all 
the non-missing economic variables with financial constraint proxies SA and WW, resulted in 
final samples of 124,839 and 101,125 observations respectively. Merging the stickiness sample 
with the BLM sample and all the non-missing economic variables, results in 56,455 
observations. The sample selection procedure is explained in Panel A of Table 2.1.  
To avoid the undesirable influence of outliers, I winsorize the key variables in the 
extreme 1% of their respective distributions. In the regression models, sample size varies 
depending on the model-specific data requirements. Firm-year observations come from a wide 
variety of industries, with two-digit SIC codes, 35–39 (27.61%) and 70-79 (13.81%) 





















TABLE 2.1: Sample Selection and Industry Distribution  
PANEL A: Sample selection procedure 
Selection Process Number of 
Observations  
Total observations produced for 1975 to 2016 462,735 
Drop: observations for SIC codes between 4800 to 4999 
Drop: observations for SIC codes between 6000 to 6999 





Drop: observations with missing data on sales and SG&A for current period and previous 






Drop: one year-lagged variable for Sale and SG&A (24,770) 
Preliminary sample for the baseline regression without ECONVAR for the SA version 
of the financial constraint  
183,173 
  
Merging with constraint proxies (after including non-missing economic variables)     
Merged with SA  124,839 
Merged with WW  101,125 
Merged with BLM 56,455 
PANEL B: Industry distribution 
Code Industry Observations % observations  
1-14 Agriculture and mining 17,164 9.37 
15-17 Building construction  2,923 1.60 
20-21 Food and kindred products  6,361 3.47 
22-23 Textile mill products and apparels 4,261 2.33 
24-27 Lumber, furniture, paper and printing 9,434 5.15 
28-30 Chemical, petroleum, rubber and allied products 15,760 8.60 
31-34 Metal 10,874 5.94 
35-39 Machinery, electrical, computer equipment 50,568 27.61 
40-47 Railroad and other transportation 4,828 2.64 
50-52 Wholesale goods, building materials  10,512 5.74 
53-59 Store merchandise, auto dealers, home furniture stores 15,537 8.48 
70-79 Business services 25,305 13.81 
80-99 Other  9,646 5.27 
 Total 183,173 100.00 
 
 
2.3 Empirical Results & Analysis  
2.3.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
Descriptive statistics of the sample are reported in panel A of Table 2.2. Over the study period 








) are 0.10 
(0.09) and 0.11 (0.09) respectively. Average sales revenue for the sample is $1,845.18 million 
(median $128.12 million). Average SG&A expense is $317.69 million (median $24.61 million). 
SA and WW have means (medians) of -2.83 (-2.92) and -0.25 (-0.24) respectively. Average 
number of employees per firm is approximately 8,390. On average, sample firms use 0.01 
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thousand (median 0.01) employees and $1.24 million (median $0.85 million) assets to support 
each million dollars in sales. The median firm of the sample has not experienced a decline in 
sales for two consecutive years (median 0 and mean 0.28).  
















TABLE 2.2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation 
 PANEL A: Descriptive statistics  





) 183,173 0.10 0.29 -0.03 0.09 0.22 





) 183,173 0.11 0.27 -0.02 0.09 0.21 
SG&A ($mil) 183,173 317.69 1,663.17 6.00 24.61 109.81 
DECDUM 183,173 0.29 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 
SA  183,173 -2.83 0.86 -3.43 -2.92 -2.28 
WW  147,701 -0.25 0.12 -0.33 -0.24 -0.16 
BLM  69,958 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
SUDEC 162,949 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 
AIN 183,173 1.24 1.22 0.58 0.85 1.36 
ASSET ($mil) 183,173 1,416.38 4,447.35 24.12 116.94 613.25 
EIN 170,768 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
EMP (thousands)  170,768 8.39 35.51 0.21 0.94 4.25 
RET 139,396 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.04 
AVOID 183,173 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EDEC 183,173 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 
FXP 31,491 0.46 0.29 0.21 0.39 0.68 
TAGRWOTH 162,767 0.16 0.81 -0.04 0.06 0.19 
SG&A_FV 142,197 0.60 0.53 0.29 0.40 0.58 
CYCLE (NBER) 183,173 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CYCLE (OECD) 183,173 0.51 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Note: SALE is sales or revenue. SG&A is selling, general and administrative expenses. SA, WW and BLM are 
the financial constraint proxies. ASSET is total assets in million dollars. EMP is the number of employees (in 





PANEL B: Correlation 















) [3] 0.707*** 0.437*** 1        
SUDEC [4] -0.151*** -0.228*** -0.128*** 1       
AIN [5] -0.013 0.049*** -0.190*** 0.067*** 1      
EIN [6] -0.029*** -0.009 0.026** -0.022** -0.202*** 1     
RET [7] 0.145*** 0.064*** 0.028*** 0.055*** -0.005 -0.002 1    
SA [8] 0.143*** 0.172*** -0.031*** -0.061*** -0.016 0.106*** 0.078*** 1   
WW [9] -0.0438*** -0.005 -0.139*** 0.059*** -0.069*** 0.135*** 0.028*** 0.656*** 1  
BLM [10] -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.076*** 0.081*** 0.079*** -0.031*** -0.007 0.031*** 0.107*** 1 
























2.3.2 Regression results: Financial constraints and cost stickiness  
Table 2.3, Panel A reports the OLS results for the association between financial constraints and 
cost stickiness. To control for unobservable industry and year characteristics associated with 
financial constraints and cost stickiness, I include year and industry dummy variables in all the 
regression specifications. To take into account the time series and cross-sectional dependence in 
the error terms of the regressions, I calculate t-statistics using standard errors that are clustered by 
firm. For my of sample of 183,173 firm-years observations SG&A costs increase by 0.67% for 
each 1% increase in sales and SG&A costs decrease by only 0.49% for each 1% decrease in sales 
(untabulated). 
 Columns (1) to (3) report the regression results without controlling for the economic 




H1 to hold, β5 has to be significant and positive. Columns (4) to (6) report regression results for the 
OLS model after incorporating financial constraint and all the economic variables to test for H1. 
The SA model shows that the β5 (coefficient = 0.035; t statistic = 3.19; p < 0.01) is positive and 
significant. This supports H1, i.e., financially-constrained firms’ exhibit less cost stickiness. The 
WW and BLM models produce consistent results as reported in columns (5) and (6) respectively.  
Looking into economic variables interacted with sticky variables, asset intensity AIN* β2 is 
significant at the 1% level, with negative coefficients in all the models. This indicates a higher 
magnitude of cost stickiness for companies that rely heavily on assets to support business 
operations. However, employee intensity (interacted with stickiness) EIN*β2 has a positive 
coefficient, and is significant at different conventional levels in all the regression models. This 
implies low cost stickiness in companies where operations rely on employees. The coefficient for 
successive decreases in sales, SUDEC*β2, is positive and significant. This suggests a lower degree 
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of cost stickiness in firms experiencing negative demand shocks in two consecutive years. These 
findings related to economic variables are consistent with Chen et al. (2012) and Dierynck et al. 
(2012). The coefficient for RET*β2 is significantly positive in the SA and WW models, but 
insignificant in the BLM model. Panel B, Table 2.3, presents the fixed effects (FE) regression 
results. Results are consistent with those reported using the OLS procedure4.  
 
 TABLE 2.3: OLS and Fixed Effect Regression Results – Financial Constraints and Cost Stickiness 
PANEL A: OLS regression results  
 SA  WW  BLM  SA  WW BLM 





)  0.559*** 0.558*** 0.743*** 0.578*** 0.589*** 0.793*** 
 [41.74] [51.48] [43.23] [28.39] [37.78] [42.48] 


















β3: FC  0.002* -0.000 0.564 0.008*** 0.041*** 1.918*** 
 [1.90] [-0.07] [1.23] [6.93] [5.14] [4.04] 




)  -0.048*** -0.375*** -6.431*** -0.044*** -0.341*** -12.833*** 
 [-9.80] [-10.17] [-2.58] [-6.45] [-6.52] [-4.67] 
β5: FC * β2 0.068*** 0.458*** 9.391* 0.035*** 0.254*** 19.438*** 
 [8.74] [7.91] [1.88] [3.19] [3.09] [3.56] 
β6:SUDEC * β2 - - - 0.098*** 0.094*** 0.103*** 
    [8.01] [7.01] [5.90] 
β7: AIN *  β2 - - - -0.047*** -0.053*** -0.044*** 
    [-10.37] [-10.40] [-5.54] 
β8: EIN *  β2 - - - 3.828*** 4.351*** 3.122** 
    [5.02] [4.75] [2.08] 
β9: RET *  β2 - - - 0.256*** 0.314*** 0.122 
    [2.76] [3.00] [0.97] 
β10: SUDEC - - - -0.059*** -0.058*** -0.053*** 
    [-40.20] [-36.58] [-26.39] 
β11: AIN - - - 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.013*** 
    [9.62] [7.42] [9.19] 
β12: EIN - - - 0.631*** 0.804*** 0.646*** 
    [7.84] [6.91] [4.29] 
β13: RET - - - -0.348*** -0.299*** -0.361*** 
    [-22.45] [-16.78] [-17.24] 
Constant 0.020** 0.020** -0.013 0.045*** 0.032*** -0.038*** 
 
4To assess the robustness of my findings reported in Table 2.3 (Panel A and B), I transform all three continuous 
financial constraint (FC) variables into dummy variables, where the dummy variable takes the value of one when 
FC=>median FC (financially constrained group), and zero otherwise (unconstrained group). I the reran the regressions 
for all three FC variables using OLS and FE methods using the dummy instead of the continuous FC variables. 
Untabulated results reveal significant and positive coefficients for β5 for WW (FE coefficient = 0.047; t statistic = 2.12; 
p < 0.05) and BLM (FE coefficient = 0.072; t statistic = 2.73; p < 0.01) measures in both OLS and FE: results that are 
consistent with those reported in Table 2.3 (Panel A and B). However, the coefficients are insignificant for SA measure.   
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PANEL A: OLS regression results  
 SA  WW  BLM  SA  WW BLM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 [2.09] [2.03] [-0.87] [4.34] [3.06] [-3.96] 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 183,173 147,701 69,958 124,839 101,125 56,455 
Adj. R-squared 0.47 0.45 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.54 
Note: Panel A reports the results from the OLS regression of association between financial constraints and SG&A 
cost behaviour. Robust t-statistics are in brackets and are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
 
PANEL B: Fixed effect regression results 
 SA  WW BLM SA  WW BLM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
β1: LN(SALEt/SALEt-1)  0.481*** 0.500*** 0.693*** 0.519*** 0.532*** 0.758*** 
 [31.35] [40.33] [33.64] [23.12] [30.68] [35.63] 














β3: FC  0.020*** -0.001 -2.283*** 0.010*** -0.010 -0.135 
 [15.68] [-0.09] [-4.18] [5.00] [-0.53] [-0.24] 
β4: FC * LN(SALEt/SALEt-1)  -0.062*** -0.450*** -4.600 -0.054*** -0.412*** -12.159*** 
 [-11.27] [-10.59] [-1.56] [-7.18] [-7.11] [-3.93] 
β5: FC * β2 0.076*** 0.492*** 11.272** 0.037*** 0.267*** 18.571*** 
 [8.32] [7.40] [2.00] [2.97] [2.85] [3.04] 
β6:SUDEC * β2 - - - 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.117*** 
    [8.19] [7.58] [6.20] 
β7: AIN *  β2 - - - -0.046*** -0.054*** -0.039*** 
    [-9.02] [-9.63] [-4.38] 
β8: EIN *  β2 - - - 5.094*** 5.977*** 4.394** 
    [5.80] [5.64] [2.49] 
β9: RET *  β2 - - - 0.258** 0.320*** 0.163 
    [2.56] [2.84] [1.15] 
β10: SUDEC - - - -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.050*** 
    [-36.88] [-33.36] [-24.02] 
β11: AIN - - - 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.027*** 
    [10.45] [7.13] [9.97] 
β12: EIN - - - 2.565*** 3.178*** 2.703*** 
    [13.38] [17.44] [5.85] 
β13: RET - - - -0.306*** -0.257*** -0.321*** 
    [-20.64] [-15.22] [-16.00] 
Constant 0.088*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.004 -0.007 
 [22.59] [8.75] [9.40] [4.74] [0.74] [-1.22] 
Industry No No No No No No 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 183,173 147,701 69,958 124,839 101,125 56,455 
Adj. R-squared 0.42 0.40 0.43 0.47 0.46 0.48 
Note: Panel B reports the results from the FE of association between financial constraints and SG&A cost 
behaviour. Robust t-statistics are in brackets and are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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2.3.3 Is it “Good” or “Bad” less cost stickiness?  
I now discuss results on whether the less cost stickiness exhibited by financially constrained firms 
reflect “good” or “bad” less cost stickiness (test of three sub-hypotheses developed in section 2.1).   
To test H1EM, I split the sample observations into ‘loss avoidance’ (AVOID) and ‘earnings 
decrease’ (EDEC) groups. The AVOID group consists of firm-year observations with annual 
earnings deflated by market capitalization of shareholders’ equity at prior year end, in the interval 
[0, 0.01] (both inclusive). The EDEC group consists of firm-year observations with changes in 
annual earnings deflated by market capitalization of shareholders’ equity at prior year end in the 
interval [0, 0.01] (both inclusive). Panel A1 of Table 2.4 presents the results for the AVOID test. 
The coefficient on β5 is positive and significant for the subsample without incentives to avoid losses 
(AVOID=0) (e.g., the coefficient is 0.034, p<0.01 for the SA model in column 1), and insignificant 
for the group with incentives to avoid losses (AVOID=1). Table 2.4 Panel A2, reports the results 
for the EDEC test. The coefficient on β5 is positive and significant for the subsample without 
incentives to avoid earnings decrease (EDEC=0) (e.g., the coefficient is 0.03, p<0.01 for SA model 
in column 1), and insignificant for the group with incentives to avoid earnings decrease (EDEC=1). 
Taken together the results for the earnings management incentives context reveal that the less cost 
stickiness exhibited by financially-constrained firms is “good” less cost stickiness. 
To test H1AP, I split the sample observations into two groups, i.e., a pervasive (high) agency 
problem group and a minimal (low) agency problem group. I use two different proxies to measure 
agency problem i.e. (i) CEO fixed pay (FXP) and (ii) total asset growth (TAGROWTH). According 
to Chen et al. (2012) and Kanniainen (2000), a manager’s empire-building incentives can be 
restrained by paying fixed salaries. Banker et al. (2011) document that fixed (cash) compensation 
is used to penalize wasteful spending on SG&A costs. FXP is the ratio of salary plus bonus divided 
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by total compensation during the year. Firm-year observations with FXP>= median FXP 
constitutes the minimal agency problem group. The pervasive agency problem group consists of 
observations with FXP<median FXP. CEO compensation data are collected from ExecuComp. 
TAGROWTH has been used as a proxy for agency problem by Giroud and Mueller (2010), 
Chhaochharia et al. (2012) and Guo et al. (2018). The ‘high’ agency problem group consists of 
firm-year observations with TAGROWTH>=median TAGROWTH. The ‘low’ agency problem 
group consists of firm-year observations with TAGROWTH<median TAGROWTH.   
Table 2.4 Panel B1 reports the results using CEO fixed pay. The coefficient on β5 is negative 
and significant for the high agency problem group (coefficient = -0.265; t statistic = -4.37, p<0.01) 
when SA is used as the financial constraint measure (column 2), thus, supporting “bad” cost 
stickiness. Columns (3) and (4) report results using the WW model and reveal that the coefficients 
on β5 are insignificant for both the low and high agency problem groups. Finally, results using the 
BLM measure (columns 5 and 6) show a marginally significant less sticky result for the low agency 
problem group (coefficient 24.99, p<0.10), but an insignificant coefficient for the high agency 
problem group. Taken together, the documented results provide weak support for “bad” cost 
stickiness in the agency problem context.  
Panel B2 presents results when TAGROWTH is used to proxy for agency problem. The 
coefficients on β5 are insignificant for the high agency problem group across all three measures of 
financial constraint (columns 2, 4 and 6). However, financially constrained firms with minimal or 
low agency problem document positive and significant coefficients on β5 for all three measures of 
financial constraints (coefficients 0.034 (p<0.10), 0.436 (p<0.01), and 19.214 (p<0.10) for SA, WW 




TABLE 2.4: Financial Constraints and Cost Stickiness – Is it good or bad? 
PANEL A1: Earnings management context – avoid losses 
 SA  SA WW WW BLM  BLM 
 AVOID=0 AVOID=1 AVOID=0 AVOID=1 AVOID=0 AVOID=1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
β1: LN(SALEt/SALEt-1)  0.582*** 0.490*** 0.593*** 0.512*** 0.794*** 0.774*** 
 [28.33] [4.17] [37.59] [5.96] [41.87] [7.40] 
β2: DECDUM * LN(SALEt/SALEt-1)  -0.093** -0.139 -0.086*** -0.184 -0.343*** -0.387 
 [-2.57] [-0.62] [-3.15] [-1.09] [-8.17] [-1.55] 
β3: FC  0.008*** -0.002 0.042*** -0.049 1.966*** 0.291 
 [7.06] [-0.32] [5.18] [-0.95] [4.09] [0.09] 
β4: FC * LN(SALEt/SALEt-1)  -0.043*** -0.068* -0.335*** -0.403 -12.898*** -11.075 
 [-6.27] [-1.70] [-6.33] [-1.28] [-4.65] [-0.66] 
β5: FC * β2 0.034*** 0.035 0.253*** -0.269 19.561*** 7.091 
 [3.07] [0.49] [3.04] [-0.51] [3.54] [0.21] 
ECONVAR * β2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ECONVAR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.045*** 0.001 0.032*** -0.023 -0.034*** -0.088 
 [4.03] [0.01] [2.80] [-0.41] [-3.10] [-1.43] 
Industry No No No No No No 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 120,924 3,915 98,184 2,941 54,633 1,822 
Adj. R-squared 0.52 0.47 0.50 0.42 0.54 0.54 
Note: Panel A1 reports the results from the FE regression of association between financial constraints and SG&A cost behaviour with and without incentives to 
avoid losses. Robust t-statistics are in brackets and are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Refer to Appendix A 













PANEL A2: Earnings management context – avoid earnings decreases 
 SA  SA WW WW BLM  BLM 
 EDEC=0 EDEC=1 EDEC=0 EDEC=1 EDEC=0 EDEC=1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
β1: LN(SALEt/SALEt-1)  0.580*** 0.645*** 0.584*** 0.693*** 0.783*** 0.891*** 
 [27.58] [10.03] [36.37] [14.17] [40.48] [11.58] 
β2: DECDUM * LN(SALEt/SALEt-1)  -0.094** -0.420* -0.081*** -0.216 -0.332*** -0.454** 
 [-2.56] [-1.95] [-2.92] [-1.57] [-7.79] [-2.04] 
β3: FC  0.008*** 0.008*** 0.039*** 0.047** 1.812*** 1.452 
 [6.06] [2.74] [4.49] [2.29] [3.57] [0.92] 
β4: FC * LN(SALEt/SALEt-1)  -0.041*** -0.057*** -0.337*** -0.318* -12.379*** -11.863 
 [-5.82] [-2.79] [-6.21] [-1.89] [-4.38] [-0.97] 
β5: FC * β2 0.030*** 0.005 0.239*** 0.405 18.649*** 23.111 
 [2.71] [0.09] [2.81] [1.13] [3.34] [0.66] 
ECONVAR * β2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ECONVAR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.047*** 0.013 0.035*** 0.012 -0.032*** -0.068* 
 [4.33] [0.48] [3.10] [0.47] [-3.35] [-1.67] 
Industry No No No No No No 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 111,251 13,588 90,347 10,778 50,006 6,449 
Adj. R-squared 0.51 0.58 0.50 0.54 0.53 0.61 
Note: Panel A2 reports the results from the FE regression of association between financial constraints and SG&A cost behaviour with and without incentives to 
avoid earnings decrease. Robust t-statistics are in brackets and are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Refer to 














PANEL B1: Agency problem (proxied by FXP) context   
  SA  SA WW WW BLM  BLM 












 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
β1: LN(SALEt/SALEt-1)  0.966*** 1.192*** 0.620*** 0.658*** 0.825*** 0.903*** 
 [9.00] [12.74] [7.38] [9.33] [19.05] [16.04] 
β2: DECDUM * LN(SALEt/SALEt-1)  -0.339 -1.268*** -0.273* -0.365*** -0.403*** -0.374** 
 [-1.33] [-5.38] [-1.71] [-2.86] [-3.59] [-2.50] 
β3: FC  0.010* 0.007* 0.082** 0.075*** 0.988 4.099*** 
 [1.90] [1.73] [2.26] [2.86] [0.94] [3.45] 
β4: FC * LN(SALEt/SALEt-1)  0.062** 0.124*** -0.364 -0.143 -11.868* -23.527*** 
 [2.05] [4.70] [-1.53] [-0.78] [-1.82] [-2.95] 
β5: FC * β2 -0.034 -0.265*** -0.283 -0.273 24.986* 16.363 
 [-0.49] [-4.37] [-0.63] [-0.83] [1.68] [0.87] 
ECONVAR * β2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ECONVAR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.018 0.023 0.014 0.032* -0.048*** -0.073*** 
 [0.81] [1.12] [0.72] [1.85] [-3.56] [-4.13] 
Industry No No No No No No 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,480 9,373 7,787 7,680 7,879 7,799 
Adj. R-squared 0.58 0.61 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.60 
Note: Panel B1 reports the results from the FE regression of association between financial constraints and SG&A cost behaviour in low and high agency 
problem firms (proxied by CEO fixed pay). Robust t-statistics are in brackets and are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 











PANEL B2: Agency problem (proxied by TAGROWTH) context 
 SA  SA WW WW BLM  BLM 












 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
β1: LN(SALEt/SALEt-1)  0.434*** 0.578*** 0.411*** 0.600*** 0.693*** 0.799*** 
 [10.50] [23.48] [13.53] [31.85] [11.19] [33.25] 
β2: DECDUM * LN(SALEt/SALEt-1)  0.035 -0.260*** 0.079** -0.222*** -0.223*** -0.463*** 
 [0.64] [-2.66] [2.00] [-3.01] [-2.69] [-4.50] 
β3: FC  0.007*** 0.014*** 0.043*** 0.078*** 0.547 3.659*** 
 [4.50] [7.50] [4.19] [6.20] [0.73] [4.90] 
β4: FC * LN(SALEt/SALEt-1)  -0.053*** -0.044*** -0.573*** -0.303*** -14.303 -15.384*** 
 [-3.91] [-5.33] [-5.41] [-4.84] [-1.63] [-4.34] 
β5: FC * β2 0.034* 0.038 0.436*** 0.332 19.214* 13.557 
 [1.94] [1.34] [3.28] [1.53] [1.68] [0.94] 
ECONVAR * β2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ECONVAR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.026*** 0.022*** -0.017 -0.048*** 
 [3.89] [4.49] [3.24] [3.05] [-1.47] [-5.04] 
Industry No No No No No No 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 59,568 65,115 48,298 52,565 24,794 26,735 
Adj. R-squared 0.37 0.50 0.36 0.47 0.39 0.51 
Note: Panel B2 reports the results from the FE regression of association between financial constraints and SG&A cost behaviour in low and agency problem 
firms (proxied by total asset growth). Robust t-statistics are in brackets and are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 














PANEL C: SG&A_FV context 
 SA  SA WW WW BLM  BLM 
 Low 
SG&A_FV 
High SG&A_FV Low  
SG&A_FV 
High  SG&A_FV Low  
SG&A_FV 
High  SG&A_FV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
β1: LN(SALEt/SALEt-1)  0.526*** 0.588*** 0.569*** 0.595*** 0.807*** 0.825*** 
 [16.65] [19.79] [25.19] [24.34] [32.00] [25.46] 
β2: DECDUM * LN(SALEt/SALEt-1)  -0.082 -0.096* -0.094** -0.098** -0.349*** -0.425*** 
 [-1.44] [-1.81] [-2.37] [-2.34] [-6.03] [-5.67] 
β3: FC  0.007*** 0.011*** 0.029** 0.073*** 2.712*** 1.809** 
 [3.43] [6.28] [2.37] [5.89] [3.99] [2.19] 
β4: FC * LN(SALEt/SALEt-1)  -0.049*** -0.064*** -0.323*** -0.590*** -15.293*** -12.208*** 
 [-4.63] [-6.30] [-4.19] [-7.31] [-4.02] [-2.65] 
β5: FC * β2 0.027 0.066*** 0.169 0.527*** 24.417*** 20.272** 
 [1.56] [3.86] [1.36] [3.82] [3.22] [2.06] 
ECONVAR * β2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ECONVAR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.030*** 0.047*** 0.017** 0.026** -0.043*** 0.002 
 [3.41] [6.45] [2.17] [2.18] [-4.44] [0.14] 
Industry No No No No No No 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 48,473 49,481 43,557 32,999 29,599 15,490 
Adj. R-squared 0.49 0.59 0.48 0.59 0.55 0.58 
Note: Panel C reports the results from the FE regression of association between financial constraints and SG&A cost behaviour in low and high future value 
generating SG&A firms. Robust t-statistics are in brackets and are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Refer 







Finally, in order to test H1VSGA, I categorise the sample into high (above median) versus 
low (equal and below median) future value-creating SG&A groups, based on the industry-specific 
future value creation potential of SG&A costs, as per the value reported in Table 2 of Banker et al. 
(2011). I present the results in Panel C of Table 2.4. The coefficient on β5 is positive and 
insignificant for the low future value subsample (coefficient = 0.027; t statistic = 1.56), but positive 
and significant for the high future value subsample (coefficient = 0.066; t statistic= 3.86; p<0.01). 
Similar results are found using the WW model. This finding might be consistent with Caggese et 
al. (2019), who find inefficient employee-firing decisions by financially constrained firms. This 
finding could also be consistent with the fact that constrained firms are exposed to high opportunity 
costs associated with retaining unutilised resources, compared to their non-constrained 
counterparts. When firms suffer from financial constraints, they may have fewer options when 
deciding which kind of SG&A costs to decrease, as their main objective becomes reducing the 
financial burden and surviving the constraint period, to bounce back later. Therefore, from a firm 
survival point of view, such behaviour can be a manifestation of “good” less cost stickiness; 
however, from an efficiency point of view, such less stickiness could be construed as “bad”. This 
finding also confirms empirically the theoretical conjecture by Musso and Schiavo (2008) that, to 
overcome financial constraint, a firm will eliminate long term investments, and this may have an 
adverse effect on its long-term growth prospects. Results using the BLM measure, however, show 
positive and significant coefficients for both low (coefficient = 24.417; p<0.01) and high 
(coefficient = 20.272; p<0.05) future value-creating groups, although the absolute magnitude of 





2.3.4 Financial constraints and cost stickiness during the business cycle  
To investigate the relation between financial constraint and cost stickiness during the business 
cycle (expansion and contraction), the sample has been divided into expansion and contraction 
based on announcements by the NBER. Table 2.5, Panel A, reports regression results using the 
NBER business cycle measure. The SA model in columns (1) and (2) shows regression results for 
the expansion and contraction periods, respectively. The variable of interest is β5, which is 
significant during both expansion (coefficient = 0.020; t statistic = 1.68, p < 0.10) and contraction 
periods (coefficient = 0.064; t statistic = 2.35; p < 0.05). I find consistent results using WW and 
BLM. I also use the OECD composite leading indicator (CLI) as an alternative measure of the 
business cycle for testing H2. Reported results in Panel B of Table 2.5 show significant positive 
coefficients on β5 for the WW and BLM models (columns 3 to 6) for both the economic expansion 
and economic contraction periods.    
The results support the premise of H2, that during expansionary periods when information 
asymmetry is low, investors charge higher returns from financially constrained firms and, thus, 
could restrict financially constrained firms from accessing external finance. On the other hand, 
during contractionary periods investors have limited money to invest, and are likely to be more 
sceptical and selective. As a result, it becomes more difficult and time consuming for constrained 
firms to find external finance on favourable terms. Therefore, constrained firms minimize costs by 
reducing unutilised resources. This result refutes Chevalier and Scharfstein’s (1996) finding that 
during contraction, when firms have low cash flow and face the difficulty of raising finance 
externally, financially-constrained supermarkets increase prices compared to their unconstrained 
counterparts, to increase short-term profit. Instead my findings are aligned with Liu et al.’s (2017b) 
conclusion that, if financially constrained firms increase prices during economic contraction, it 
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would create the opportunity for non-constrained competitors to engage in a predatory pricing 
strategy, which would hinder competition, resulting in constrained firms being driven out of the 
market. However, although the absolute magnitude of less stickiness is higher during contraction 
periods compared to expansion periods in all three models, and across both business cycle 
measures, the difference in coefficients is not statistically different between the two sub-periods 





















 TABLE 2.5: Business Cycle, Financial Constraint and Cost Stickiness 
PANEL A: NBER        
 SA  SA WW WW BLM  BLM 
 Expansion Contraction  Expansion Contraction  Expansion Contraction  





)  0.572*** 0.596*** 0.584*** 0.595*** 0.791*** 0.849*** 
 [25.98] [12.45] [35.20] [15.34] [41.68] [9.84] 


















β3: FC  0.009*** 0.005* 0.044*** 0.025 2.267*** 0.714 
 [6.68] [1.83] [5.12] [1.30] [4.50] [0.50] 


















β5: FC * β2 0.020* 0.064** 0.159* 0.452** 22.401*** 29.266* 
 [1.68] [2.35] [1.74] [2.30] [3.66] [1.71] 
β6:SUDEC * β2 0.078*** 0.143*** 0.072*** 0.132*** 0.085*** 0.114*** 
 [5.54] [5.68] [4.64] [4.73] [3.92] [3.46] 
β7: AIN * β2 -0.048*** -0.039*** -0.054*** -0.045*** -0.039*** -0.043*** 
 [-9.45] [-3.67] [-9.45] [-3.91] [-4.27] [-3.00] 
β8: EIN * β2 3.894*** 2.812* 4.209*** 4.135** 1.916 4.648 
 [4.57] [1.65] [4.12] [1.99] [1.26] [1.13] 
β9: RET * β2 0.397*** 0.111 0.450*** 0.225 0.287* 0.095 
 [3.70] [0.57] [3.64] [1.07] [1.83] [0.40] 
β10: SUDEC -0.059*** -0.055*** -0.058*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.052*** 
 [-38.47] [-14.53] [-35.08] [-13.17] [-25.27] [-8.69] 
β11: AIN 0.008*** 0.016*** 0.007*** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.022*** 
 [8.05] [6.22] [5.91] [5.38] [8.01] [6.20] 
β12: EIN 0.647*** 0.521*** 0.825*** 0.686** 0.637*** 0.479 
 [7.31] [2.61] [6.57] [2.32] [4.02] [0.85] 
β13: RET -0.352*** -0.280*** -0.297*** -0.248*** -0.357*** -0.322*** 
 [-20.76] [-7.62] [-15.23] [-5.93] [-15.61] [-6.40] 
Constant 0.047*** 0.051 0.035*** 0.039 -0.028** -0.090** 
 [4.82] [1.49] [3.50] [1.19] [-2.31] [-2.48] 
Industry No No No No No No 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 104,294 20,545 84,120 17,005 48,615 7,840 
Adj. R-squared 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.54 0.50 
Note: Panel A reports the results from the FE regression of association between financial constraints and SG&A cost 
behaviour during expansion and contraction period using NBER. Robust t-statistics are in brackets and are based on 













PANEL B: OECD        
 SA  SA WW WW BLM  BLM 
 Expansion Contraction  Expansion Contraction  Expansion Contraction  





)  0.605*** 0.552*** 0.586*** 0.589*** 0.797*** 0.793*** 
 [22.48] [19.77] [28.59] [27.41] [31.42] [29.41] 


















β3: FC  0.006*** 0.010*** 0.031*** 0.051*** 2.455*** 1.586** 
 [3.74] [6.19] [2.76] [4.57] [3.80] [2.28] 


















β5: FC * β2 0.022 0.046*** 0.229* 0.278** 16.893** 24.635*** 
 [1.42] [2.98] [1.94] [2.41] [2.30] [3.04] 
β6:SUDEC * β2 0.104*** 0.094*** 0.099*** 0.091*** 0.107*** 0.099*** 
 [6.02] [5.52] [5.22] [4.86] [4.57] [3.83] 
β7: AIN * β2 -0.048*** -0.046*** -0.055*** -0.051*** -0.048*** -0.035*** 
 [-7.72] [-7.55] [-7.45] [-7.71] [-5.12] [-2.89] 
β8: EIN * β2 4.126*** 3.453*** 4.508*** 4.068*** 5.357*** 1.171 
 [3.67] [3.49] [3.08] [3.70] [2.60] [0.59] 
β9: RET * β2 0.003 0.487*** 0.086 0.534*** -0.287 0.651*** 
 [0.02] [3.68] [0.54] [3.54] [-1.60] [3.51] 
β10: SUDEC -0.056*** -0.061*** -0.055*** -0.061*** -0.049*** -0.057*** 
 [-28.72] [-30.72] [-25.99] [-28.24] [-18.99] [-19.05] 
β11: AIN 0.006*** 0.012*** 0.003** 0.013*** 0.006*** 0.022*** 
 [4.27] [9.31] [2.18] [8.12] [3.18] [10.74] 
β12: EIN 0.683*** 0.592*** 0.941*** 0.698*** 0.729*** 0.544** 
 [5.59] [5.48] [5.23] [4.36] [3.67] [2.36] 
β13: RET -0.363*** -0.335*** -0.329*** -0.272*** -0.400*** -0.320*** 
 [-16.71] [-15.62] [-13.22] [-10.98] [-14.06] [-10.82] 
Constant 0.039** 0.056*** 0.030* 0.040** -0.015 -0.035* 
 [2.50] [3.34] [1.89] [2.35] [-0.89] [-1.93] 
Industry No No No No No No 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 59,042 65,797 47,689 53,436 30,354 26,101 
Adj. R-squared 0.51 0.52 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.54 
Note: Panel B reports the results from the FE regression of association between financial constraints and SG&A cost 
behaviour during expansion and contraction period using OECD. Robust t-statistics are in brackets and are based on 














PANEL C: Z-test of difference in coefficient 
  Contraction  Expansion   





(Std. Error) z-stat 

































Note: Panel C reports the Z-test of difference in coefficients of FE regression reported in Panel A and B business 
cycle. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. Z-statistic to test for differences across groups is computed as 

















2.3.5 Additional tests  
2.3.5.1 Corporate governance, financial constraints and cost stickiness  
Corporate governance plays a monitoring role in alleviating the empire building tendency of 
managers by restraining them from increasing SG&A costs excessively when sales increase, and 
encouraging them to downsize unused resources in SG&A costs when sales decrease (Chen et al., 
2012). Weak governance leads to managers investing in value-destroying projects (Titman et al., 
2004). This monitoring mechanism of corporate governance also plays a role in alleviating 
financial constraint. Francis et al. (2013) show that better corporate governance decreases financial 
constraints: an effect that is more pronounced in countries with relatively weak country-level 
governance protection. The baseline model did not include a corporate governance score and, 
hence, could raise an omitted variable concern. In order to alleviate this concern, I reran the baseline 
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regression for strong versus weak corporate governance groups. I consider two corporate 
governance indices, namely, the G-index (Gompers et al., 2003) (data are collected from the 
Institutional Shareholder Services), and the E-index (Bebchuk et al., 2008). For both of these 
measures, a higher value indicates weak governance. I create strong (weak) governance groups 
with observations below (equal and above) the median G- and E-indices. Untabulated results reveal 
that the coefficients on β5 are insignificant for strong as well as weak corporate governance sub-
groups across all three measures of financial constraints (e.g., the coefficients on β5 are 0.016 (t 
statistic 0.11) for strong and 0.048 (t statistic 0.39) for weak corporate governance groups following 
the G-index measure. The corresponding coefficients are -0.141 (t statistic -0.98) and 0.165 (t 
statistic 1.34) for the E-index measure, when SA is used as the proxy for financial constraints. One 
of the possible reasons behind these insignificant results could be the extremely small sample size 
for this test (for both E-index and G-index, the maximum observations is 7,189).   
 
2.3.5.2 Change in tax rates, financial constraints and cost stickiness  
I consider whether changes in corporate income tax rates affect cost behaviour of financially-
constrained firms. I posit that retaining unutilised resources could be a strategy to decrease tax 
expense in high tax rate years, while cash savings can be obtained by reducing slack resources in 
years with tax rate reductions (Guenther, 1994). Gordon and Lee (2001) find that change in the 
corporate tax rate influences corporate debt policy. Guenther (1994) hypothesises, and finds 
evidence, that firms engage in income decreasing accruals in the year prior to tax rate reductions.  
 Over the sample period, there has not been a significant increase or decrease in the tax rate 
in the U.S. except for the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which decreased the corporate tax rate from 46 
percent to 34 percent. Therefore, I use the Tax Reform Act of 1986 for this analysis. I hypothesise 
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that prior to the 1986 tax rate reduction regime, financially-constrained firms would have engaged 
in higher sticky cost behaviour by retaining resources. But after the 1986 tax rate reduction, 
financially-constrained firms would have incentives to engage in less sticky behaviour by shedding 
unutilised resources and associated SG&A costs, to benefit from cash savings.  
 To test my prediction, I restrict the test period from 1986 to 1988, and denote 1986 as the 
last year with a 46 percent tax rate; 1987 as the transition year; and 1988 as the first year with a 34 
percent tax rate. The coefficients on β5 are insignificant in 1986 for both the SA and the WW 
financial constraint measures but are positive and significant in 1988 (coefficients 0.148 and 1.39, 
significant at p<0.05 and p<0.01 for the SA and WW measures respectively) (untabulated).   
 
2.4 Chapter Summary  
Although traditional cost behaviour identifies all costs as either fixed or variable, the relation 
between cost and cost driver is more complex (Noreen, 1991). Some costs rise more when cost 
drivers increase but do not decrease proportionately with a decrease in activity level. This cost 
pattern is termed cost stickiness. A significant number of academic research papers have 
documented evidence of cost stickiness in the U.S. and in international contexts. In this paper, I 
have examined the cost behaviour of financially-constrained firms.  
I argue that the managers of financially constrained firms have an incentive to reduce slack 
resources, as an attempt to survive the adversities of financial constraints. My findings show that 
financially constrained firms exhibit less sticky behaviour. This prediction is in line with the 
“efficiency” view of cost stickiness implying that firms will decrease unused resources for the right 
reasons i.e., for survival. On the other hand, retaining unutilised resources by managers of 
financially-constrained firms for ‘empire building’ reasons, is a manifestation of “bad” cost 
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stickiness, i.e., stickiness stemming from the wrong reasons. I document the presence of both 
“good” and “bad” less stickiness using three contextual settings: namely, earnings management 
incentives, agency problem and the future value-creating potential of SG&A costs. I also 
investigate whether the association between financial constraints and cost stickiness varies across 
the economic cycle. I find that, less cost stickiness is observed during both economic expansion 






















TRADE CREDIT AND COST STICKINESS (ESSAY TWO)5 
 
Prior research infers that suppliers have access to information related to customers’ operational 
stability and performance that can restrain customers’ empire building incentives (see, e.g. Cao et 
al., 2018; Fisman & Love, 2003; Petersen & Rajan, 1997). As trade credit is based on long-term 
relationships and trust, and involves sunk costs such as legal procedures, bargaining costs and 
search costs, suppliers have an interest in the operational stability of their clients (see, e.g. Cunat, 
2007; Love & Zaidi, 2010). There is a ripple effect of customer activities on the supplier firm 
performance as well. Jorion and Zhang (2009), for instance, document that firms supplying credit 
to customers who subsequently file Chapter 11 bankruptcy, suffer from large negative abnormal 
stock returns. Additionally, suppliers tend to reduce both the quantity and tenure of credit available 
to financially constrained clients (Love & Zaidi, 2010). Suppliers are knowledgeable about clients’ 
overall industry stability, and if the suppliers are the sole providers of inputs, then that gives them 
higher bargaining power, and the power to stop supplies, if payments are not paid on time (Uesugi 
& Yamashiro, 2008). Therefore, suppliers have both the incentives and the opportunities to monitor 
their customers’ operations.  
In the context of cost management, suppliers are likely to monitor customers’ actions 
related to downward resource adjustment, because the retention of unutilised resources would 
decrease the present value of sales, increase the opportunity cost of keeping unused resources, and 
affect current cash flows of clients adversely. All these would have an adverse effect on a supplier’s 
 
5This chapter has been accepted in Accounting & Finance (https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12606).  
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finance and overall operation. As suppliers have both the incentives and the scope to monitor 
buyers’ resource adjustment decisions; I expect trade credit to be associated with cost stickiness. 
 
3.1 Literature Review & Hypotheses Development 
3.1.1 Trade credit and cost stickiness  
Suppliers can finance a firm’s resources by extending trade credit (Petersen & Rajan, 1997; Cao et 
al., 2018). Although trade credit is a more expensive form of finance than bank loans (see, e.g. 
Afrifa et al., 2018; Guariglia & Mateut, 2006; Lin & Chou, 2015; Yang, 2011), many firms around 
the globe use trade credit as their main source of finance, which begs the question as to why firms 
prefer this source. To answer this, a number of theories, namely: financing advantage theory, 
transaction cost theory, as well as signalling and information asymmetry theory, have been used in 
prior literature to explain the usage of trade credit.  
 Following bank credit, trade credit is the second major source of external finance, and plays 
a pivotal role in the growth of clients’ operations (see, e.g. Berger & Udell, 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt 
& Maksimovic, 2001; Cunat, 2007; Norden et al., 2020). Suppliers, through trade credit, can 
influence clients’ business cycles either positively or negatively (see, e.g. Jacobson & Von 
Schedvin, 2015; Norden et al., 2020). The financing advantage theory suggests that it is easier for 
suppliers to investigate the credit worthiness of clients, and force the repayments, because of 
frequent visits by the supplier to the client’s premises that lower information asymmetry (Petersen 
& Rajan, 1997). Bank loans usually contain stricter conditions, and require stringent collateral, 
owing to the heightened information asymmetry between bank (the lender), and client (the 
borrower), which leads to some borrowers being credit-rationed by banks (see, e.g. Cheng et al., 
2018; Yang, 2011). Trade credit can reduce transaction costs for the client by cumulating and 
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paying on a monthly or quarterly basis, instead of every time the goods are delivered (Petersen & 
Rajan, 1997). In addition, the size and timing of a client’s order sends signals to the supplier about 
that client’s business condition; and a client’s inability to take advantage of early payment 
discounts also signals their creditworthiness (see, e.g. Fisman & Love, 2003; Petersen & Rajan, 
1997). 
 According to Jain (2001), the main motivation behind extending trade credit is the savings 
in monitoring cost by suppliers. Suppliers hold private information about their clients, which equips 
them to monitor client activities (Biais & Gollier, 1997). Hirshleifer et al. (2018) find that the 
amount of trade credit offered to a buyer, and the ability of the buyer to pay the credit on time, are 
both associated with future stock returns, thereby, confirming the proposition that suppliers possess 
private information about buyers. Aktas et al. (2012) document that use of trade credit sends a 
signal to investors about the quality of investments: a signal that is stronger in firms with weak 
governance. The authors conclude that trade credit is an alternative to standard governance 
mechanisms in mitigating the agency problem. Cao et al. (2018) find support for their conjecture 
that higher use of trade credit leads to lower future stock price crash risk, owing to suppliers’ 
monitoring vigilance, whereby, managerial opportunism is restrained. I posit that such monitoring 
behaviour can also be manifested in cost management decisions.  
Trade credit is an important alternative source of finance for both short- and long-term debt 
(Deloof & Jegers, 1999). The substitution hypothesis posits that trade credit is a substitute for bank 
credit (see, e.g. Deloof & Jegers, 1999; Blasio, 2005). Therefore, suppliers perform a crucial 
monitoring role for clients who rely more on trade credit as opposed to bank credit. This monitoring 
function becomes critical if the inputs supplied to the clients are very specialized or customized, 
because such inputs may be difficult to re-sell quickly should clients’ default on their payment and, 
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thus, necessitate debt recovery. Therefore, by extending trade credit, the supplier puts itself at risk, 
owing to the possibility that the customer might engage in value destroying activities (Cao et al., 
2018), i.e., misuse of resources and/or investing heavily in SG&A costs resulting in default. 
Additionally, Jacobson and Von Schedvin (2015) document that suppliers suffer from significant 
losses resulting from client’s failure to pay trade credit, and this also increases their bankruptcy 
risk. Thereby, the supplier is likely to actively monitor a customer’s overall operation and cost 
management activities, in particular.  
Prior studies have documented that managers with empire building tendencies are likely to 
add excessive resources when sales increase and are unlikely to reduce unutilized resources when 
sales decline, resulting in cost stickiness (Banker et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2012). They further show 
that this relation is stronger in firms with weak corporate governance. Therefore, self-serving 
managers might be less tempted to shed unused resources, because downsizing by decreasing 
resources reduces their chance for maximizing private benefits. Given that such actions increase 
the default risk for suppliers, the suppliers have incentives to monitor the buyer’s cost management 
practices. This is likely to be reflected in firms using trade credit to shed the slack resources in 
order to reduce avoidable costs in the event of a sales decline: a manifestation of lower cost 
stickiness.   
 However, from a resource adjustment theory perspective, one can argue that, once 
committed, resources are not easy to scale down without incurring additional adjustment costs, 
e.g., severance pay to terminated employees, pressure from media and regulators. Similarly, there 
is cost related to upward resource adjustment, such as training costs of new employees, and 
transaction costs of purchasing new equipment (Cheng et al., 2018). For instance, if firms requiring 
specialized skilled workers respond to a temporary demand drop by firing such workers, then the 
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subsequent search and hiring costs might outweigh the opportunity costs of retaining the workers. 
In addition, firms may retain unused resources when sales decline, even though that retention 
results in a decrease in the present value of sales and affects firm performance adversely, because 
suppliers provide trade credit even to unprofitable customers as long as they are confident about 
the customer’s future sales potential (Petersen & Rajan, 1997). From the perspective of managerial 
expectations, retaining unutilised resources decreases the present value of sales, and increases the 
opportunity cost of keeping unused resources, thereby, affecting firm performance adversely. This 
becomes more acute with successive decreases in sales. Rational managers, therefore, are expected 
to cut down unused resources6.  
Although there are competing views on the association between trade credit and cost 
behaviour, I posit that, when sales decrease, suppliers will force managers to reduce unused 
resources disproportionately more for the purpose of increasing operating efficiency and reducing 
the risk of customer bankruptcy. This perspective is consistent with prior studies by Petersen and 
Rajan (1997), Fisman and Love (2003) and Cao et al. (2018), all of which conclude that trade credit 
plays a monitoring role, courtesy of the supplier’s better access to information on buyers’ 
operational stability and performance7. Therefore, I develop the following directional hypothesis: 




6To rule out the possibility that the association between trade credit and cost behaviour is driven by resource adjustment 
and/or managerial expectations of future sales, rather than the monitoring intensity of trade credit providers, I have 
included empirical proxies for resource adjustments and managerial expectations in my regression models. 
7As discussed before, trade credit is an external monitoring mechanism deployed by suppliers. Managerial expectation 
of future sales, on the other hand, is a firm-specific issue based on the manager’s optimism or pessimism about future 
sales/demand. Similarly, operating slack arises because of managers’ resource adjustment decisions. Thus, trade credit 
is inherently different from managerial expectations and operating slack.    
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3.1.2 The agency problem, trade credit and cost stickiness  
The association of lower cost stickiness with more trade credit, however, provides only a partial 
picture of the cost behaviour of firms. For instance, Kama and Weiss (2013) and Yang (2019) show 
that managers cut back resources to meet earnings benchmarks (bad stickiness); whereas, such cost 
cutting could also be a rational response to financial distress (good stickiness). As the arguments 
for the development of H1 above are based on the assertions that trade credit plays an external 
monitoring role, I posit that the hypothesized relationship in H1 above is likely to be moderated by 
firm-specific agency problem.  
 The agency problem occurs due to the misalignment of interests between principals 
(shareholders) and agents (managers). An implication of the agency problem is that managers 
engage in empire building activities, e.g., growing the firm beyond its optimal size by retaining 
unutilized resources, for status, power, compensation, and prestige (see, e.g. Chen et al., 2012; 
Hope & Thomas, 2008; Jensen, 1986; Masulis et al., 2007; Stulz, 1990). For example, 
overinvestment in labour (e.g., over-hiring or under-firing) could be motivated by managers’ desire 
to engage in empire building activities by retaining underperforming projects (Williamson, 1963). 
Based on prior literatures of agency theory, slack resources are retained because managers get both 
monetary and nonmonetary benefits from managing large, complex organizations, and try to avoid 
time-consuming, difficult decisions related to shedding unused resources (see, e.g. Bertrand & 
Mullainathan, 2003; Chen et al., 2012; Datta et al., 2010). Therefore, firms with marked agency 
problem have more opportunity to engage in overspending in operational costs, such as SG&A. 
Chen et al. (2012) document that managers’ empire building tendencies lead to cost stickiness, and 
this positive relation is weaker under strong corporate governance, implying that corporate 
governance can mitigate the agency problem, and results in lower cost stickiness.  
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Financing advantage theory posits that providers of trade credit can easily investigate and 
monitor the creditworthiness of their clients, courtesy of having better access to information related 
to customers’ operational stability and performance, compared to banks and institutional lenders 
(see, e.g. Cao et al., 2018; Fisman & Love, 2003; Petersen & Rajan, 1997). Thereby, when sales 
decrease, trade credit will play a stronger monitoring role in firms plagued with high agency 
problem. This should be reflected in lower cost stickiness for firms with high agency problem in 
the setting: a manifestation of the monitoring role of trade credit on cost behaviour.  
H2: Trade credit is associated with lower cost stickiness in high agency problem firms, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
3.1.3 Product market competition, trade credit and cost stickiness  
Product market competition has been linked to improved managerial efficiency by decreasing 
operating costs and reducing agency costs (Baggs & De Bettignies, 2007). Therefore, it is likely 
that product market competition may moderate the association between trade credit and cost 
stickiness. Li and Zheng (2017) document that product market competition results in cost 
stickiness. The authors argue that when firms face competition, management will opt to invest more 
instead of curtailing resources, in order to maintain or strengthen their competitive position in the 
market. Sales decline could be an indicator that the firm is losing its market position and could 
result in aggressive investment in research and development, marketing or quality control, thus, 
leading to sticky cost behaviour (Li & Zheng, 2017). In addition, owing to resource adjustment 
costs associated with downsizing operations, e.g. severance payments, managers are likely to delay 
shedding unutilised resources until they can ascertain whether the decrease in demand is permanent 
(Li & Zheng, 2017).  
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However, the missing link in this finding of Li and Zheng’s (2017) study, is whether trade 
credit moderates this strategy of retaining slack resources by firms facing high product market 
competition. Economists argue that firms operating in competitive industries have strong 
incentives to minimize slack to reduce unnecessary cost in order to maximise profits, rather than 
run the risk of going out of business (Giroud & Mueller, 2011). Baggs and De Bettignies (2007) 
document that competition leads to cost reduction, and that this relation is more prominent in firms 
with agency problem. Thus, market competition acts as an external governance mechanism (see, 
e.g. Ko et al., 2016; Lee et al., 2018). Firms operating in high (low) competitive environments have 
strong (weak) corporate governance environments: a factor that affects agency costs differentially 
(Giroud & Mueller, 2011). Therefore, owing to suppliers’ monitoring roles, I would expect that the 
association between high levels of trade credit and lower cost stickiness should be stronger for 
firms operating in weak competitive markets. 
H3: Trade credit is associated with lower cost stickiness for firms operating in weak competitive 
markets, ceteris paribus. 
 
3.1.4 Customer concentration, trade credit and cost stickiness 
The underlying assumption so far in this study has been that all suppliers have equal ability and 
incentive to monitor customer behaviour. However, this disregards the possibility that variation in 
the bargaining power of buyers over suppliers can moderate the association between trade credit 
and cost stickiness. I address this concern by incorporating customer concentration as a proxy for 
suppliers’ monitoring incentives.  
Customer concentration refers to the concentration of the customer base, and is a critical 
factor in the supplier-customer relationship (Huang et al., 2016). Prior research documents that 
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customer concentration is related to supplier financial policy (see, e.g. Banerjee et al., 2008; Cohen 
& Li, 2016; Huang et al., 2016; Itzkowitz, 2013; Titman & Wessels, 1988; Wang, 2012), and to 
supplier performance and risk (see, e.g. Campello & Gao, 2017; Dhaliwal et al., 2016; Huang et 
al., 2016; Kalwani & Narayandas, 1995; Patatoukas, 2012; Piercy & Lane, 2006; Ravenscraft, 
1983). Agostino and Trivieri (2014) assume that when customer concentration is high, suppliers 
have strong incentives to monitor their customers’ financial health.  
However, major customers are likely to exert bargaining power over suppliers by 
demanding lower prices and delayed payments (see, e.g. Bhattacharyya & Nain, 2011; Campello 
& Gao, 2017; Fee & Thomas, 2004; Murfin & Njoroge, 2014). This is likely to lower profits and 
increase the volatility of both earnings and cash flow for the suppliers. Also, if a supplier has an 
overall low market share; in other words, there are several suppliers available in the market, then 
the customer faces comparatively low switching costs, and has high bargaining power over the 
supplier (see, e.g. Hui et al., 2012; Inderst & Wey, 2007; Schumacher, 1991; Snyder, 1996). 
Additionally, if the customer is less reliant on the supplier because supplier provides only a small 
portion of total inputs then the customer can switch to another supplier without incurring extra 
switching costs, or manufacture the product internally (Dhaliwal et al., 2016). Thereby, suppliers’ 
monitoring role will be prominent when customer concentration is low (i.e. stronger bargaining 
power of supplier), resulting in lower cost stickiness. 







3.2 Research Design 
3.2.1 Empirical model  
The extensive literature on cost stickiness uses the following popular model developed by 
Anderson et al. (2003) to test for the presence or absence of cost stickiness (e.g., Chen et al., 2012; 
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I use the same model but first use COGS as the cost component. The rationale for doing so 
stems from the fact that COGS includes direct and indirect material costs that are financed by the 
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11




                               ∑ 𝛽𝑛
17
𝑛=12 𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑛,𝑡 +             (3.2b) 
 
where COGS (Compustat data item COGS) is costs of goods sold, SG&A (Compustat data 
item XSGA) is selling, general and administrative expenses, and SALE (Compustat data item 
SALE) is sales revenue. DECDUM takes the value of 1 if sales in year t are less than sales in year 
t-1, and 0 otherwise. For equations (3.2a) and (3.2b), the coefficient β1 measures the percentage 
increase in COGS and SG&A respectively, with a 1% increase in sales revenue. The sum of 
coefficients β1 and β2 measures the percentage decrease in COGS and SG&A with a 1% decrease 
in sales. A significant positive β1 and a significant negative β2 confirm cost stickiness.  
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TC is the trade credit variable (detailed in subsection 3.2.2). ECONVAR are the economic 
variables, which include successive decrease (SUDEC), GDP growth rate (GDP), asset intensity 
(AIN), employee intensity (EIN), stock performance (RET) and operating slack (OSLACK). These 
six economic variables are incorporated in the model, both as interactions with the sticky variable, 
β2, and as stand-alone variables.   
I discussed in section 3.1.1 that the association between trade credit and cost stickiness 
could be affected by managerial expectations regarding changes in future sales and/or resource 
adjustment costs, in addition to agency considerations. I, therefore, include SUDEC and GDP to 
proxy for the former; whilst I include AIN and EIN as proxies for the latter. SUDEC is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the revenue in year t-1 is less than the revenue in t-2, and 0 otherwise (Banker 
& Byzalov, 2014). I expect the coefficient on the interactive variable β6 (SUDEC*β2) to be positive 
and significant, indicating that successive decrease in sales revenue diminishes cost stickiness. The 
coefficient on β7 (GDP*β2) is expected to be negative, because growing GDP increases managerial 
optimism regarding future sales, thereby, prompting managers to retain unused resources: actions 
that should result in more cost stickiness. GDP is measured as real GDP growth rate (from Bureau 
of Economic Analysis). AIN is measured as the total assets divided by the sales for year t, and EIN 
is the ratio of the total number of employees over sales. The interactive variables AIN*β2 and 
EIN*β2 are expected to be negative because asset and employee intensive firms have high levels 
of cost stickiness. RET is measured as the raw stock return (from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP)). RET proxies for stock price performance, and the relation with cost 
stickiness is unclear. Good stock performance could result in shedding unutilized resources or it 
could signal future positive earnings leading to retention of unnecessary SG&A costs (Chen et al., 
2012). OSLACK is defined as the excess of resources over those needed by a firm (see, e.g. 
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Azadegan et al., 2013; Bourgeois, 1981; Nohria & Gulati, 1996). I measure OSLACK using the 
industry-adjusted cash-to-cash cycle of Hendricks et al. (2009) as follows: 
Industry-adjusted cash-to-cash = days in inventory + days in receivables – days in payables 
 
where days in inventory = 365 (average inventory/ cost of goods sold); days in receivables 
= 365(average accounts receivables/ sales); days in payables = 365(average accounts payable/ cost 
of goods sold). I derive the industry-adjusted cash-to-cash cycle by subtracting the industry mean 
cash-to-cash cycle from the cash-to-cash cycle of the firm (Hendricks et al., 2009).8 The expected 
sign of the interactive variable β11 (OSLACK*β2) is unclear because an optimistic manager may 
retain unused capacity, or a pessimistic manager may shed unused capacity. The coefficient of 
primary interest is the sign and significance of the interactive variable, β5. A positive and significant 
β5 will support H1.  
 
3.2.2 Measurement of the independent variable: Trade credit   
As there is no consensus on which is the best proxy for trade credit measurement, and the majority 
of studies use more than one trade credit measure as a proxy, I use three different measures in this 
study that have been widely used in prior studies. The trade credit measures used are: (i) the ratio 
of accounts payable to cost of goods sold (TC1=AP/COGS) (see, e.g. Afrifa et al., 2018; Garcia-
Appendini & Montoriol-Garriga, 2013; Love et al., 2007; Molina & Preve, 2012; Shenoy & 
Williams, 2017; Wu et al., 2012); (ii) the ratio of accounts payable to sales (TC2=AP/SALE) (see, 
 
8I assess the sensitivity of the results by using two alternative measures of OSLACK. First, I take the industry-adjusted 
cash-to-cash cycle and normalize it using the sum of industry mean days of inventory, accounts receivables, and 
accounts payables as deflator (Hendricks et al., 2009). Second, I use industry-adjusted days in inventory (Hendricks et 




e.g. Aktas et al., 2012; Ferrando & Mulier, 2013), and (iii) the ratio of accounts payable to purchase 
(TC3=AP/PURCHASE) (Agostino & Trivieri, 2019), where purchase is COGS plus the changes in 
inventory.  
 
3.2.3 Moderating variables   
To test the prediction of H2, I split the sample observations into low and high agency problem 
groups, based on two different measures that capture agency problem. I do so because the key 




]) and, therefore, multiplying this variable by a fourth term would make interpretation 
of the resulting term extremely difficult. Following prior literature, I use (i) capital expenditure 
(CAPEX) and (ii) acquisition ratio (ACQRATIO) as proxies for agency problem. Both of these 
measures have been used as proxies for the agency problem in prior studies by Chhaochharia et al. 
(2012), Giroud and Mueller (2010) and Guo et al. (2018). As elucidated in section 3.2.2, one of the 
consequences of the agency problem is managers’ tendency to engage in empire-building. Such 
managers are likely to overspend in the form of capital expenditure or acquire business to build an 
empire. Therefore, I have used these two measures that I believe capture the empire-building 
tendency of managers. The high agency problem group consists of observations with values of 
these variables higher than the median, while the low agency problem group consists of 
observations equal to or below the median value of these variables. Although free cash flow has 
been used as proxy for the agency problem in many prior studies, including Chen et al. (2012), I 
avoid this measure because free cash flow is the excess cash resulting from a mismatch between 
available cash and the firm’s growth prospects (Jensen, 1986). However, managers do not 
necessarily misuse free cash flow for personal benefit. A pessimistic manager might hold on to 
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more free cash when sales decline. Additionally, this variable has been used in operations 
management research as a proxy for slack resources, rather than for agency problem.   
 To test H3, I use the Li et al. (2013)
9 measurement of product market competition (PMC), 
which is based on perceptions of management related to competition reflected in the MD&A 
section of the 10-K filings (Li & Zheng, 2017). Li et al. (2013) count the number of times any of 
the words “competition, competitor, competitive, compete, competing” appears in each 10-K filing, 
and then scale this number by the total number of words in the filing; thus, a high value of this 
measure indicates a more competitive environment. The advantage of this text-based measure is 
that it reflects managers’ perceived intensity of competition and its impact on their deliberate 
resource adjustments (Li & Zheng, 2017). Using the Li et al. (2013) and Li and Zheng (2017) 
methodology, I rank the PMC variable into deciles, and then standardize it to lie between 0 and 1, 
where 0 is a low PMC (below or equal to 0.44) group and 1 is a high PMC (above 0.44) group. 
One limitation of using this publicly available data is that it reduces the sample size to 27,433 firm-
year observations: a significant reduction from the baseline sample. I, therefore, caution readers to 
consider this sample attrition concern in interpreting the results for this test.    
 To test the moderating effect of customer concentration (CC) (test of H4), I use Compustat’s 
segment customer files to identify suppliers that disclose sales to major corporate customers. Since 
1976, the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 14 (SFAS 14) of the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has required suppliers to disclose external customers that 
individually account for 10% or more of their revenues. FAS 131 superseded SFAS 14 in 1997, 
but the requirement to report such customers remains intact for public companies under SEC 
Regulation S-K Item 101. I measure customer concentration as an indicator variable that is set to 
 
9The data is available from Professor Li’s webpage at http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/feng/ 
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one if a supplier discloses at least one corporate customer that accounts for at least 10% of its 
annual revenues, and zero otherwise (Campello & Gao, 2017; Dhaliwal et al., 2016; Huang et al., 
2016).  
 
3.2.4 Sample selection and descriptive statistics  
Financial data are collected from Compustat, whilst the stock return data are collected from the 
CRSP for the years 1977 to 2017. For the cost stickiness regression, I need two years of lag values 
for SALE; thereby, the main sample period starts from 1979. I deliberately choose a long sample 
period to provide a richer analysis of the cost stickiness behaviour and, also, because the seminal 
work by Anderson et al. (2003) comprises data from 1979. Panel A, Table 3.1, illustrates the sample 
selection process, which follows the process used by Anderson et al. (2003). I begin with a total 
sample of 460,351 firm-year observations during 1977–2017. I then exclude firm-year observations 
from the regulated industries (two-digit SIC code 48-49) and financial institutions (two-digit SIC 
codes 60-69). This process eliminates a total of 172,681 firm-year observations. After excluding 
observations based on missing data on SALE and SG&A for the current and previous periods, zero 
SALE and SG&A values, negative SALE and SG&A values, as well as SALE<SG&A and 
duplicate observations, the sample size drops down to 202,565 observations. I lost 22,775 firm-
year observations because of the requirement for one-year lagged revenue and SG&A observations, 
and a further 4,317 firm-year observations were dropped for years 1977 and 1978. Another 709 
firm-year observations were eliminated for missing values on accounts payable, accounts payable 
higher than total assets, accounts payable higher than current liabilities and accounts payable higher 
than total liabilities, resulting in a preliminary sample of 174,764 firm-year observations. The 
sample selection procedure is explained in Panel A, Table 3.1.  
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To avoid the undesirable influence of outliers, I winsorize all the continuous variables in 
the extreme 1% of their respective distributions. In the regression models, sample size varies 
depending on the model-specific data requirements. Firm-year observations come from a wide 
variety of industries, with two-digit SIC codes, 35–39 (27.55%) and 70-79 (14.32%) commanding 
the largest industry representation in the sample, as reported in Panel B, Table 3.1. Panel B also 
reports the industry-wise mean, median and standard deviation for TC1 because prior studies by 
Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Fisman and Love (2003) document that use of trade credit varies 
across industries. The agriculture and mining industry (two-digit SIC 1-14) has the highest TC1 (a 
mean of 45%), followed by business services (two-digit SIC 70-79) (a mean 19%), and chemical, 
petroleum, rubber and allied products (two-digit SIC 28-30) (a mean of 17%). Untabulated results 
are similar for the TC2 and TC3 measures.   
 
TABLE 3.1: Sample Selection and Industry Distribution  
PANEL A: Sample selection procedure   
Selection Process Number of 
Observations 
Total observations produced for 1977 to 2017 460,351 
Drop: observations for SIC codes between 4800 to 4999 (29,807) 
Drop: observations for SIC codes between 6000 to 6999 (142,874) 
 287,670 
Drop: observations with missing data on sales and SG&A for current period and previous 
period; sales and SG&A values are zero; sales and SG&A are negative; sales are smaller 





Drop: one year-lagged variable for Sale and SG&A (22,775) 
 179,790 
Drop: observations produced for 1977 and 1978 (4,317) 
 175,473 
Drop: observations with missing accounts payable; accounts payable higher than total 




     (709) 










PANEL B: Industry distribution 
                                                                                                                                         TC1 
Code Industry Observations % 
observations 
Mean Median Std. 
Dev. 
1-14 Agriculture and mining 16,655 9.53 0.45 0.22 0.49 
15-17 Building construction  2,775 1.59 0.13 0.09 0.13 
20-21 Food and kindred products  6,028 3.45 0.12 0.10 0.10 
22-23 Textile mill products and apparels 3,732 2.14 0.11 0.09 0.08 
24-27 Lumber, furniture, paper and printing 8,630 4.94 0.12 0.09 0.10 
28-30 Chemical, petroleum, rubber and allied 







31-34 Metal 9,839 5.63 0.11 0.10 0.09 
35-39 Machinery, electrical, computer 







40-47 Railroad and other transportation 4,761 2.72 0.15 0.09 0.20 
50-52 Wholesale goods, building materials  9,917 5.67 0.13 0.11 0.15 
53-59 Store merchandise, auto dealers, home 







70-79 Business services 25,022 14.32 0.19 0.12 0.26 
80-99 Other  9,354 5.35 0.13 0.09 0.17 
 Total 174,764 100.00    
 
3.3 Empirical Results & Analysis  
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
Descriptive statistics of the sample are reported in Table 3.2. Over the study period from 1979 to 













0.10 (0.08), 0.11 (0.08) and 0.11 (0.08), respectively. Average sales revenue for the sample is 
$2,059.79 million (median $148.73 million). Average COGS and SG&A expense are $1,453.38 
million (median $79.46 million) and $352.09 million (median $28.68 million), respectively. TC1 
(accounts payable deflated by costs of goods sold), TC2 (accounts payable deflated by sales) and 
TC3 (accounts payable deflated by purchase) have means (medians) of 0.18 (0.11), 0.09 (0.07) and 
0.17 (0.11), respectively. Average number of employees per firm is approximately 8,910. On 
average, sample firms use 0.01 thousand (median 0.01) employees and $1.27 million (median $0.88 
million) assets to support each million dollars in sales. The median firm of the sample has not 
experienced a decline in sales for two consecutive years (median 0.00 and mean 0.29). The mean 
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(median) of CAPEX (capital expenditure scaled by total assets) and ACQRATIO (sum of the value 
of all acquisitions made by a firm in a year scaled by firm’s total market capitalization) are 0.07 
(0.04) and 0.03 (0.00), respectively. The mean of PMC and CC are 0.60 and 0.44, respectively. 
 
TABLE 3.2: Descriptive Statistics  





) 174,764 0.10 0.34 -0.03 0.08 0.22 





) 196,241 0.11 0.38 -0.03 0.08 0.23 





) 174,764 0.11 0.31 -0.02 0.08 0.21 
SG&A ($mil) 174,764 352.09 1,782.97 7.02 28.68 127.77 
DECDUM 174,764 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 
SUDEC 159,218 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 
GDP 174,764 2.74 1.79 1.9 2.9 4.00 
AIN 174,738 1.27 1.25 0.59 0.88 1.41 
ASSET ($mil) 174,738 2,275.67 13,700.50 28.74 139.88 726.06 
EIN 162,930 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
EMP (thousands)  162,930 8.91 38.07 0.21 0.99 4.50 
RET 134,414 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.01 1.04 
OSLACK 152,253 1.67 379.23 -42.42 7.51 47.63 
TC1  174,636 0.18 0.23 0.07 0.11 0.18 
TC2 174,738 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.11 
TC3 173,104 0.17 0.23 0.07 0.11 0.18 
CAPEX 172,893 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.08 
ACQRATIO 152,764 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PMC 27,433 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 1.00 
CC 160,679 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Note: SALE is sales or revenue. COGS is costs of goods sold and SG&A is selling, general and administrative 
expenses. ASSET is total assets. EMP is total number of employees. Other variables are defined in the Appendix B.  
 









), respectively. I find that majority of the correlations 





) and TC1 and negatively correlated with TC2 and TC3. From Panel B, change 





































         
SUDEC [4] -0.172*** -0.174*** -0.159*** 1         
GDP [5] 0.128*** 0.113*** 0.081*** 0.003 1        
AIN [6] -0.041*** -0.026*** -0.219*** 0.062*** -0.025*** 1       
EIN [7] -0.013*** -0.004 -0.049*** -0.013*** 0.047*** 0.052*** 1      
RET [8] 0.149*** 0.079*** 0.107*** 0.037*** -0.074*** -0.023*** 0.003 1     
OSLACK [9] -0.006* -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.003 0.001 0.035*** 0.019*** 0.000 1    
TC1 [10] 0.009** -0.041*** -0.132*** 0.027*** 0.013*** 0.485*** 0.025*** -0.006* 0.098*** 1   
TC2 [11] -0.027*** -0.007* -0.172*** 0.057*** 0.026*** 0.435*** 0.047*** -0.024*** 0.070*** 0.784*** 1  
TC3 [12] -0.016*** -0.059*** -0.149*** 0.034*** 0.009*** 0.441*** 0.001 -0.011*** 0.093*** 0.925*** 0.744*** 1 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions 
 
  





























         
SUDEC [4] -0.188*** -0.252*** -0.166*** 1         
GDP [5] 0.137*** 0.101*** 0.093*** 0.004 1        
AIN [6] -0.029*** 0.026*** -0.167*** 0.059*** -0.044*** 1       
EIN [7] 0.009** 0.035*** -0.001 -0.023*** 0.049*** -0.099*** 1      
RET [8] 0.169*** 0.046*** 0.119*** 0.034*** -0.081*** -0.035*** 0.004 1     
OSLACK [9] 0.056*** 0.031*** 0.057*** -0.020*** -0.001 -0.004 -0.024*** 0.008** 1    
TC1 [10] 0.052*** 0.061*** -0.055*** 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.428*** -0.109*** 0.001 0.236*** 1   
TC2 [11] -0.011*** 0.017*** -0.137*** 0.063*** 0.032*** 0.330*** -0.077*** -0.031*** 0.151*** 0.758*** 1  
TC3 [12] 0.007* 0.023*** -0.099*** 0.024*** 0.012*** 0.414*** -0.111*** -0.008** 0.248*** 0.964*** 0.739*** 1 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions 
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3.3.2 Regression results: Trade credit and cost stickiness  
3.3.2.1 Trade credit and cost stickiness: baseline regressions 
Table 3.4, Panel A, reports the OLS and firm fixed effect results for the association between trade 
credit and cost stickiness using COGS as the dependent variable. Panel B reports the OLS and firm 
fixed effect results for the association between trade credit and cost stickiness using SG&A as the 
dependent variable. To control for unobservable industry and year characteristics associated with 
trade credit and cost stickiness, I include year and industry dummy variables in all the regression 
specifications. To take into account the time series and cross-sectional dependence in the error 
terms of the regressions, I calculate t-statistics using standard errors that are clustered by firm. 
 Panel A, Column (1), reveals that COGS increases by 0.977% for each 1% increase in sales 
and COGS decreases by 0.965% for each 1% decrease in sales. This is consistent with Chen et al. 
(2019) who find that, compared to SG&A costs, operating costs, which include COGS, are more 
responsive to fluctuations in sales and, thus, are considered more variable in nature than SG&A 
costs.  The variable of interest is β5: (𝑇𝐶 ∗  𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑈𝑀 ∗ 𝐿𝑁 [
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡−1
]). From columns (5), (7) and 
(9) it is evident that the coefficients on β5 are positive and significant across all three TC measures 
(coefficients of 0.140 (p<0.01); 0.211 (p<0.01); and 0.124 (p<0.01) for TC1, TC2 and TC3 
measures, respectively). This supports my H1, i.e., higher trade credit is associated with lower cost 
stickiness. Columns (6), (8) and (10) present the fixed effects regression results, with coefficients 
on β5 of 0.121 (p<0.01), 0.331 (p<0.01) and 0.078 (p<0.05) for the TC1, TC2 and TC3 measures, 
respectively, that are consistent with those reported using the OLS procedure. Columns (5) to (10) 
reveal that the coefficient on β4 (𝑇𝐶 ∗ 𝐿𝑁 [
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡−1
]) is negative and significant. This suggests that 
in periods of declining sales, firms’ lower unutilized resource owing to the presence of trade credit. 
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The negative coefficient on β4 and the positive coefficient on β5, although opposite in sign, imply 
the same direction of the effect of trade credit on COGS, i.e., trade credit is related to lower cost 
stickiness.  
The coefficient on SUDEC, the proxy for managerial expectations, is positive and 
significant indicating that successive decreases in sales diminish stickiness. However, the 
coefficient on GDP, another proxy for managerial expectations, is significantly positive. Although 
this contradicts my expectation, consistent with Hartlieb et al. (2020), Lee et al. (2019), Hartileb et 
al. (2019) and Li and Zheng (2017). The coefficient on AIN, a proxy for resource adjustment costs, 
is significantly negative. This indicates that asset intensive firms have higher cost stickiness. 
However, the coefficient on EIN is significantly positive which is similar to Banker et al. (2013b) 
and Chen et al. (2012). Chen et al. (2012) conjecture that firms in recent times are more likely to 
employ temporary or contractual employees, thus, lowering resource adjustment costs related to 
laying off labour when sales decrease or rehiring labour when sales increase. The coefficients on 
RET are positive; but mostly insignificant. Finally, OSLACK has a negative but insignificant 
coefficient that is similar to the finding of Bradbury and Scott (2018). 
Panel B, column (1), reports the coefficient on β1 (𝐿𝑁 [
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡−1
]) as positive and significant 
(coefficient = 0.682; t statistic = 175.23; p < 0.01), implying that SG&A expenses increase by 
0.682% for a 1% increase in sales. The coefficient on β2 is significantly negative (coefficient = -
0.192; t statistic = -27.06; p < 0.01). The sum of β1 and β2 is 0.49, which implies that SG&A 
expenses decrease by 0.49% for a 1% decrease in sales, thereby, confirming cost stickiness in my 
sample. Anderson et al. (2003) using industrial firms from 1979 to 1998 find that SG&A costs 
increase by 0.55% for each 1% increase in sales: however, SG&A costs decrease by only 0.35% 
for each 1% decrease in sales. After controlling for managerial expectations, resource adjustment 
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costs and operating slack in the sample, column (3) shows that SG&A costs increase by 0.705% 
for each 1% increase in sales: however, SG&A costs decrease by only 0.481% for each 1% decrease 
in sales and, thus, continue to provide strong evidence of cost stickiness.  
It is evident from columns (5), (7) and (9) that the coefficients on β5 are positive and 
significant across all three TC measures (coefficients of 0.222 (p<0.01); 0.591 (p<0.01); and 0.270 
(p<0.01) for TC1, TC2 and TC3 measures, respectively). This supports my H1, i.e., higher trade 
credit is associated with lower cost stickiness. Columns (6), (8) and (10) present the fixed effects 
regression results with coefficients on β5 of 0.274 (p<0.01), 0.706 (p<0.01) and 0.299 (p<0.01) for 
the TC1, TC2 and TC3 measures, respectively, which are consistent with those reported using the 




negative and significant, as is similar to my findings for the COGS specification.    
The coefficients on proxies for managerial expectations (i.e., SUDEC and GDP), resource 
adjustment costs (i.e., AIN and EIN) and operating slack (i.e. OSLACK) have the same sign and 
significance as documented in Panel A for the COGS specification. However, the coefficients on 
RET are positive and significant, indicating that good stock performance results in shedding 
unutilized resources (Chen et al., 2012).  
As mentioned in Section 3.2.4 above, some prior studies provide evidence that use of trade 
credit varies across industries. It is, therefore, intuitive to expect that the association between trade 
credit and cost stickiness could also vary across industries. In an untabulated analysis, I find that 
trade credit is associated with less SG&A cost stickiness in the building construction (two-digit 
SIC 15-17); lumber, furniture, paper and printing (two-digit SIC 24-27); chemical, petroleum, 
rubber and allied products (two-digit SIC 28-30); machinery, electrical, computer equipment (two- 
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TABLE 3.4: OLS and Fixed Effect Regression Results – Trade Credit and Cost Stickiness 







































)  0.977*** 0.965*** 0.985*** 0.978*** 1.021*** 1.015*** 0.992*** 0.987*** 1.020*** 1.011*** 
 [315.86] [251.99] [238.33] [201.13] [198.48] [166.67] [175.87] [142.84] [198.75] [168.45] 




)  -0.012** 0.004 -0.039*** -0.036** -0.080*** -0.071*** -0.052*** -0.058*** -0.084*** -0.078*** 
 [-1.99] [0.56] [-2.95] [-2.50] [-6.07] [-4.97] [-3.73] [-3.61] [-6.17] [-5.21] 
β3: TC  - - - - -0.042*** -0.155*** 0.103*** 0.193*** -0.040*** -0.136*** 
     [-5.16] [-12.26] [6.57] [7.77] [-4.96] [-11.06] 




)  - - - - -0.110*** -0.121*** -0.077** -0.088* -0.122*** -0.129*** 
     [-5.71] [-5.18] [-2.02] [-1.78] [-6.09] [-5.45] 
β5: TC * β2 - - - - 0.140*** 0.121*** 0.211*** 0.331*** 0.124*** 0.078** 
     [4.43] [3.26] [3.00] [3.74] [4.14] [2.25] 
β6: SUDEC * β2 - - 0.059*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 
    [5.43] [5.29] [5.54] [5.15] [5.36] [5.31] [5.53] [5.10] 
Β7: GDP * β2 - - 0.004 0.008*** 0.003 0.008*** 0.004 0.007** 0.003 0.008*** 
   [1.41] [2.65] [1.09] [2.82] [1.40] [2.52] [1.19] [2.72] 
β8: AIN * β2 - - -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.007** -0.005 -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.004 -0.001 
   [-3.39] [-3.30] [-2.35] [-1.42] [-4.01] [-4.31] [-1.47] [-0.15] 
β9: EIN * β2 - - 2.390*** 2.700*** 1.463*** 1.385** 2.345*** 2.422*** 1.925*** 2.198*** 
   [4.74] [4.42] [2.70] [2.23] [4.51] [4.02] [3.74] [3.59] 
β10: RET * β2 - - 0.083 0.186** 0.067 0.135 0.084 0.185** 0.070 0.155* 
   [1.01] [2.04] [0.82] [1.55] [1.02] [2.03] [0.85] [1.71] 
β11: OSLACK* β2 - - -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
   [-1.46] [-1.38] [-0.90] [-1.06] [-1.54] [-1.45] [-0.78] [-0.74] 
β12: SUDEC - - -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.010*** 
   [-7.68] [-8.60] [-7.16] [-8.22] [-8.02] [-8.86] [-7.10] [-7.88] 
β13: GDP - - -0.004** -0.001 -0.005*** -0.000 -0.003** -0.001 -0.005*** -0.001 
   [-2.34] [-0.43] [-3.41] [-0.25] [-2.02] [-0.71] [-3.33] [-0.41] 
β14: AIN - - 0.001 0.001 0.008*** 0.014*** -0.001 -0.003 0.007*** 0.011*** 
   [1.08] [0.44] [8.23] [7.50] [-1.10] [-1.64] [7.59] [6.15] 
β15: EIN - - 0.398*** 1.025*** 0.303*** 1.385*** 0.416*** 0.864*** 0.292*** 1.190*** 
   [6.72] [5.74] [4.91] [7.51] [6.96] [4.86] [4.72] [6.64] 
β16: RET - - -0.363*** -0.361*** -0.369*** -0.356*** -0.361*** -0.362*** -0.368*** -0.358*** 




























































β17: OSLACK - - -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
   [-1.52] [-1.39] [-0.94] [-1.05] [-1.58] [-1.45] [-0.84] [-0.78] 
Constant 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.017*** 0.005 0.026*** 0.010** 0.008* -0.004 0.028*** 0.012*** 
 [3.38] [3.53] [4.31] [1.30] [6.02] [2.36] [1.69] [-1.00] [6.40] [2.94] 
Industry Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 196,241 196,241 129,815 129,815 129,815 129,815 129,815 129,815 129,815 129,815 
Adj. R-squared 0.76 0.73 0.77 0.75 0.78 0.76 0.77 0.75 0.78 0.76 
Note: This table reports the results from the OLS and FE regressions of the association between trade credit and COGS behaviour. Robust t-statistics are in brackets and are 
based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions. 
 
 







































)  0.682*** 0.630*** 0.705*** 0.671*** 0.733*** 0.700*** 0.762*** 0.730*** 0.734*** 0.701*** 
 [175.23] [134.70] [137.51] [113.10] [114.34] [93.59] [102.10] [83.14] [115.99] [94.64] 




)  -0.192*** -0.157*** -0.224*** -0.203*** -0.263*** -0.248*** -0.287*** -0.276*** -0.270*** -0.254*** 
 [-27.06] [-18.83] [-13.58] [-11.19] [-15.05] [-12.89] [-15.72] [-13.48] [-15.43] [-13.18] 
β3: TC  - - - - 0.057*** 0.072*** 0.147*** 0.229*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 
     [8.45] [6.62] [9.04] [8.93] [7.71] [4.93] 




)  - - - - -0.146*** -0.155*** -0.578*** -0.608*** -0.155*** -0.160*** 
     [-6.78] [-5.95] [-9.65] [-8.41] [-7.00] [-5.92] 
β5: TC * β2 - - - - 0.222*** 0.274*** 0.591*** 0.706*** 0.270*** 0.299*** 
     [4.45] [4.67] [5.47] [5.36] [6.54] [6.19] 
β6: SUDEC * β2 - - 0.093*** 0.106*** 0.093*** 0.108*** 0.094*** 0.108*** 0.094*** 0.108*** 
    [7.52] [8.07] [7.56] [8.17] [7.60] [8.21] [7.62] [8.22] 
Β7: GDP * β2 - - 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 
   [5.00] [5.24] [4.99] [5.07] [5.13] [5.22] [4.92] [5.04] 
β8: AIN * β2 - - -0.046*** -0.042*** -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.048*** -0.045*** 




























































β9: EIN * β2 - - 2.958*** 4.114*** 2.992*** 4.069*** 3.140*** 4.225*** 2.924*** 4.023*** 
   [3.59] [4.31] [3.64] [4.28] [3.79] [4.42] [3.57] [4.25] 
β10: RET * β2 - - 0.358*** 0.374*** 0.356*** 0.371*** 0.342*** 0.366*** 0.356*** 0.368*** 
   [3.73] [3.50] [3.70] [3.46] [3.57] [3.43] [3.71] [3.45] 
β11: OSLACK * β2 - - -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
   [-0.96] [-0.51] [-1.73] [-1.29] [-1.07] [-0.87] [-1.57] [-1.06] 
β12: SUDEC - - -0.058*** -0.051*** -0.058*** -0.051*** -0.058*** -0.051*** -0.058*** -0.051*** 
   [-39.90] [-33.29] [-39.70] [-33.19] [-39.55] [-33.19] [-39.81] [-33.25] 
β13: GDP - - -0.019*** -0.031*** -0.018*** -0.031*** -0.019*** -0.032*** -0.018*** -0.031*** 
   [-10.39] [-13.81] [-10.23] [-13.77] [-10.41] [-14.00] [-10.31] [-13.77] 
β14: AIN - - 0.009*** 0.021*** 0.007*** 0.019*** 0.009*** 0.020*** 0.008*** 0.021*** 
   [9.87] [12.03] [7.83] [10.78] [9.88] [11.29] [8.50] [11.48] 
β15: EIN - - 0.482*** 1.861*** 0.542*** 1.849*** 0.523*** 1.784*** 0.521*** 1.857*** 
   [5.89] [7.84] [6.61] [7.80] [6.39] [7.53] [6.36] [7.84] 
β16: RET - - -0.343*** -0.350*** -0.344*** -0.353*** -0.346*** -0.354*** -0.343*** -0.351*** 
   [-21.39] [-21.18] [-21.51] [-21.35] [-21.63] [-21.43] [-21.45] [-21.24] 
β17: OSLACK - - -0.000** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 
   [-2.28] [-0.91] [-3.22] [-1.85] [-2.49] [-1.44] [-2.82] [-1.32] 
Constant 0.023*** 0.092*** 0.013*** 0.039*** 0.003 0.030*** -0.001 0.023*** 0.005 0.032*** 
 [6.95] [28.95] [3.09] [8.02] [0.75] [6.09] [-0.30] [4.43] [1.22] [6.44] 
Industry Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 174,764 174,764 118,506 118,506 118,506 118,506 118,506 118,506 118,506 118,506 
Adj. R-squared 0.47 0.42 0.52 0.48 0.52 0.48 0.52 0.48 0.52 0.48 
Note: This table reports the results from the OLS and FE regressions of the association between trade credit and SG&A cost behaviour. Robust t-statistics are in brackets and are 












digit SIC 35-39); business services (two-digit SIC 70-79) and other (two-digit SIC 80-99) 
industries.  However, I also find some industries exhibiting a positive association between trade 
credit and high cost stickiness: food and kindred products (two-digit SIC 20-21); textile mill 
products and apparel (two-digit SIC 22-23) and wholesale goods and building materials (two-digit 
SIC 50-52) industries.  
 
3.3.2.2 Trade credit and cost stickiness: moderating effects of agency problem, 
product market competition, and customer concentration  
I now present the regression results for the moderating effects of agency problem, product market 
competition and customer concentration on the association between trade credit and cost stickiness. 
For these tests I use only SG&A as the cost component, because of the endogeneity concerns related 
to COGS. These stem from the fact that COGS depend on goods production, which responds 
directly to changes in sales volume. In addition, because of the accrual-based accounting system, 
firms can recognize only the portion of COGS related to the current period’s sales and defer that 
remaining to a future period, unlike SG&A expenses. Finally, the key explanatory variable trade 
credit proxies, TC1 and TC3, use COGS as deflator: therefore, econometric concerns are raised if 
COGS is used as a dependent variable. 
Results related to H2 are reported in Table 3.5. Table 3.5, Panels A1, B1 and C1, report the 
results using TC1, TC2 and TC3, respectively. For brevity, I tabulate only the firm fixed-effect 
results. OLS regression results, too, are consistent with firm fixed-effect results. The coefficient on 
β5 is positive and highly significant for both low and high agency problem groups and for both 
agency problem proxies (i.e., CAPEX and ACQRATIO) across all three measures of trade credit. 
From Panel A1, when CAPEX is used as proxy for the agency problem (columns 1 and 2), the 
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coefficients on β5 are positive and significant for both low agency problem (coefficient = 0.183; t 
statistic = 2.11, p<0.05) and high agency problem firms (coefficient = 0.157; t statistic = 1.95; 
p<0.10). Results using the ACQRATIO proxy (columns 3 and 4) reveal that the coefficients on β5 
are positive and significant for both low agency problem (coefficient = 0.162; t statistic = 2.44; 
p<0.05) and high agency problem sub-groups (coefficient = 0.553; t statistic = 3.96; p<0.01) for 
the TC1 measure. I find similar results using TC2 and TC3.  
Panels A2, B2 and C2 report the Z-test for difference in coefficients on cost stickiness (β5) 
between the high versus low agency problem sub-groups. It is evident from Panel A2 that the 
coefficients are statistically different for the ACQRATIO proxy (coefficient 0.162 in the low agency 
group versus 0.553 in the high agency group, significant at p<0.02 using TC1), but insignificant 
for the CAPEX-based agency measure. A similar finding is evident from Panel C2 using the TC3 
measure. In Panel B2, using TC2 as the trade credit proxy, I find that the difference in coefficients 
on β5 is statistically insignificant between high versus low agency problem groups for both CAPEX 
and ACQRATIO proxies. Taken together, the results provide evidence that the monitoring role of 
trade credit in inducing lower cost stickiness is more pronounced for firms with high, compared 
with low, agency problem. However, such a finding is conditional on the proxies used to 










TABLE 3.5: Agency Problem, Trade Credit and Cost Stickiness 

























)  0.693*** 0.667*** 0.568*** 0.788*** 















β3: TC1  0.070*** 0.070*** 0.043*** 0.110*** 
 [4.11] [4.86] [3.30] [5.46] 














β5: TC1 * β2 0.183** 0.157* 0.162** 0.553*** 
 [2.11] [1.95] [2.44] [3.96] 
ECONVAR*β2 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ECONVAR Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.013 0.038*** 0.042*** 0.059*** 
 [1.55] [5.43] [6.57] [6.08] 
Industry No No No No 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 58,457 58,992 75,705 37,508 
Adj. R-squared 0.51 0.40 0.39 0.59 
Note: Robust t-statistics are in brackets and are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions. 
 
PANEL A2: Z-test of difference in coefficient  
  Low Agency High Agency  





TC1 CAPEX_D 0.183 0.157 0.218 
  (0.087) (0.081)  
 ACQRATIO_D 0.162 0.553 2.529 
  (0.066) (0.139)  
Note: Panel A2 reports the Z-test of difference in coefficients of FE regression reported in Panel A1. Refer to Appendix 
B for variable definitions. Z-statistic to test for differences across groups is computed as follows (see, e.g. Cohen, 1983; 



















































)  0.724*** 0.702*** 0.605*** 0.817*** 
 [57.02] [54.78] [46.68] [67.07] 














β3: TC2  0.154*** 0.291*** 0.180*** 0.238*** 
 [4.03] [7.40] [5.57] [4.51] 














β5: TC2 * β2 0.481** 0.640*** 0.639*** 0.760** 
 [2.57] [3.36] [3.82] [2.52] 
ECONVAR * β2 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ECONVAR Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.009 0.027*** 0.034*** 0.054*** 
 [1.03] [3.75] [5.18] [5.37] 
Industry No No No No 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 58,457 58,992 75,705 37,508 
Adj. R-squared 0.51 0.41 0.39 0.59 
Note: Robust t-statistics are in brackets and are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions. 
 
PANEL B2: Z-test of difference in coefficient  
  Low Agency High Agency  





TC2 CAPEX_D 0.481 0.640 0.597 
  (0.187) (0.190)  
 ACQRATIO_D 0.639 0.760 0.350 
  (0.167) (0.301)  
Note: Panel B2 reports the Z-test of difference in coefficients of FE regression reported in Panel B1. Refer to Appendix B 
for variable definitions. Z-statistic to test for differences across groups is computed as follows (see, e.g. Cohen, 1983; 


















































)  0.692*** 0.668*** 0.569*** 0.787*** 
 [63.52] [63.19] [53.99] [72.33] 














β3: TC3  0.040** 0.055*** 0.021* 0.099*** 
 [2.50] [3.97] [1.70] [4.88] 














β5: TC3 * β2 0.147** 0.218*** 0.185*** 0.559*** 
 [2.08] [2.96] [3.27] [5.47] 
ECONVAR * β2 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ECONVAR Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.015* 0.039*** 0.044*** 0.060*** 
 [1.80] [5.60] [6.85] [6.15] 
Industry No No No No 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 58,457 58,992 75,705 37,508 
Adj. R-squared 0.51 0.40 0.39 0.59 
Note: Robust t-statistics are in brackets and are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions. 
 
PANEL C2: Z-test of difference in coefficient  
  Low Agency High Agency  





TC3 CAPEX_D 0.147 0.218 0.691 
  (0.071) (0.074)  
 ACQRATIO_D 0.185 0.559 3.195 
  (0.057) (0.102)  
Note: Panel C2 reports the Z-test of difference in coefficients of FE regression reported in Panel C1. Refer to Appendix B 
for variable definitions. Z-statistic to test for differences across groups is computed as follows (see, e.g. Cohen, 1983; 















Table 3.6, Panel A reports results related to H3 i.e., the moderating effect of product market 
competition on the association between trade credit and cost stickiness. When TC1 is used as the 
proxy for trade credit (columns 1 and 2), the coefficients on β5 are positive and significant for the 
low PMC group (coefficient = 0.457; t statistic = 2.74; p<0.01), and insignificant for the high PMC 
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group (coefficient = 0.209; t statistic = 1.02). Similar results are evident for the other two measures 
of trade credit (TC2 and TC3). For the TC3 measure, the coefficients on β5 are significantly larger 
for the low PMC group (coefficient = 0.609; t statistic = 4.15; p<0.01) as opposed to the high PMC 
group (coefficient = 0.335; t statistic = 1.95; p<0.10).  
Panel B reports the Z-test for difference in coefficients on β5 between the high versus low 
PMC sub-groups. Although the low PMC group shows significant and positive coefficients, and 
the high PMC group mostly insignificant coefficients, there is a lack of evidence for statistical 
significance using the z-test for difference in coefficients. Therefore, the reported findings, albeit 
consistent with H3, need to be evaluated considering this lack of a statistically significant difference 
in coefficients.  
Table 3.7, Panel A shows the results related to H4, i.e., the moderating effects of customer 
concentration on the association between trade credit and cost stickiness. The coefficients on β5 are 
positive and significant for both the low customer concentration group (coefficient = 0.334; t 
statistic = 3.15; p<0.01) and the high customer concentration group (coefficient = 0.177; t statistic 
= 2.24; p<0.05), when TC1 is used as the proxy for trade credit (columns 1 and 2). TC2 and TC3 
show similar results, i.e., the low customer concentration group shows lower cost stickiness 
compared to the high customer concentration group. In all these tests, the magnitude of the 
coefficients is greater for the low- as compared to the high-customer concentration group. Although 
the reported findings are generally consistent with H4, the difference in coefficients on β5 is 
statistically insignificant between the low- and high-customer concentration groups (Panel B). 
Therefore, I am unable to assert conclusively that, because of their customers’ lack of bargaining 
power and high switching costs, suppliers play a more prominent role in monitoring firms in the 




Table 3.6: Product Market Competition, Trade Credit and Cost Stickiness 























)  0.699*** 0.739*** 0.739*** 0.765*** 0.700*** 0.740*** 
 [26.45] [36.47] [23.13] [30.96] [26.60] [37.58] 


















β3: TC  0.165*** 0.011 0.511*** 0.152* 0.131*** -0.019 
 [3.68] [0.33] [4.23] [1.67] [2.73] [-0.63] 


















β5: TC * β2 0.457*** 0.209 0.877* 0.508 0.609*** 0.335* 
 [2.74] [1.02] [1.88] [0.94] [4.15] [1.95] 
ECONVAR * β2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ECONVAR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.013 -0.020** -0.027* -0.029*** -0.012 -0.018* 
 [-0.90] [-2.06] [-1.71] [-2.77] [-0.85] [-1.84] 
Industry No No No No No No 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,422 15,652 10,422 15,652 10,422 15,652 
Adj. R-squared 0.43 0.52 0.43 0.53 0.43 0.53 
Note: Robust t-statistics are in brackets and are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions.  
 
PANEL B: Z-test of difference in coefficient 
 Low PMC High PMC  





TC1 0.457 0.209 0.939 
 (0.167) (0.204)  
TC2 0.877 0.508 0.514 
 (0.466) (0.543)  
TC3 0.609 0.335 1.212 
 (0.147) (0.172)  
Note: Panel B reports the Z-test of difference in coefficients of FE regression reported in Panel A. Refer to Appendix 
B for variable definitions. Z-statistic to test for differences across groups is computed as follows (see, e.g. Cohen, 


























Table 3.7: Customer Concentration (CC), Trade Credit and Cost Stickiness 
PANEL A: Fixed effect regression results 






















)  0.780*** 0.630*** 0.807*** 0.661*** 0.779*** 0.632*** 
 [75.90] [56.30] [65.97] [47.28] [76.47] [57.28] 


















β3: TC  0.100*** 0.053*** 0.305*** 0.161*** 0.081*** 0.029* 
 [5.46] [3.07] [6.83] [3.84] [4.42] [1.79] 


















β5: TC * β2 0.334*** 0.177** 0.810*** 0.550*** 0.336*** 0.261*** 
 [3.15] [2.24] [3.49] [2.74] [3.99] [3.74] 
ECONVAR * β2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ECONVAR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.030*** 0.040*** 0.021*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.042*** 
 [4.52] [4.01] [3.09] [3.33] [4.72] [4.17] 
Industry No No No No No No 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 56,288 52,497 56,288 52,497 56,288 52,497 
Adj. R-squared 0.54 0.42 0.54 0.42 0.54 0.42 
Note: Robust t-statistics are in brackets and are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions.  
 
PANEL B: Z-test of difference in coefficient 
 Low CC High CC  





TC1 0.334 0.177 1.189 
 (0.106) (0.079)  
TC2 0.810 0.550 0.846 
 (0.232) (0.201)  
TC3 0.336 0.261 0.687 
 (0.084) (0.069)  
Note: Panel B reports the Z-test of difference in coefficients of FE regression reported in Panel A. Refer to Appendix B 
for variable definitions. Z-statistic to test for differences across groups is computed as follows (see, e.g. Cohen, 1983; 





















3.3.2.3 Robustness test 
In order to mitigate the endogeneity concern in this study I have conducted a robustness check by 
replacing the TC level measure with the change in TC. The endogeneity concern could stem from 
the fact that both the choice of obtaining trade credit and the decision to adjust resources are 
endogenously determined, and some unobserved variables could be driving both the decisions. I 
perform the change specification to address the endogeneity concern following Xu and Zheng 
(2018), who investigate the relationship between tax avoidance and cost stickiness. The result from 
Table 3.8 shows that the coefficients on β5 (𝛥𝑇𝐶𝑡 ∗  𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑈𝑀 ∗ 𝐿𝑁 [
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡−1
]) are still positive and 
significant across all three TC specifications for both the OLS and the FE regressions models: 
results that are consistent with my main findings. The results, therefore, alleviate the endogeneity 
concerns, if any.  
 























)  0.713*** 0.677*** 0.719*** 0.683*** 0.714*** 0.678*** 





















 )  0.105*** 0.092*** 0.448*** 0.417*** 0.101*** 0.088*** 























) * β2 0.121* 0.186** 0.277 0.398** 0.116** 0.158** 
 [1.71] [2.41] [1.62] [2.10] [2.00] [2.52] 
ECONVAR*β2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ECONVAR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.015*** 0.042*** 0.018*** 0.048*** 0.015*** 0.041*** 
 [3.76] [8.72] [4.44] [9.89] [3.52] [8.45] 
Industry No No No No No No 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 118,505 118,505 118,506 118,506 118,381 118,381 
Adj. R-squared 0.52 0.48 0.52 0.48 0.52 0.48 
Note: This table reports the results from OLS and FE regressions of the association between change in trade credit and 
SG&A cost behaviour. Robust t-statistics are in brackets and are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Refer to Appendix B for variable definitions. 
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3.4 Chapter Summary  
In this study, I examine the association between trade credit and cost behaviour in the U.S. listed 
companies, and the moderating effect of agency problem, product market competition and 
customer concentration. I find that costs are, in general, sticky in the U.S., and is consistent with 
previous studies. Trade credit is an important source of external finance for many firms, and can 
perform a governance role. Suppliers have an interest in monitoring customers’ overall operation 
and cost management activities actively because, by extending credit to customers, suppliers are 
undertaking the risk that customers might default on payment. Therefore, studying the relation 
between trade credit and cost behaviour is of significant importance. Using three different trade 
credit proxies, I document that trade credit lowers cost stickiness. This finding I interpret as 
illustrating the monitoring power of suppliers over the resource management decisions made by 
client firm managers to ensure shareholder value-maximization. Moreover, such lower cost 
stickiness is more prevalent in the high agency problem sub-sample. Further investigation reveals 
that the external monitoring role of trade credit decreases cost stickiness for firms operating in non-
competitive product markets. However, the monitoring role of suppliers is limited for those firms 


















COST STICKINESS AND FIRM VALUE (ESSAY THREE) 
 
Investors make their investment decisions based primarily on the financial health of a firm, and 
this is determined by the future earnings and cash flow potential of the firm. Investors consider 
current earnings as a key firm performance indicator, as it can reliably predict future earnings 
(Finger, 1994; Nissim & Penman, 2001), future cash flows (Dechow et al., 1998; Barth et al., 2001), 
and firm equity performance (Dechow, 1994) or, in other words, the future wealth of the firm 
(Callen et al., 2009). More volatile earnings, and increased analysts’ earnings forecast errors 
stemming from greater cost stickiness when sales decline, increase investors’ investment risk 
(Weiss, 2010). Also, such risk increases because firms with greater cost stickiness have less analyst 
coverage (Weiss, 2010). An increase in investment risk requires investors to demand a higher return 
on their investments, thereby, increasing the cost of equity for the firm. Furthermore, retaining 
slack resources when sales decline incurs adjustment costs: an effect that also reduces cash flows. 
Thus, I investigate the association between cost stickiness and firm value. Since, cost of equity and 
future cash flows are the components of firm value, I further propose that the association between 









4.1 Literature Review & Hypotheses Development 
4.1.1 Cost stickiness and firm value 
Research related to asymmetric cost behaviour has gained popularity because to generate and 
sustain profit, efficient cost management plays a is vital role. Moreover, cost management has 
wider repercussions for both debt and equity investors in the areas of risk assessment, trust of 
customers, employees (with respect to job security) and other stakeholders in the community. 
Investors consider current earnings as a key firm performance indicator that has been found to 
predict reliably future earnings (Finger, 1994; Nissim & Penman, 2001), future cash flows 
(Dechow et al., 1998; Barth et al., 2001), and firm equity performance (Dechow, 1994) or, in other 
words, the future wealth of the firm (Callen et al., 2009). It, therefore, follows that cost behaviour 
that profoundly affects accounting earnings should be related to firm value. However, the empirical 
relationship is expected to be conditional on the theory driving the cost behaviour of a firm.  
 I posit that resource adjustment and managerial expectation considerations may not affect 
firm value adversely. Resource adjustment theory is based on the notion that many costs arise from 
managers’ deliberate resource commitment decisions. Once committed, it is not easy to scale back 
resources without incurring some kind of adjustment cost. For instance, labour adjustment costs 
have been found to induce cost stickiness (Banker et al., 2013; Golden et al., 2020). Managers are 
likely to enter into contracts for resources, which are costly to renegotiate; thus, when demand falls, 
managers are bound to retain those slack resources, because discarding them would incur 
obligatory costs such as severance payments (Calleja et al., 2006). This view, therefore, suggests 
that rational investors should be able to incorporate such ‘adjustment costs’ into their valuations 
without putting downward pressure on stock prices.  Managerial expectation theory posits that 
when managers are optimistic (pessimistic) about future demand, they are likely to retain (reduce) 
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slack resources in the event of declining demand (Venieris et al., 2015; Banker & Byzalov, 2014; 
Banker et al., 2014a). Optimistic managers consider a declining demand as ‘temporary’ and prefer 
to retain slack resources to minimize the downward adjustment costs. If investors are concerned 
about long-term value creation by the company, then retaining slack resources by optimistic 
managers in the event of a declining demand should not necessarily lead to a decrease in firm value. 
Agency theory, on the other hand, predicts a negative relationship between cost stickiness 
and firm value. Agency problem occurs because of a misalignment of interests between 
shareholders and managers. An implication of the agency problem, is that managers engage in 
empire-building activities, e.g., growing the firm beyond its optimal size by retaining unutilized 
resources, for status, power, compensation, and prestige (see, e.g. Chen et al., 2012; Hope & 
Thomas, 2008; Jensen, 1986; Masulis et al., 2007; Stulz, 1990). Prior studies have documented that 
managers with empire-building tendencies are likely to add excessive resources when sales 
increase and are unlikely to reduce unutilized resources when demand falls, resulting in cost 
stickiness (Banker et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2012). Therefore, self-serving managers might be less 
tempted to shed unused resources, because downsizing by disposing resources reduces their chance 
of maximizing private benefits. However, such activity is likely to be value-destroying for the firm. 
Based on the more rational premise that retaining unutilized resources is detrimental for firm, 
thereby, I predict the following:  






4.1.2 Mediating effect of cost of equity and cash flow on cost stickiness and firm 
value 
So far, I have discussed the plausible direct relationship between cost stickiness and firm value. A 
related issue to be examined is whether this direct relation between cost stickiness and firm value 
is mediated through the cost of equity and cash flow channels.  Since firm value consists of cost of 
equity and expected future cash flow components (Penman, 2011, 2016; Plumlee et al., 2015; 
Bachoo et al., 2013), investigating the mediating effect of these two components would provide 
critical insights into the cost stickiness and firm value relationship.  
 As discussed before, cost stickiness increases earnings volatility, analysts’ forecast error 
(Weiss, 2010; Ciftci et al., 2016) and credit risk (Homburg et al., 2016): precursors to heightened 
investment risks. Such heightened risks, in turn, require investors to demand a higher return from 
their investments, thereby, increasing the firm-level cost of equity capital. With respect to future 
cash flows, holding onto unutilized resources during the period of declining demand incurs cost. 
Many such obligations, for instance, wages to workers, maintenance and repair costs of equipment, 
rents on leased equipment and storage/warehouse fees, have to be paid during the period with cash 
to avoid contractual violations. A decline in cash during period of declining sales would, therefore, 
affect firm value adversely. Furthermore, cost stickiness makes the accurate prediction of future 
cash flows a difficult task, which again affects firm value adversely, since investors consider future 
cash flows when making investment decisions. Thus, I hypothesize as follows:          
H2: The association between cost stickiness and firm value postulated in H1 above is mediated 





4.2 Research Design 
4.2.1 Empirical model  
In order to test the relation between cost stickiness and firm value (H1), I adopt the following cross-
sectional regression model:   
TOBINQi,t = β0 + β1 OC_STICKYi,t + β2 RISKi,t + β3 SIZEi,t + β4 LEVi,t + β5 PROFITi,t  
+ β6 GROWTHi,t + β7 IOWNi,t + ε                                  (4.1) 
    
I use Tobin’s Q (TOBINQi,t)
10 for the year t  as the proxy for firm value following previous 
literature (e.g., Konijn et al., 2011; Henry, 2008; Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Jin & Jorion, 2006; 
Maury & Pajuste, 2005). I measure TOBINQ as book value of assets plus market value of equity 
minus book value of equity minus deferred tax, scaled by the book value of assets. I control for 
firm risk (RISKi,t), firm size (SIZEi,t), leverage (LEVi,t), firm profitability (PROFITi,t), firm growth 
or investment opportunities (GROWTHi,t) and institutional ownership (IOWNi,t). All variables are 
defined in the Appendix C.  
The main independent variable in the analysis is OC_STICKYi,t. I use the firm-level cost 
stickiness measure developed by Weiss (2010). Weiss (2010) defines cost stickiness for firm i in 
quarter q (STICKYi,q) as the difference in the slope of the cost function between the two most recent 
quarters from quarter q-3 to q, such that sales decrease in one quarter and sales increase in the 
other. 
STICKYi,q= LN(ΔCOST/ΔSALES)i,Ť – LN(ΔCOST/ΔSALES)i,Ţ Ť,
 Ţ ϵ {q, . . ,q-3}             (4.2)                           
 
 
10I have taken TOBINQ at period t because STICKY is the annualized mean value of the quarterly STICKY measure. 
Since the market updates its values based on quarterly information, I consider the end-of-year market value as an 
appropriate measure.  
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where Ť (Ţ) is the most recent of the last four quarters with an increase (decrease) in sales, 
ΔCOST= COSTi,q-COSTi,q-1 and  ΔSALES = SALEi,q-SALEi,q-1. I obtain OC_STICKYi,t by taking the 
mean of STICKYi,q values for firm i and in year t following Kim et al. (2019). I multiply Weiss’s 
(2010) original measure by -1 following Rouxelin et al. (2018) and Golden et al. (2020), so that 
higher values imply more cost stickiness. H1 predicts a negative and significant coefficient on 
OC_STICKYi,t. I take operating costs (OC)
11 because it is more comprehensive, as it includes costs 
related to both internal and external financing. Moreover, operating costs are incurred for everyday 
business operations, and failure to meet these contractual obligations could lead to early bankruptcy 
(Chen et al., 2019b). In additional tests, I use the stickiness of selling, general and administrative 
cost (SGA_STICKY) and cost of goods sold (COGS_STICKY) as alternative cost components.  
 
4.2.2 Resource adjustment cost, managerial expectation and agency problem 
proxies  
I include asset intensity (AIN) and employee intensity (EIN) as two proxies for resource adjustment 
costs. AIN is measured as the total assets divided by the sales for year t, and EIN is the ratio of the 
total number of employees over sales. Based on the median value of AIN, I create two sub-groups 
with the high (low) AIN group representing firms incurring high (low) resource adjustment costs. 
I follow a similar procedure for the EIN proxy.  
For managerial expectation I use two proxies (i) an internal proxy, successive decrease in 
sales (SUCDEC) and (ii) an external proxy (macro-economic business cycle measure) (OECD). 
SUCDEC is a dummy variable which is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if revenue in year t-
1 is less than revenue in t-2, and 0 otherwise, and has been commonly used in asymmetric cost 
 
11Compustat data item SALEQ minus IBQ as sticky is measured using quarterly data.  
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behaviour literature. Managers are likely to be pessimistic about a future with successive decreases 
in sales. As an external proxy, I use the OECD Composite Leading Indicators to measure 
managerial expectation12. Banker et al. (2016) has used business cycle as a proxy managerial 
expectation. During recession (expansion) managers are likely to be pessimistic (optimistic) about 
future demand. 
Based on prior literature, I use three proxies for agency problem (i) capital expenditure 
(CAPEX), (ii) acquisition ratio (ACQ) and (iii) fixed pay (FXP). Both CAPX and ACQ have been 
used as proxies for the agency problem in prior studies by Chhaochharia et al. (2012), Giroud and 
Mueller (2010) and Guo et al. (2018). As elucidated in subsection 4.1.1, one of the consequences 
of the agency problem is managers’ tendency to engage in empire-building. Such managers are 
likely to overspend in the form of capital expenditure, or acquire business to build an empire. 
Therefore, I have used these two measures that I believe capture the empire-building tendency of 
managers. The high agency problem group consists of observations with values of these variables 
higher than the median, while the low agency problem group consists of observations equal to or 
below the median value of these variables. According to Chen et al. (2012) and Kanniainen (2000), 
a manager’s empire-building incentives can be restrained by paying fixed salaries (FXP). Banker 
et al. (2011) document that fixed (cash) compensation is used to penalize wasteful spending on 
SG&A costs. I divide the sample into high and low agency problem groups based on the median 
value of the FXP. Following Chen et al. (2012) I calculate FXP as ratio of salary plus bonus divided 
by total compensation during the year where FXP lower (higher) than median FXP is high (low) 
agency problem group. Following Hartlieb et al. (2020), I split the sample into high and low 
 
12According to this time series, the recession begins at the midpoint of the period of the peak and ends at the midpoint 
of the period of the trough. I define a recession dummy accordingly.  
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‘resource adjustment’ ‘managerial expectations’ and ‘agency problem’ groups to conduct the 
empirical tests.  
    
4.2.3 Mediating effect variables  
To test the mediating effects of cost of equity and cash flows on the association between cost 
stickiness and firm value (H2), I follow the mediation test approach of Baron and Kenny (1986). 
Following Baron and Kenny (1986), I use the following four steps to establish these mediation 
channels (Eqs. (4.3a)-(4.3c)). First, I show that variations in the independent variable (i.e., 
OC_STICKY, in this study) are correlated with the dependent variable (i.e., TOBINQ; Eq. (4.3a)), 
to confirm the possibility that a mediation effect is present. Second, I show how variations in the 
independent variable (i.e., OC_STICKY) account for variations in the mediators (Eq. (4.3b)). Third, 
I show that the mediators have a significant effect on the dependent variable (i.e., TOBINQ; Eq. 
(4.3c). Finally, I show that the significant relationship between OC_STICKY and TOBINQ (Eq. 
(4.3a)) either becomes insignificant after controlling for the mediators (full mediation) or that the 
significance level shrinks after doing so (partial mediation). In order to test the mediation effect 
(H3) I use the following set of equations: 
 
TOBINQi,t = β0 + β1 OC_STICKYi,t + Ʃ CONTROLSi,t + ε                                                                        (4.3a) 
MVi,t = α0 + α1 OC_STICKYi,t + Ʃ CONTROLSi,t + ε                                                                                 (4.3b) 
TOBINQi,t = λ0 + λ1 OC_STICKYi,t + λ2 MV_COEi,t + λ3 MV_FCFi,t  + Ʃ CONTROLSi,t + ε                    (4.3c) 
 
where MV are the mediating variables, with MV_COEi,t being the mediating variable 
representing cost of equity capital (COEi.t), and MV_FCFi,t being the mediating variable pertaining 
to free cash flow (FCFi.t). Based on prior studies (Gupta et al., 2018; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Easton, 
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2004) I use implied approaches to estimate the cost of equity. Equation (4.3a) is the original 
baseline regression model or equation (4.1). For equation (4.3b) I include SIZE, LEV, IOWN, BETA 
(market beta), BTM (book-to-market value), ZSCORE (Altman’s Z-score) and DAC (discretionary 
accrual) as the control variables for the test using COE as the mediating channel (Gupta et al., 
2018; Hasan et al., 2015; El Ghoul et al., 2011). Owing to lack of prior literature on the 
determinants of free cash flow, I included the control variables used in the baseline model as some 
of the potential determinants of FCF. For equation (4.3c) I use the same control variables as in 
equation (4.1). The total effect of cost stickiness (i.e. OC_STICKY) on firm value (i.e. TOBINQ) 
can be decomposed into direct and indirect effects. The direct effect is λ1 from Equation (4.3c) 
above, while the indirect effect is α1*λ2 for the proposed mediators. The core of the mediation effect 
is testing the null hypothesis 𝐻0: α1*λ2 =0. I use a simultaneous equation model for defining and 
estimating the direct and indirect effects. Variables are defined in the Appendix C. 
 
4.2.4 Sample selection and descriptive statistics  
The sample period spans from 1982 to 2016. I deliberately choose a long sample period to provide 
a richer analysis of the cost stickiness behaviour and firm value. I collect both yearly and quarterly 
financial data from Compustat, whilst the stock return data are collected from the CRSP and the 
institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuter’s F13 File. To estimate the implied cost of 
equity capital I collect analyst forecast data from IBES. I begin with an initial sample of 413,585 
firm-years observations. I then exclude 36,192 firm-year observations from the regulated industries 
(two-digit SIC code 48-49) and 96,226 firm-year observations from the financial institutions 
industry (two-digit SIC codes 60-69). The final sample consists of 85,521 firm-year observations. 
Table 4.1, panel A, reports the sample selection process. In the regression models, sample size 
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varies depending on the model-specific data requirements. Firm-year observations come from a 
wide variety of industries, with two-digit SIC codes, 35–39 (30.13%) and 70-79 (13.83%) 
commanding the largest industry representation in my sample, as reported in Table 4.1, panel B. 
To avoid the undesirable influence of outliers, I winsorize all the continuous variables in the 
extreme 1% of their respective distributions.    
 
Table 4.1: Sample Selection and Industry Distribution  
Panel A: Sample selection procedure 
Selection Process Number of 
Observations 
Total observations produced for 1982 to 2016 413,585 
Drop: duplicate observations (36,192) 
 377,393 
Drop: observations for SIC codes between 4800 to 4999 (26,300) 
Drop: observations for SIC codes between 6000 to 6999 (96,226) 
Preliminary sample  254,867 
Drop: missing values for calculating TOBINQ (49,309) 
Non-missing sample for TOBINQ  205,558 
Non-missing sample for OC_STICKY (mean of STICKYi,q values for firm i and in year t) 180,500 





Panel B: Industry distribution 
Code Industry Observations % 
observations 
1-14 Agriculture and mining 5,666 6.63 
15-17 Building construction  1,327 1.55 
20-21 Food and kindred products  2,681 3.13 
22-23 Textile mill products and apparels 1,754 2.05 
24-27 Lumber, furniture, paper and printing 4,111 4.81 
28-30 Chemical, petroleum, rubber and allied products 9,529 11.14 
31-34 Metal 4,727 5.53 
35-39 Machinery, electrical, computer equipment 25,766 30.13 
40-47 Railroad and other transportation 2,643 3.09 
50-52 Wholesale goods, building materials  4,300 5.03 
53-59 Store merchandise, auto dealers, home furniture stores 6,973 8.15 
70-79 Business services 11,831 13.83 
80-99 Other  4,213 4.93 







4.3 Empirical Results & Analysis  
4.3.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
Descriptive statistics of the baseline regression variables are reported in Panel A of Table 4.2. Over 
the study period from 1982 to 2016, the mean (median) of TOBINQ and OC_STICKY are 1.87 
(1.96) and 0.05 (0.95), respectively. The average firm may be considered as moderately large 
(SIZE=5.40), with moderate risk (RISK=0.14), and moderate leverage (LEV = 0.23). On average, 
firms are profitable (PROFIT = 0.10) and exhibit high growth opportunities (GRWOTH = 0.01)13. 
Institutional ownership (IOWN) averages 39 percent. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics of 
the variables used in the mediating test. The mean (median) of the mediating variables: COE_PEG, 
COE_MPEG and FCF are 0.11 (0.10), 0.12 (0.10) and 0.08 (0.08), respectively. 
 Panel C, Table 4.2 shows the correlation between all the main variables. I find that the 
majority of the correlations are significant at the conventional level. From the correlation matrix it 
is apparent that firm value (TOBINQ) is significant and negatively correlated with OC_STICKY (-
0.021, p-value < 0.001). Though only suggestive of the underlying association, the highly 
significant negative correlation coefficient indicates that firms with higher cost stickiness have 
lower market values. Qtot, an alternative measure of firm value (discussed in section 4.3.2), is 
positively correlated with TOBINQ (0.570, p-value < 0.001) and negatively correlated with 
OC_STICKY (-0.021, p-value < 0.001). RISK, PROFIT and IOWN are positively correlated with 
TOBINQ; whereas, LEV and GROWTH are negatively correlated.  
 
 
13GROWTH is measured as dividend yield following Henry (2008) and firms paying higher dividend yields are 




Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Observations Mean Std.Dev. 25% Median 75% 
TOBINQ 85521 1.87 1.96 1.05 1.38 2.05 
Qtot 83279 1.31 2.66 0.23 0.66 1.44 
OC_STICKY 85521 0.05 0.95 -0.28 0.03 0.40 
RISK 85521 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.17 
SIZE 85521 5.40 2.07 3.87 5.24 6.81 
LEV 85521 0.23 0.24 0.04 0.19 0.34 
PROFIT 85521 0.10 0.29 0.05 0.13 0.20 
GROWTH 85521 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 
IOWN 85521 0.39 0.30 0.11 0.34 0.64 
Note: Refer to Appendix C for variable definitions. 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics related to mediating test 
Variables Observations Mean Std.Dev. 25% Median 75% 
COE_PEG 21909 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.14 
COE_MPEG 21909 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.14 
FCF 21909 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.13 
BETA 21909 1.13 0.80 0.64 1.06 1.53 
BTM 21909 0.55 0.47 0.28 0.46 0.71 
ZSCORE 21909 56.05 225.82 3.26 5.36 11.71 
DAC 21909 0.18 0.40 0.03 0.07 0.17 
Note: Refer to Appendix C for variable definitions. 
 
Panel C: Correlation 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
TOBINQ [1] 1         
Qtot [2] 0.570*** 1        
OC_STICKY [3] -0.021*** -0.021*** 1       
RISK [4] 0.125*** 0.049*** -0.005 1      
SIZE [5] -0.114*** 0.006 -0.020*** -0.369*** 1     
LEV [6] 0.005 -0.057*** 0.005 0.071*** 0.093*** 1    
PROFIT [7] -0.182*** -0.062*** -0.026*** -0.256*** 0.236*** -0.049*** 1   
GROWTH [8] -0.089*** -0.059*** 0.005 -0.251*** 0.242*** 0.031*** 0.111*** 1  
IOWN [9] 0.014*** 0.073*** -0.013*** -0.265*** 0.606*** -0.052*** 0.169*** 0.025*** 1 




4.3.2 Regression results: Cost stickiness and firm value  
Table 4.3 reports the OLS and firm fixed effect (FE) results for the association between cost 
stickiness and firm value for H1. To control for unobservable industry and year characteristics 
associated with firm value and cost stickiness, I include year and industry dummy variables in all 
the regression specifications. To take into account the time series and cross-sectional dependence 
in the error terms of the regressions, I calculate t-statistics using standard errors that are clustered 
by firm.  
 Column (1) shows the OLS regression results for the relationship between OC_STICKY and 
TOBINQ, whilst column (2) shows the FE regression results. I find a negative and significant 
relationship between cost stickiness and firm value under both the OLS and the FE specifications. 
For example, the coefficient on OC_STICKY is -0.048 (p<0.01) in the OLS specification. In terms 
of economic magnitude, the estimated coefficient implies that a one standard deviation increase in 
cost stickiness decreases firm value by 2.44 percent relative to its mean (coefficient -0.048* SD of 
OC_STICKY (0.95)/mean of TOBINQ (1.87)*100)).  
 The sign and significance of the control variables are generally consistent with prior studies 
(e.g., Konijn et al., 2011; Henry, 2008; Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Maury & Pajuste, 2005). The 
coefficients on LEV (0.66, p<0.05), PROFIT (0.68, p<0.01), and IOWN (1.19, p<0.01) are positive 
and significant. The coefficients on SIZE (-0.54, p<0.01)14 and GROWTH (-3.04, p<0.01) are 
negative and significant. Based on prior studies (Henry, 2008) RISK should have a negative relation 
with firm value although my result shows the opposite (coefficient 0.99, p<0.01). One plausible 
reason could be that higher risk implies higher return which, in turn, increases firm value.  
 
14Konijn et al. (2011), Henry (2008), Milelong and Amit (2006) and Maury and Pajuste (2005) document a negative 
coefficient on firm size. 
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As a robustness test, I use an alternative measure of firm value (Qtot). Results using the 
alternative measure of firm value (Qtot) are also reported in Table 4.3 (columns 3 and 4). I calculate 
Qtot as follows, based on Peters and Taylor (2017): 
Qtoti,t = Vi,t / (Kphyi,t + Kinti,t)                                                                                                        (4.4) 
 
 where Qtot is measured by scaling firm value by the sum of the physical and intangible 
capital (Peters and Taylor, 2017). V is firm’s market value defined as market value of equity 
(Compustat data item PRCC_F times CSHO) plus book value of debt (Compustat data item DLTT 
plus DLC), minus current assets (Compustat data item ACT). Kphy is the replacement value of 
physical capital (Compustat data item PPEGT). Kint is the replacement cost of intangible capital, 
which is the sum of a firm’s externally purchased (Compustat data item INTAN) and internally 
created intangible capital. If INTAN is missing, I set the value to zero. Internally created intangible 
capital is the sum of knowledge capital (G) and organizational capital (O).     
Gi,t = (1 - ∂R&D) Gi,t-1 + R&Di,t                                                                                                       (4.5) 
Oi,t = (1 - ∂SG&A) Oi,t-1 + SG&Ai,t                                                                                                    (4.6) 
 
 In equation (4.5) Gi,t is the end-of-period stock of knowledge capital, ∂R&D is depreciation 
rate, and R&Di,t is the real research and development expenditure (Compustat data item XRD) for 
the year. I replace missing XRD with zero following Peters and Taylor (2017) and Lev and 
Radhakrishnan (2005). Following Peters and Taylor (2017) I use a 15% depreciation rate for ∂R&D. 
Based on the suggestion Peters and Taylor (2017), I set Gi,0 = 0.  
In equation (4.6) Oi,t is the organizational capital, ∂SG&A is depreciation rate, and SG&Ai,t is 
the selling, general and administrative expenses (Compustat data item XSGA minus XRD minus 
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RDIP) for the year. If XRD is higher than XSGA but is less than COGS, or XGA missing, I measure 
SG&Ai,t as XSGA with no additional adjustments. I set XSGA, XRD and RDIP to zero if missing, 
following Peters and Taylor (2017) and Hasan and Cheung (2018). Following Peters and Taylor 
(2017) I use a 20% depreciation rate for ∂SG&A. I further set Oi,0 = 0 following Peters and Taylor 
(2017). Although the main sample period starts from 1982, I measure the Qtoti,t  using data from 
1950 consistent with Peters and Taylor (2017). Results using this alternative proxy for firm value 
is very consistent with the TOBINQ measure. The coefficients on OC_STICKY are negative and 
significant in both the OLS (coefficient -0.042, p<0.01) and in the FE (coefficient -0.029, p<0.01). 
Taken together, the evidence reveals a detrimental effect of cost stickiness on firm value, which 
supports H1. In the next section I provide further tests in this regard.  
 
Table 4.3: OLS and Fixed Effect Regression Results – Cost Stickiness and Firm Value 
Dependent Variable: TOBINQ  Qtot 
 OLS FE  OLS FE 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
OC_STICKYt -0.048*** -0.022***  -0.042*** -0.029*** 
 [-4.59] [-2.77]  [-3.50] [-2.85] 
RISKt 1.592*** 0.991***  1.715*** 1.379*** 
 [8.58] [5.73]  [9.28] [8.31] 
SIZEt -0.145*** -0.537***  -0.049*** -0.062** 
 [-11.75] [-11.79]  [-4.09] [-2.15] 
LEVt 0.231 0.661**  -0.657*** -0.650*** 
 [1.23] [2.17]  [-6.13] [-6.45] 
PROFITt -0.888*** 0.680***  -0.358*** 0.876*** 
 [-6.83] [4.19]  [-3.28] [5.57] 
GROWTHt -0.772 -3.042***  -1.929** -3.129*** 
 [-1.64] [-8.78]  [-2.05] [-5.98] 
IOWNt 0.885*** 1.188***  0.714*** 0.874*** 
 [14.96] [13.73]  [10.40] [10.08] 
Constant 1.765*** 3.685***  1.106*** 1.468*** 
 [21.87] [22.06]  [10.29] [11.08] 
Firm fixed effect No Yes  No Yes 
Industry Yes No  Yes No 
Year Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 85,521 85,521  83,279 83,279 
Adj. R-squared 0.09 0.06  0.05 0.04 
Note: This table reports the results from OLS and FE regressions of the association between cost stickiness and firm 
value. Robust t-statistics are in brackets and are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. Refer to Appendix C for variable definitions. 
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Columns (1) to (4), Table 4.4 reports fixed effect results for the ‘resource adjustments’, 
whilst columns (5) to (8) report results for the ‘managerial expectations’ arguments for the 
documented relationship in Table 4.3. I hypothesized that rational investors might understand  
managerial decision to retain slack resources in the presence of declining demand to minimize 
resource adjustment costs and, hence, may not penalize the firm. However, I find no such evidence. 
If anything, I find a value-destroying effect of retaining slack resources for all but the low AIN 
group for which the coefficient on OC_STICKY is insignificant. The coefficients are negative and 
significant for the high AIN group (coefficient -0.025, p<0.05) and for both the low EIN 
(coefficient -0.017, p<0.05) and the high EIN (coefficient -0.025, p<0.10) groups.  
With respect to the ‘managerial expectation’ hypothesis, I again fail to find evidence 
supporting ‘rational investor behaviour’. Greater cost stickiness during both the optimistic 
(coefficient -0.025, p<0.05, column (5)) and pessimistic (coefficient -0.025, p<0.010, column (6)) 
scenarios appear to affect firm value adversely when SUCDEC is used as the proxy for managerial 
expectation. However, when I use the macro-economic business cycle (OCED) as the proxy for 
managerial expectation, I find the decline in firm value due to cost stickiness is prevalent only 
during the recessionary period (coefficients -0.026, p < 0.01). This could indicate that rational 
investors penalize firms retaining slack resources during a recessionary period only. Overall, the 
findings from Panel A, Table 4.4 supports H1.          
The FE regression results related to H1, on whether the existence of agency problem affect 
the association between firm value and cost stickiness, are reported in panel B of Table 4.4. For 
agency problem proxies CAPX and ACQ I find evidence that cost stickiness destroys firm value 
for high agency problem groups only. For example, the coefficient on OC_STICKY is -0.024 
(p<0.10, column 2) and -0.022 (p<0.05, column 4) for the CAPX and ACQ-based agency measures, 
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respectively. However, I fail to find significant result using FXP, probably owing to a much smaller 
sample size as well as the inherent limitation of the proxy used. For example, Hall and Liebman 
(1998) and Brüggen and Zehnder (2014) show that more variable pay of executives is better at 
aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. The result indicates that agency problem 
strengthens the negative association between cost stickiness and firm value. Thereby, the result 
implies that retention of slack resources for managerial empire-building reasons instead of 
disposing of them when demand decreases, destroys firm value. For brevity I report only the FE 















Table 4.4: Cost Stickiness and Firm Value  
Panel A: Test of cost stickiness and firm value: resource adjustment and managerial expectation  
 Resource Adjustment Managerial Expectation 
















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
OC_STICKYt 0.002 -0.025** -0.017** -0.025* -0.025** -0.025* -0.018 -0.026*** 
 [0.23] [-2.35] [-2.05] [-1.81] [-2.53] [-1.89] [-1.28] [-2.60] 
RISKt 0.830*** 1.508*** 1.110*** 1.103*** 1.521*** 0.639 1.177*** 1.091*** 
 [4.47] [5.92] [7.14] [4.12] [7.83] [1.64] [3.82] [5.55] 
SIZEt -0.396*** -0.587*** -0.473*** -0.624*** -0.509*** -0.544*** -0.551*** -0.451*** 
 [-5.13] [-11.43] [-11.41] [-10.31] [-9.23] [-6.66] [-6.72] [-11.63] 
LEVt 0.553 0.417 0.528 0.371 0.191 1.163** 0.316 0.544* 
 [1.41] [1.57] [1.40] [1.20] [0.64] [2.35] [0.59] [1.71] 
PROFITt 2.940*** -0.151 2.717*** 0.022 1.143*** 0.289 0.700** 1.017*** 
 [15.24] [-0.99] [11.42] [0.11] [2.82] [0.81] [2.17] [5.47] 
GROWTHt -2.653*** -3.234*** -2.919*** -2.470*** -4.098*** -1.693*** -3.080*** -3.363*** 
 [-6.52] [-6.31] [-6.87] [-4.76] [-8.17] [-3.83] [-6.57] [-8.01] 
IOWNt 0.794*** 1.365*** 0.841*** 1.407*** 0.997*** 1.192*** 1.106*** 1.089*** 
 [8.04] [11.24] [9.56] [10.54] [11.44] [7.68] [8.69] [11.14] 
Constant 2.432*** 4.529*** 3.121*** 4.072*** 3.484*** 3.381*** 3.800*** 3.197*** 
 [8.61] [20.24] [16.97] [19.16] [15.97] [12.13] [12.92] [23.82] 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry No No No No No No No No 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 48,333 37,188 45,015 40,506 59,759 23,133 41,493 44,028 
Adj. R-squared 0.14 0.07 0.15 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.08 
Note: This table reports the results from FE regressions of the association between cost stickiness and firm value. Robust t-statistics are in brackets and are based 












Panel B: Test of cost stickiness and firm value: agency perspective   
 CAPX ACQ FXP 
 Low agency High Agency Low agency High Agency Low agency High Agency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OC_STICKYt -0.014 -0.024* -0.065 -0.022** -0.019 -0.015 
 [-1.31] [-1.95] [-0.46] [-2.55] [-1.36] [-1.34] 
RISKt 1.401*** 0.681** -0.772 0.994*** 0.572 0.500 
 [6.61] [2.57] [-0.32] [5.62] [1.29] [1.59] 
SIZEt -0.499*** -0.553*** -1.131** -0.533*** -0.496*** -0.565*** 
 [-11.36] [-6.09] [-2.09] [-11.21] [-5.60] [-10.36] 
LEVt 0.395* 1.201* 0.689 0.533* 0.677 -0.190 
 [1.79] [1.95] [0.40] [1.81] [0.67] [-0.85] 
PROFITt 0.328 1.376*** -0.601 0.666*** 2.631*** 4.194*** 
 [1.54] [5.01] [-0.35] [3.92] [3.75] [13.63] 
GROWTHt -1.702*** -4.509*** -9.989 -2.858*** -5.033*** -5.328*** 
 [-3.68] [-8.91] [-1.31] [-8.24] [-4.14] [-6.45] 
IOWNt 1.260*** 1.022*** 0.261 1.178*** 0.692*** 0.336** 
 [11.32] [7.84] [0.15] [13.54] [3.00] [2.49] 
Constant 3.584*** 3.599*** 5.624*** 3.662*** 4.089*** 5.050*** 
 [19.28] [10.81] [3.52] [21.06] [9.15] [13.43] 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry No No No No No No 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 40,066 44,626 1,136 81,226 11,293 11,594 
Adj. R-squared 0.06 0.08 0.35 0.06 0.16 0.30 
Note: This table reports the results from FE regressions of the association between cost stickiness and firm value. Robust t-statistics are in brackets 










I report the mediating test results (H2) in Table 4.5. Column (1) reports regression result of 
equation (4.3a) whilst columns (2) to (4) report results for equations (4.3b) and (4.3c). The same 
approach is followed in columns (5) to (7) with the only difference being in column (2) where I 
have used COE_PEG as the MV_COE proxy; whereas, in column (5) I have used COE_MPEG as 
the MV_COE proxy. Column (1) shows that the coefficient on OC_STICKY is negative and 
significant (coefficient -0.028, p < 0.10), consistent with results in column (1), Table 4.3 (note that 
the coefficient is smaller than -0.048 reported in Table 4.3 because of a substantial drop in the 
sample size). Column (2) documents a significant positive relation between cost stickiness 
(OC_STICKY) and COE_PEG (coefficient 0.002, p < 0.01), indicating that cost stickiness induces 
a higher cost of equity. This is justified because, as earnings become more volatile, investors are 
unable to use current earnings to predict future earnings and, therefore, require higher return on 
their investments. Column (3) shows a significant negative relation between OC_STICKY and FCF 
(coefficient -0.002, p < 0.01) implying that cost stickiness decreases free cash flow. A decrease in 
cash flow is expected when slack resources are retained in the face of declining demand because 
obligatory contractual payments continue to be paid off. Column (4) shows the coefficient on 
OC_STICKY is negative and significant but smaller in magnitude than that reported in column (1), 
implying a partial mediation effect. Overall, I find evidence supporting H2 that the decrease in firm 
value due to cost stickiness is partially mediated through both the cost of equity and free cash flow 








Table 4.5: Mediating Effect of Cost of Equity and Cash Flow 
 TOBINQ COE_PEG FCF TOBINQ COE_MPEG FCF TOBINQ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
OC_STICKYt -0.028* 0.002*** -0.002*** -0.021** 0.002*** -0.002*** -0.019** 
 [-1.92] [3.67] [-2.59] [-2.46] [4.53] [-2.58] [-2.23] 
COEt - - - -4.838*** - - -4.586*** 
    [-37.22]   [-37.33] 
FCFt - - - -0.501*** - - -0.433*** 
    [-5.30]   [-4.59] 
RISKt 1.710*** - -0.117*** 2.292*** - -0.121*** 2.243*** 
 [5.43]  [-12.52] [17.13]  [-12.96] [16.78] 
SIZEt 0.029** -0.010*** 0.004*** -0.013*** -0.009*** 0.004*** -0.014*** 
 [2.51] [-39.22] [11.18] [-2.65] [-35.56] [10.91] [-2.75] 
LEVt -0.715*** 0.068*** -0.066*** -0.465*** 0.072*** -0.065*** -0.463*** 
 [-3.54] [33.49] [-24.67] [-12.08] [33.50] [-24.62] [-12.01] 
PROFITt 5.872*** - 0.322*** 5.390*** - 0.325*** 5.342*** 
 [25.40]  [66.19] [69.16]  [66.64] [68.09] 
GROWTHt -2.814*** - -1.152*** -3.348*** - -1.134*** -2.013*** 
 [-4.80]  [-35.90] [-7.26]  [-35.32] [-4.33] 
IOWNt 0.150*** -0.034*** 0.016*** -0.018 -0.039*** 0.016*** -0.027 
 [2.80] [-21.76] [7.36] [-0.60] [-23.31] [7.33] [-0.90] 
BETAt - 0.007*** - - 0.006*** - - 
  [14.99]   [12.10]   
BTMt - 0.045*** - - 0.051*** - - 
  [56.04]   [59.67]   
ZSCOREt - -0.000*** - - -0.000*** - - 
  [-5.48]   [-5.12]   
DACt - 0.002** - - 0.002** - - 
  [2.06]   [1.99]   
Constant -0.102 0.143*** 0.063*** 0.839*** 0.150*** 0.063*** 0.854*** 
 [-0.80] [29.19] [8.98] [8.34] [28.88] [9.05] [8.48] 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,909 21,909 21,909 21,909 21,909 21,909 21,909 
Adj. R-squared 0.31 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.28 0.28 0.32 
Direct effect - - - -0.021** - - -0.019** 
Indirect effect 
(COE) 
- - - -0.008*** - - -0.009*** 
Indirect effect 
(FCF) 
- - - 0.001** - - 0.001** 
Total effects - - - -0.028*** - - -0.028*** 
Note: This table reports regressions results of the mediation effect of cost of equity and cash flow on the association 
between cost stickiness and firm value. Robust t-statistics are in brackets and are based on standard errors that are 






4.3.3 Additional test  
I conduct additional analyses for each of the main components of operating costs, i.e. SGA and 
COGS, using equation (1). Results are reported in Table 4.6. Columns (1) to (4) use TOBINQ, 
whilst columns (5) to (8) use Qtot as the proxy for firm value. Both the OLS and FE results are 
reported in the table. From columns (3) and (7) I find the SGA_STICKY is significant and negatively 
related to both TOBINQ (coefficients -0.012, p < 0.01) and Qtot (coefficients -0.010, p < 0.05). 
Results reported in columns (4) and (8) demonstrate that COGS_STICKY is also significant and 
negatively related to both TOBINQ (coefficients -0.036, p < 0.01) and Qtot (coefficients -0.033, p 
< 0.01). Thus, I find further evidence that both SGA and COGS stickiness destroys firm value.     
 
4.3.4 Robustness test 
To mitigate the endogeneity concern in this study I have conducted a robustness check by replacing 
all the variables with the change version of the respective variable. The endogeneity concern could 
stem from some unobservable factors driving both cost stickiness and firm value simultaneously. 
In Table 4.7 I use change in TOBINQ (Panel A) and Qtot (Panel B) as the dependent variable. The 
results from both panels show that the coefficients on ΔSTICKY continue to be negative and 
significant across all three STICKY (OC_STICKY, SGA_STICKY and COGS_STICKY) 
specifications. For example, the OLS coefficients are (-0.020, p<0.01; -0.011, p < 0.01 and -0.017, 
p < 0.01) and the FE coefficients are (-0.015, p<0.05; -0.007, p<0.05 and -0.011, p<0.10) for the 
regression models: results that are consistent with the main findings. The results, therefore, 




          
         Table 4.6: Cost Stickiness and Firm Value: Alternative cost components   
Dependent Variable: TOBINQ  Qtot 
 OLS FE  OLS FE 
 SGA COGS SGA COGS  SGA COGS SGA COGS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
STICKYt -0.004 -0.079*** -0.012*** -0.036***  -0.002 -0.062*** -0.010** -0.033*** 
 [-0.68] [-8.05] [-3.01] [-4.64]  [-0.30] [-5.50] [-2.46] [-3.18] 
RISKt 1.356*** 1.566*** 0.833*** 1.056***  1.231*** 1.634*** 1.088*** 1.443*** 
 [7.16] [8.67] [4.26] [6.03]  [8.19] [8.87] [7.92] [8.22] 
SIZEt -0.100*** -0.147*** -0.445*** -0.529***  -0.000 -0.046*** -0.045* -0.076*** 
 [-7.54] [-12.37] [-10.05] [-12.10]  [-0.05] [-4.19] [-1.74] [-2.66] 
LEVt 0.179 0.196 0.617 0.483*  -0.454*** -0.637*** -0.477*** -0.728*** 
 [0.83] [1.18] [1.54] [1.77]  [-5.00] [-6.49] [-5.68] [-8.16] 
PROFITt -0.403** -0.861*** 0.943*** 0.632***  0.308** -0.383*** 1.266*** 0.727*** 
 [-1.98] [-8.36] [3.94] [4.88]  [2.38] [-3.66] [5.75] [4.78] 
GROWTHt -0.497 -0.628 -2.977*** -2.714***  -1.549** -2.574*** -2.721*** -2.956*** 
 [-0.97] [-1.31] [-7.79] [-8.04]  [-2.00] [-3.66] [-7.64] [-5.97] 
IOWNt 0.713*** 0.885*** 1.025*** 1.140***  0.486*** 0.694*** 0.665*** 0.818*** 
 [11.88] [15.35] [10.31] [13.87]  [9.60] [10.60] [10.05] [9.48] 
Constant 1.507*** 1.777*** 3.170*** 3.685***  0.710*** 1.078*** 0.996*** 1.536*** 
 [18.30] [23.00] [21.17] [23.11]  [8.03] [10.52] [8.40] [11.52] 
Firm fixed effect No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes No No  Yes Yes No No 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 65,621 84,171 65,621 84,171  64,244 82,003 64,244 82,003 
Adj. R-squared 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.07  0.05 0.06 0.07 0.04 
Note: This table reports the results from OLS and FE regressions of the association between cost stickiness and firm value. Robust t-statistics are in 









        Table 4.7: Change in Cost Stickiness and Firm Value 
         Panel A: Dependent variable - TOBINQ 
 OLS FE 
 OC SGA COGS OC SGA COGS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ΔSTICKYt -0.020*** -0.011*** -0.017*** -0.015** -0.007** -0.011* 
 [-2.94] [-3.33] [-2.98] [-2.44] [-2.42] [-1.88] 
ΔRISKt 1.089*** 0.848*** 1.095*** 1.137*** 0.872*** 1.164*** 
 [8.41] [6.49] [9.10] [8.84] [6.98] [9.60] 
ΔSIZEt -1.258*** -1.040*** -1.082*** -1.402*** -1.074*** -1.221*** 
 [-7.98] [-6.85] [-11.01] [-6.70] [-5.36] [-9.25] 
ΔLEVt 1.507*** 1.681** 1.100** 1.374** 0.978 1.211** 
 [2.60] [2.26] [2.47] [2.31] [1.36] [2.35] 
ΔPROFITt 0.998*** 1.027*** 0.993*** 1.478*** 1.510*** 1.547*** 
 [7.56] [5.72] [6.05] [9.85] [4.85] [7.74] 
ΔGROWTHt -2.617*** -2.639*** -2.117*** -2.712*** -2.370*** -2.217*** 
 [-9.36] [-7.44] [-8.45] [-8.55] [-6.11] [-7.52] 
ΔIOWNt 1.431*** 1.294*** 1.390*** 1.318*** 1.123*** 1.300*** 
 [11.41] [9.73] [13.29] [10.53] [8.62] [11.91] 
Constant 0.141*** 0.110*** 0.131*** 0.194*** 0.164*** 0.165*** 
 [4.95] [3.71] [4.32] [6.66] [5.86] [5.98] 
Firm fixed effect No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 68,585 47,097 66,794 68,585 47,097 66,794 
Adj. R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.11 
Note: This table reports the results from OLS and FE regressions of the association between change in cost stickiness and firm value. Robust t-










Panel B: Dependent variable – Qtot 
 OLS FE 
 OC SGA COGS OC SGA COGS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ΔSTICKYt -0.032*** -0.009*** -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.007** -0.025*** 
 [-4.25] [-3.25] [-3.95] [-3.59] [-2.43] [-3.64] 
ΔRISKt 1.366*** 0.887*** 1.373*** 1.364*** 0.872*** 1.406*** 
 [10.51] [8.88] [11.07] [10.70] [8.29] [11.26] 
ΔSIZEt 0.151*** 0.108* 0.130** 0.194*** 0.081 0.184*** 
 [2.72] [1.79] [2.29] [2.76] [1.08] [2.60] 
ΔLEVt -0.275*** -0.228*** -0.306*** -0.189* -0.225*** -0.283*** 
 [-3.62] [-3.34] [-4.14] [-1.91] [-2.60] [-2.84] 
ΔPROFITt 0.601*** 0.776*** 0.575*** 1.028*** 1.291*** 0.817*** 
 [4.66] [4.54] [4.90] [6.53] [5.37] [5.75] 
ΔGROWTHt -1.920*** -1.620*** -1.497*** -1.842*** -1.283*** -1.501*** 
 [-7.49] [-6.40] [-5.79] [-6.56] [-4.82] [-5.68] 
ΔIOWNt 1.126*** 0.886*** 1.105*** 1.123*** 0.868*** 1.131*** 
 [12.51] [11.25] [11.76] [11.97] [10.74] [11.33] 
Constant -0.013 0.004 -0.001 -0.129*** -0.026 -0.093** 
 [-0.33] [0.11] [-0.01] [-2.98] [-0.90] [-2.41] 
Firm fixed effect No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 65,580 45,303 63,949 65,580 45,303 63,949 
Adj. R-squared 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.05 
Note: This table reports the results from OLS and FE regressions of the association between change in cost stickiness and firm value. Robust t-







4.4 Chapter Summary  
In this study, I investigate the association between cost stickiness and firm value of U.S. listed 
companies from 1982 to 2016, and the mediating effects of cost of equity and cash flow channels 
on this association. The overall finding is that cost stickiness affects firm value adversely, and is 
prevalent in firms with marked agency problems. Further, I find evidence that this negative 
association between cost stickiness and firm value is partially mediated through both the cost of 
equity channel and the cash flow channel. This study not only contributes to the existing limited 
literature related to implications of cost stickiness (management accounting) but also extends that 
literature by integrating financial accounting (firm value) and corporate finance (cost of equity and 

















5.1 Conclusion  
This research aims to offer insight into the extant literature on cost stickiness. I investigate when 
firms face financial constraint how the managers manage cost during declining sales. Similarly, 
when firms rely heavily on trade credit to finance operations how the managers manage cost during 
declining sales. It also offers insight into the implication of such cost management on overall firm 
value.  
As resources drive the cost of a business, and financial constraints affect resource 
availability, my study (Essay One) also enriches the financing constraints literature. This study 
challenges the notion that cost stickiness/less stickiness is always either good or bad, instead shows 
that such judgements are dependent on the managerial incentives for managing unutilized 
resources. For instance, Kama and Weiss (2013) show that managers cut back resources to meet 
earnings benchmarks; whereas, I document that this incentive does not force financially 
constrained firms to reduce slack resources. In line with the assertions by Caggese et al. (2019) and 
Musso and Schiavo (2008), I show, empirically, that constrained firms shed value-creating SG&A 
costs for survival, which might be efficient (good) in the short-term, but detrimental (bad) for their 
growth in the long-term. In this study, I could not find any relationship between cost stickiness and 
agency problem, in financially constrained firms. I encourage future research to further investigate 
this important issue. The overall conjecture is that for constrained firms, survival takes precedence 
over empire building. However, how this cost-cutting affects a constrained firm’s future growth 
and financial performance, remains a fruitful avenue for future research.   
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One of the critical implications of my findings is that managers should be cautious in using 
the assumptions of the traditional cost model, as this study provides evidence for SG&A cost 
stickiness. Moreover, managers should consider the macroeconomic cycle when estimating and 
planning product costs, as the study provides strong evidence that SG&A cost behaviour is less 
sticky during both economic expansion and economic contraction periods, although the effect is 
more pronounced during contraction.  
Essay Two reconfirms the suppliers’ monitoring role attributable to their access to the 
internal information of customers through trade credit financing. The results of my study have 
important implications for shareholders. Prior studies document that suppliers extend trade credit, 
even to unprofitable firms, if they believe clients have high sales potential, because that would 
bring them higher future profit (see, e.g. Goto et al., 2015; Petersen & Rajan, 1997). Therefore, 
managers should try to build long-term relations with suppliers, as this will not only boost their 
operation, but will also ensure efficient cost management through suppliers’ external governance 
role. Investors should consider the use of trade credit as a signal of efficient cost management and, 
hence, better firm performance. Other stakeholders, such as customers and employees, too, may 
place increased trust in firms with more trade credit, because of its associated monitoring benefit, 
i.e., efficient cost management. Therefore, while trade credit is an expensive source of finance, 
managers should use it more, because this will help to attract external capital at a cheaper cost, 
owing to investors’ increased confidence.  
Essay Three explores the relationship between cost stickiness and firm value and, to the 
best of my knowledge, this is the first study to do so. Weiss (2010) finds that forecast accuracy 
decreases for firms with cost stickiness, thereby, increasing forecast dispersion emanating from 
more uncertainty in estimating firm earnings. Because forecast dispersion increases the cost of 
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equity capital (Dhaliwal et al., 2016), it is intuitive to argue that, by reducing cost stickiness, firms 
are likely to reduce the cost of capital as well. Although, Weiss (2010) shows that investors 
understand cost stickiness, the three-day CAR surrounding the earnings announcement as proxy 
for market response can be noisy, as stock prices adjust slowly to the new information that such a 
short-time window is unable to capture (Kothari, 2001; Fama, 1998). I, therefore, test for a long-
term effect, and also test whether existing theories on asymmetric cost behaviour help explain the 
adverse effect of cost stickiness on firm value. This study, therefore, provides insight and 
understanding into how managers’ deliberate resource adjustment decisions affect firms’ overall 
financial health and value. Perhaps, managers need to be more transparent about their resource 
adjustment decisions, so that investors can incorporate both resource adjustment costs and 
managerial expectations of future demand, when doing risk assessments related to their investment 
decisions. 
 
5.2 Limitations & Scope   
My study is subject to a few limitations which future research might attempt to overcome. One 
shortcoming relates to the timing of when firms become financially constrained. It might be 
construed that firms with resources to shed when facing sales declines, would not have been 
constrained in the prior period. Severely constrained firms, on the other hand, may not even have 
had the resources in the first place and, therefore, would not exhibit a decrease in costs. This 
suggests a nonlinear effect of financial constraints, which might be addressed in future research.  
Although several variables were included to ensure that results reflect the monitoring 
aspects of trade credit, rather than resource adjustments and/or managerial expectations, it is 
acknowledged that omitted correlated variables could affect the findings reported in this study. For 
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example, I did not include managerial overconfidence as a possible factor moderating the trade 
credit-cost stickiness relationship, owing to the lack of accessible data. Future research could 
explore the substitutive versus the complementary relationship between trade credit and other 
informal corporate governance mechanisms. For example, in a recent study, Hasan and Habib 
(2019) document that firms domiciled in high social capital counties rely less on trade credit. This 
evidence, therefore, appears to suggest that the monitoring effect of trade credit in inducing less 
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VARIABLE DEFINITIONS – ESSAY ONE 











) Natural log of change in sales or revenue (Compustat data item SALE) 
DECDUM  A dummy variable which takes the value of one when sales in year t are less than those 
in year t-1 and zero otherwise 
SA I follow Hadlock and Pierce (2010) and use SA Index as my financing constraint measure. 
They find that leverage, cash flow and, particularly, firm size and firm age are useful 
predictors of financial constraints. SA index is derived using the formula:  
-0.737*SIZE+0.043*SIZE2-0.040*AGE.  
SIZE Natural log of total assets (Compustat data item AT)  
AGE Number of years the firm is listed on Compustat 
WW The financing constraints measure developed by Whited and Wu (2006). The WW index 
is a linear combination of six empirical factors: cash flow to total assets (−), sales growth 
(−), long-term debt to total assets (+), log of total assets (−), dividend policy indicator 
(−), and the firm’s three-digit industry sales growth (+) 
CF Cash flow (Compustat data item IB plus DP) divided by total assets (Compustat data item 
AT) 
DIVPOS A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm pays dividends (Compustat data item DVC plus 
DVP) and 0 otherwise 
TLTD Long-term debt (Compustat data item DLTT) divided by total assets (Compustat data 
item AT) 
LNTA Natural log of total assets (Compustat data item AT) 
ISG Firm’s three-digit SIC code industry annual sales growth 
SG Firm’s annual sales growth  
BLM Bondnaruk et al. (2015) text based measure of financial constraint.  
SUDEC Successive decrease is a dummy variable which is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 
if revenue in year t-1 is less than revenue in t-2, and 0 otherwise 
AIN Asset intensity calculated total assets (Compustat data item AT) divided by sales 
(Compustat data item SALE) 
EIN Employee intensity is the ratio of total number of employees (Compustat data item EMP) 
over sales 
RET Stock performance or raw stock return from CRSP  
AVOID Dummy variable that equals 1 if annual earnings (Compustat data item NI) deflated by 
market capitalization of shareholders’ equity (Compustat data item PRCC_F x CSHO) at 
prior year end is in the interval [0, 0.01], and 0 otherwise 
EDEC Dummy variable that equals 1 if the change in annual earnings (Compustat data item NI) 
deflated by market capitalization of shareholders’ equity (Compustat data item PRCC_F 
x CSHO) at prior year end is in the interval [0, 0.01], and 0 otherwise 
FXP Ratio of salary plus bonus (ExecuComp data item SALARY plus BONUS) divided by 
total compensation (ExecuComp data item TDC1) during the year. A dummy variable 
was created which takes the value of one when FXP<median FXP (high agency problem 
group) and zero otherwise (low agency problem group). 
TAGRWOTH Total asset growth, measured as total assets (Compustat data item AT) in year t minus 
total assets in year t-1, deflated by total assets in year t-1. A dummy variable was created 
which takes the value of one when TAGROWTH=>median TAGROWTH (high agency 






Variables  Definition 
SG&A_FV Industry-specific future value creation of SG&A, obtained from Table 2 of Banker et al. 
(2011). A dummy variable was created which takes the value of one when 
SG&A_FV>median SG&A_FV and zero otherwise. One indicates high future value-














































VARIABLE DEFINITIONS – ESSAY TWO 










) Natural log of change in selling, general and administrative expenses (Compustat 





) Natural log of change in sales or revenue (Compustat data item SALE) 
DECDUM  A dummy variable which takes the value of one when sales in year t are less than 
those in year t-1 and zero otherwise 
SUDEC Successive decrease is a dummy variable which is an indicator variable that is 
equal to 1 if revenue in year t-1 is less than revenue in t-2, and 0 otherwise 
GDP GDP growth in year t. Data available at https://www.bea.gov/  
AIN Asset intensity calculated total assets (Compustat data item AT) divided by sales 
(Compustat data item SALE) 
EIN Employee intensity is the ratio of total number of employees (Compustat data item 
EMP) over sales (Compustat data item SALE) 
RET Stock performance or raw stock return from CRSP  
OSLACK Industry-adjusted cash-to-cash = days in inventory + days in receivables – days in 
payables 
where days in inventory = 365 (average inventory/ cost of goods sold); days in 
receivables = 365(average accounts receivables/ sales); days in payables = 365 
(average accounts payable/ cost of goods sold). Then industry-adjusted cash-to-
cash cycle is calculated by taking the difference between industry mean cash-to-
cash cycle and the cash-to-cash cycle of the firm 
TC1  Ratio of accounts payable (Compustat data item AP) to cost of goods sold 
(Compustat data item COGS) 
TC2 Ratio of accounts payable (Compustat data item AP) to sales (Compustat data item 
SALE) 
TC3 Ratio of accounts payable (Compustat data item AP) to purchase (PURCHASE)  
PURCHASE Purchase is COGS (Compustat data item COGS) added with difference between 
end (year t) and beginning (year t-1) of the year inventory (Compustat data item 
INVT) 
CAPEX Capital expenditures, measured as capital expenditure (Compustat data item 
CAPX) scaled by total assets (Compustat data item AT) 
CAPEX_D A dummy variable which takes the value of one when CAPEX>median CAPEX 
and zero otherwise. One indicates high agency problem and zero indicates low 
agency problem.  
ACQRATIO Acquisition ratio, measured as the sum of the value of all acquisitions made by a 
firm in a year (Compustat data item AQC), scaled by firm’s total market 
capitalization (Compustat data item PRCC_F x CSHO) 
ACQRATIO_D A dummy variable which takes the value of one when ACQRATIO>median 
ACQRATIO and zero otherwise. One indicates high agency problem and zero 
indicates low agency problem.  
PMC Following the Li et al. (2013) and Li and Zheng (2017) methodology, the PMC 
variable is ranked into deciles, and then standardized to lie between 0 and 1, where 
0 is a low PMC and 1 is a high PMC. Data is available at 
http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/feng/ 
CC Customer concentration is an indicator variable coded 1 if a supplier discloses at 






VARIABLE DEFINITIONS – ESSAY THREE 
Variables Definition of measurement  
Firm value variables  
TOBINQ Tobin’s Q, measured as Compustat data item [AT+(CSHOxPRCC_F)-CEQ-TXDB]/AT 
Qtot Measured by scaling firm value by the sum of physical and intangible capital using Peters 
and Taylor (2017) methodology (explained in detail in section 4.2)  
  
Sticky variables   
OC_STICKY Sticky measure of operating cost (OC) using equation (2) explained in section 3.1. OC is 
calculated as Compustat data item SALEQ minus IBQ 
SGA_STICKY Sticky measure of selling, general and administrative cost (Compustat data item XSGAQ) 
using equation (2) explained in section 3.1 
COGS_STICKY Sticky measure of cost of goods sold (Compustat data item COGSQ) using equation (2) 
explained in section 3.1  
  
Control variables  
RISK Firm risk, calculated as the standard deviation of monthly share returns (CRSP) 
SIZE Firm size, calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets (Compustat data item AT) 
LEV Leverage, measured as book debt (Compustat data item DLC plus DLTT) divided by total 
assets (Compustat data item AT) 
PROFIT Profit, measured as operating income before depreciation (Compustat data item OIBDP) 
divided by total assets (Compustat data item AT) 
GROWTH Firm growth or investment opportunities calculated as dividend per share (Compustat 
data item [DVC/CSHO]) dividend by end-of year share price (Compustat data item 
PRCC_F) 
IOWN Percentage of common shares held by institutional investors retrieved from Thomson 
Reuter’s F13 File  
  
Mediating variables   
COE_PEG Implied cost of equity, estimated by PEG model of Easton (2004). Data collected from 
IBES and Compustat. 
𝑃𝐸𝐺 =  √(𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+2 − 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1)/𝑃𝑡                                     (A.1) 
where 𝑃𝑡 = the market price per share at time t (Compustat data item PRCC_F); 
𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+𝑖 = median forecasted earnings per share (EPS) of a firm for the year i at time t.. 
COE_MPEG Implied cost of equity, estimated by MPEG model of Easton (2004). Data collected from 
IBES and Compustat. 
 
𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺 =  √(𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+2 + 𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺 ∗ 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡 − 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1)/𝑃𝑡          (A.2) 
where 𝐷𝑃𝑆 = the current payout ratio (Compustat data item [DVPSP_F] 
dividend by [IBCOM/CSHO]) following Gupta et al. (2018). Following Gupta et al. 
(2018) I use a return on assets of 6% if the denominator is negative. I winsorize to be 
within 0 and 1. Other variables are defined as before.  
FCF Free cash flow is measured as cash flow from operating activities less common and 
preferred dividends scaled by total assets (Compustat data item OANCF minus DVC 
minus DVP over AT) 
  
Control variables for COE 
BETA Market beta calculated from regression using monthly returns with returns of the CRSP 
value weighted index (including dividends) as the return on the market index using at 
least 36 months  
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BTM Book value to market value of equity measured as Compustat data item [CEQ/( 
CSHOxPRCC_F)] 
ZSCORE Altman’s Z score calculated as 1.2(Compustat data item ACT minus LCT over AT) + 1.4 
(Compustat data item RE over AT) + 3.3(Compustat data item EBIT over AT) + 0.6 
(Compustat data item [CSHOxPRCC_F] over [DLTT+DLC]) + 1 (Compustat data 
itemSALE over AT)  
DAC The absolute value of discretionary accrual, generated from the performance-matched 
modified Jones model (Kothari et al., 2005). I estimate the model for all firms in the same 




=  𝛿0 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) +  𝛿1 (
∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) +  𝛿2 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) +  𝛿3(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1)
+  𝑖,𝑡   
(A.3) 
              where ACC is the total accruals calculated as (Compustat data item IB minus 
OANCF) in year t and TA is total assets (Compustat data item AT) in year t-1. ∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸 is 
the change in sales (Compustat data item SALE) in year t; ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶 is the change in accounts 
receivables (Compustat data item RECT) in year t; PPE is the value of property, plant 
and equipment (Compustat data item PPEGT) at year t; and ROA is return on assets 
calculated as (Compustat data item IB scaled by AT) in year t-1. Non-discretionary 
accruals is the predicted value from the above equation, with DAC representing the 
residuals        
  
Resource adjustment proxies 
AIN Asset intensity calculated as total assets (Compustat data item AT) divided by sales 
(Compustat data item SALE) 
EIN Employee intensity is the ratio of total number of employees (Compustat data item EMP) 
over sales 
 
Managerial expectation proxies 
SUCDEC A dummy variable which is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if revenue in year t-1 
is less than revenue in t-2, and 0 otherwise 
OECD OECD Composite Leading Indicators 
  
Agency problem proxies 
CAPX Capital expenditure, measured as capital expenditure (Compustat data item CAPX) 
scaled by total assets (Compustat data item AT)  
ACQ Acquisition ratio, measured as the sum of the value of all acquisitions made by a firm in 
a year (Compustat data item AQC), scaled by firm’s total market capitalization 
(Compustat data item PRCC_F x CSHO)  
FXP Ratio of salary plus bonus (ExecuComp data item SALARY plus BONUS) divided by 
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